The Road to Bali: ERIA Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration by Fukunaga, Yoshifumi et al.
THE ROAD TO BALI:
ERIA Perspectives on the 
WTO Ministerial and Asian 
Integration
An ERIA - UPH - WTI e-book
ERIA Research Project Report 2012, No. 31
Editors: Yoshifumi Fukunaga, John Riady, Pierre Sauvé
1 
 
Contents 
 
Foreword 
Hidetoshi Nishimura, Executive Director, ERIA 
 
I. Introduction and Overview  
Yoshifumi Fukunaga (ERIA), John Riady (UPH) and Pierre Sauvé (WTI) 
 
II. Contributions from ERIA Research Institute Network (RIN) Members 
 
1. China, Zhang Yunling, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
2. Korea, Jin Kyo Suh, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)  
3. Singapore, Hank Lim, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)  
4. Japan, Daisuke Hiratsuka, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE/JETRO) 
5. Cambodia, Vannarith Chheang, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and 
Peace (CICP)  
6. New Zealand, Gary Hawke, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
(NZIER) 
7. The Philippines, Erlinda M. Medalla, Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS) 
8. Vietnam, Vo Tri Thanh, Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) 
9. Indonesia, Yose Rizal Damuri, Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS)  
10. Myanmar, Sandar Oo and Zin Zin Naing, Yangon Institute of 
Economics (YIE) 
11. India, Biswajit Dhar, Research and Information System for Developing 
Countries (RIS) 
12. Malaysia, Zakariah Rashid, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research 
(MIER) 
13. Lao PDR, Leeber Leebouapao, National Economic Research Institute 
(NERI) 
14. Australia, Malcolm Bosworth, Greg Cutbush and Jenny Corbett, 
Australian National University (ANU) 
15. Indonesia, Simon Lacey, Pelita Harapan University (UPH) 
  
  
About the editors 
About the sponsoring institutions  
  
2 
 
Box, Table and Figures 
 
Box 1. Trade facilitation initiatives in ASEAN ……. P. 10 
 
Table 1. Trade facilitation provisions in ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs …… P. 36 
 
Figure 1. Logistics restrictiveness indices, selected economies …… P. 101 
Figure 2. Bilateral and Regional FTAs in East Asia …… P. 112 
 
  
3 
 
Foreword 
I am delighted to launch this new e-book, “The Road to Bali: ERIA Perspectives on 
the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration”. This is the first product from the 
collaboration of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), 
UPH (Universitas Pelita Harapan), and the World Trade Institute (WTI).  
 
In December this year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) will host its Ninth 
Ministerial Conference (MC9) in Bali, Indonesia. Looking back on the WTO’s young 
history, the very first ministerial conference also took place in this region, in 
Singapore in 1996. Over the past 17 years, we have witnessed significant changes. 
The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda negotiations were launched in 2001 but its 
conclusion has faced huge and recurring challenges. In the meantime, preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs), particularly bilateral ones, have offered a faster track for 
trade liberalization and market integration. Many new issues and policy agendas 
have been taken up in preferential deals. Beyond bilateral PTAs, the world has also 
recently witnessed the rise of mega-PTAs: such as the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Pacific 
Alliance, and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  
 
Although not generally considered a mega-FTA, the ASEAN Economic Community 
has provided a far broader and deeper economic integration path for the 10 ASEAN 
member states than usual PTAs. At the same time, the proliferating web of PTAs has 
become the source of a number of systemic problems, creating a veritable spaghetti 
or noodle bowl of overlapping trade disciplines and market opening commitments. 
Differing sets of rules are maintained in many areas, particularly rules of origin (ROO), 
trade-related intellectual property rights, and investment protection. Such 
developments have likely both generated and diverted trade and investment flows. 
On the other hand, preferential agreements have yielded few meaningful advances 
on thorny issues such as subsidy and related trade remedy regimes or agricultural 
trade.  
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Despite the surge of preferentialism, the WTO’s engagement has remained limited. 
The dispute settlement body has monitored some PTAs, but only a few. The WTO’s 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreement has provided an important venue for peer 
review of PTAs, but not all agreements have been thoroughly discussed.  
 
Bali has long been an epicenter of Asian regionalism. In 2003, ASEAN Leaders 
agreed on their goal of establishing the ASEAN Community (originally targeted in 
2020, now accelerated to 2015). In 2011, ASEAN Leaders proposed a new mega-
regional PTA construct – the RCEP, which brings together the ASEAN+6 members 
(Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). Heads of states have also 
recently discussed the possibility of concluding the TPP negotiations on the margins 
of the latest APEC Leaders Meeting held in Bali. It is critical for trade ministers 
gathered for MC9 in Bali to ponder the WTO’s continued relevance in a world of 
heightened preferentialism and to do so in a creative way. 
 
This e-book offers insights from East Asian scholars to help WTO Members make a 
success of the forthcoming Bali Ministerial and set the membership on a needed 
post-Bali reform path. The e-book features contributions from a number of ERIA’s 
regional institute network (RIN) members, complemented by a paper from a legal 
scholar from UPH which enriches the economists’ discussion with a legal perspective 
on the manifold challenges WTO Members confront. The e-book also features an 
introductory chapter penned by the publication’s co-editors, ERIA’s Yoshifumi 
Fukunaga, UPH’s John Riady and the WTI’s Pierre Sauvé, summarizing key 
messages and advancing a set of recommendations flowing from the analyses on 
offer.  
 
Special thanks are hereby extended to Prof. Fukunari Kimura (ERIA) and Mr. 
Nathaniel Santoso (UPH) for their support throughout the e-book’s preparation as 
well as to the WTI’s Susan Kaplan for her excellent editorial assistance. I am also 
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keen to acknowledge the precious support from the Swiss State Secretariat of 
Economic Affairs (SECO) for affording the three institutes the means to initiate their 
unique cooperation and policy dialogue.   
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank the authors of this book’s various chapters for 
enriching us with their deep insights and forward-looking proposals on how the WTO 
can best continue to underpin global prosperity and the Asian lessons WTO 
Members can usefully draw on in charting new directions for the multilateral trading 
system.   
 
 
Hidetoshi Nishimura 
Executive Director, ERIA 
Jakarta, November 2013 
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I.  Introduction and Overview 
Yoshifumi Fukunaga, John Riady and Pierre Sauvé 
 
1. Background and context of the e-book 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) will stage its ninth Ministerial Conference (MC9) 
in Bali, Indonesia, on 3-6 December 2013. The meeting comes at a critical juncture 
for the multilateral trade body, long mired in the Doha Round stalemate. Beyond 
offering a critical first test at consensus-building and institutional renewal, the Bali 
Ministerial affords a unique opportunity to gauge contrasting perceptions across 
ASEAN and East Asian countries of the continued relevance of the WTO to trade and 
economic governance within the region and beyond. 
 
Resulting from the collaborative efforts of the Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Universitas Pelita Harapan (UPH) and the World 
Trade Institute (WTI) at the University of Bern, this policy research initiative has 
sought to encourage comparative scholarship from ERIA’s Regional Institution 
Network (RIN) members1 on some of the key questions arising from the forthcoming 
WTO Ministerial gathering:  
 What do ERIA’s RIN members expect the Bali MC9 to produce by way of 
tangible outcomes? Are certain negotiating agenda items ripe for early 
harvesting?  
 How can WTO Members use the Bali MC9 to impart renewed vigor to 
multilateral cooperation (including not only rule-making and market opening 
but also multilateral surveillance and dispute settlement) in the trade field? 
 What priorities should ASEAN and East Asian countries pursue at the Bali 
Ministerial?  
 How relevant does the WTO remain to the process of deepening economic 
integration in ASEAN and East Asia, and to the trade governance priorities of 
ERIA member governments more broadly?  
                                                              
1 One more contribution was made by Simon Lacey from Universitas Pelita Harapan. 
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 How and in what areas can multilateral advances in Bali best serve and 
complement ASEAN’s march toward the realization of the ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2015? 
 Can the forthcoming launch of negotiations on a Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) among ASEAN+6 countries facilitate the 
process of multilateralizing regional advances? 
 Can ongoing negotiations towards a Trans-Pacific Partnership facilitate the 
process of extending regional advances on a multilateral basis?  
 
2. The continued relevance of the WTO 
The contributions in this e-book confirm beyond any reasonable doubt that the WTO 
retains central salience as an anchor of global trade governance. Despite the 
challenges and repeated roadblocks encountered in the conduct of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations as well as the recent surge in preferential 
economic integration initiatives throughout the region (and indeed much of the world), 
the great majority of contributors concur that the WTO continues to play an 
irreplaceable role in the governance of international trade. This was vividly expressed 
by Chinese RIN Member Prof. Zhang Yunling: 
“[I]t is vital to keep the multilateral trading system working and effective since 
no the other institution can serve the needs of both the developed and 
developing economies.” (Chapter II.1) 
The above viewpoint was reinforced by New Zealand RIN Member Prof. Gary Hawke, 
whose contribution recalls how the WTO needs to retain its role as a central 
coordinating institution in global commercial relations. It is by now a widely accepted 
reality that while preferential trade agreements can usefully pursue a trade 
liberalization and regulatory cooperation agenda, they cannot solve some of the most 
intractable challenges in contemporary trade relations. This is notably the case of 
ever morphing non-tariff barriers, trade remedies, agricultural trade, export support 
subsidies, etc. Moreover, the prevalence of weak (or weakly enforced) disciplines 
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across numerous preferential agreements carries genuine risks for global trade. As 
former UNCTAD and WTO head Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi pointed out: 
“[Too many bilateral deals] could rock the foundations of non-discrimination 
and transparency upon which the multilateral system is built. These core 
principles not only help level the playing field between developed and 
developing countries, but also make the international trading environment a 
more predictable and less complex place to do business.”2 
Several contributors concur that care must be taken, notably through a strengthening 
of multilateral disciplines and monitoring, to ensure that the continued proliferation of 
preferential market opening and rule-making initiatives – the so-called “spaghetti or 
noodle bowl” challenge remains squarely on the radar screen of multilateral 
diplomacy and that every operational means be explored and pursued for extending 
regional advances on a multilateral basis.  
 
The various contributions to this e-book strongly suggest that the multilateral trading 
system is widely seen as being at a critical crossroads, such that the Bali Ministerial 
will be a centrally important moment in the multilateral trade body’s young life. The 
Ministerial meeting affords Member countries and WTO’s new management team a 
unique opportunity to hit the “reset” button and yield a tangible, momentum-inducing, 
harvest to multilateral diplomacy.  
 
While the probable harvest on offer is often derided as “Doha-lite” and is indeed 
assuredly significantly less ambitious than the DDA’s initially lofty (and likely 
unrealistic) aims, imparting forward momentum in Bali even on a scaled down 
agenda would likely carry enormous symbolic value at a time when most forms of 
multilateral diplomacy, including beyond the trade field, face daunting prospects.  
 
As it happens, and as many contributions to this e-book usefully recall, the harvest 
that is within reach of being reaped in Bali is hardly devoid of commercial significance. 
                                                              
2 As quoted by Dr. Erlinda Medalla from PIDS, the Philippines’ RIN Member, in Chapter II.7.  
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Every effort must thus be deployed to both promote convergence on a concrete set 
of deliverables in Bali whilst also setting in motion a process of forward thinking able 
to steer the DDA towards its ultimate conclusion and set the WTO on a future reform 
path.   
 
3. The Bali Deliverables 
3.1 Towards a WTO Trade Facilitation (TF) Agreement 
Most scholars in this e-book agree that a WTO agreement on trade facilitation would 
generate large benefits for East Asia and the world economy. Such a view reflects 
the highly successful experience and ongoing efforts at implementing various TF 
initiatives in the region (see Box 1 below). Arguably more than any other region of 
the world, countries and firms in ASEAN and East Asia have in recent decades 
established strong cross-border production networks in which intermediate goods 
and services cross borders multiple times over short time spans. The manifold trade 
facilitation initiatives that have been undertaken throughout the region have greatly 
enhanced the efficiency of production networks and brought significant benefits to 
economic agents and member countries by reducing transport costs, promoting 
seamless logistics, adding density to trade routes, and facilitating linkages between 
goods and service producing sectors.  
 
Beneficiaries of stepped-up TF include not only middle-income countries like 
Malaysia, Indonesia or Thailand but also the region’s lesser developed economies, 
such as Cambodia and Lao PDR. Thanks to strengthened TF, Cambodia and Lao 
PDR have experienced significant inflows of foreign direct investment, allowing local 
producers to insert themselves in regional value chains and expand the remit of pro-
poor employment in the formal sector. Both countries have in recent years registered 
higher growth rates than the ASEAN-6 members, suggesting that the TF-induced 
expansion of production networks has been an important source of inclusive growth, 
helping the region address the challenge of development gaps. There is every 
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reason to believe that a WTO-anchored TF agenda could set a similar process in 
motion globally, such that TF should also be seen as a core element of the DDA’s 
pro-poor agenda.  
 
Box 1. Trade facilitation initiatives in ASEAN 
In their collective march towards the establishment of an ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2015, 3  most ASEAN countries have established national single 
windows (NSWs), a key first step towards creating an ASEAN-wide Single Window 
(i.e. a network of 10 NSWs). Seven ASEAN Member States have already 
operationalized their NSWs, with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar having initiated 
the requisite regulatory reforms (e.g., simplifying customs documents) to implement 
their NSWs. The ASEAN Trade Repository (linking National Trade Repositories) now 
under construction aims to ensure the transparency of trade-related regulations. 
ASEAN countries have furthermore signed several regional agreements and 
protocols to facilitate the flow of goods-in-transit and harmonized the integration 
area’s tariff nomenclature at the 8-digit level (AHTN).4 The region’s Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity adopted in 2010 lists a significant number of initiatives on 
physical connectivity (hard infrastructure), institutional connectivity (soft 
infrastructure), as well as people-to-people connectivity (movement of people). 5 
ASEAN’s concept of institutional connectivity overlaps with the WTO’s approach to 
trade facilitation. At the sub-regional level within ASEAN, the Cross-Border Transport 
Agreement (CBTA) pursued within the Greater Mekong Sub-Region initiative is 
durably enhancing cross-border procedures, for instance through single-stop 
inspections. 6  The latter initiative has subsequently been adopted by other sub-
                                                              
3 For a fuller discussion of steps towards the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community, see ERIA (2012). See 
also ASEAN (2008; 2012). 
4 In addition to them, ASEAN has undertaken a series of efforts to simplify rules of origin in AFTA and ATIGA. In 
2008, new rules of origin were adopted which allowed business to choose between regional value content or 
change in tariff classification rule. This rule was later adopted in the three ASEAN+1 FTAs (ASEAN‐Australia‐New 
Zealand, ASEAN‐Japan, and ASEAN‐Korea). ASEAN has gone further by setting‐up self‐certification programs by 
2015.  
5 The three connectivity concepts have been adopted and expanded to APEC in 2013.  
6 See Chapter II.1 (Zhang Yunling) for more detail. 
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regional initiatives within ASEAN.7  
 
East Asia has also seen a number of important trade facilitation initiatives. ASEAN 
Members have entered into several so-called “ASEAN+1” preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) with Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. All 
of the ASEAN+1 PTAs feature a broad set of trade facilitation provisions covering 
customs procedures and cooperation; technical regulations, standards and sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures; non-tariff barriers, especially administrative fees and 
charges; transparency of laws, regulations and administrative rules; and the use of 
ICT and e-commerce.8 Beyond the ASEAN region, APEC’s supply chain connectivity 
initiative adopted in 2010 has set a numerical target of a 10% improvement in supply 
chain performance measured in terms of time, costs and uncertainty by 2015. The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations currently underway also feature detailed trade 
facilitation provisions in a dedicated chapter. 
 
One recent ERIA study has shown that, through the above regional and national 
efforts, ASEAN countries have successfully improved their trade facilitation and 
logistics performance, even as they strive to reach global best practice standards.9 
The above study suggests that trade within ASEAN has derived large benefits from 
recent region-wide efforts on trade facilitation.10  
 
Remarkably, all of the above efforts, initiated as they were by a diverse group of 
developing and least developed countries, are strongly indicative of ASEAN’s deep 
understanding and belief in the economic and commercial value of sustained 
investments in trade facilitation. ASEAN’s policy dialogue and ASEAN+1 trading 
partners, as well as international organizations such as the Asian Development Bank 
                                                              
7 Those initiatives are known as the Brunei‐Indonesia‐Malaysia‐Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMP‐EAGA) 
and Indonesia‐Malaysia‐Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT‐GT). 
8 Wong and Pellan (2012). 
9 ERIA (2013).  
10 Ibid. Based on gravity model estimations, the study shows that a 1% improvement in trade facilitation and 
logistics regulatory index could lead to a 2.5‐2.7% increase in intra‐ASEAN trade. 
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and the World Bank, have offered strong support to TF efforts at the national, sub-
regional and regional level. Such trade-related technical assistance and economic 
cooperation initiatives, while not legally binding in nature, are nonetheless key 
responses to ASEAN’s collective determination to improve the region’s trade 
facilitation performance.  
 
One important aspect of trade facilitation is its almost inherently non-discriminatory 
character. Steps taken to facilitate trade (e.g., simplified customs procedures) stand 
to benefit exporters and importers all at once. The faster movement of goods across 
borders and the improved predictability and transparency of trade transactions further 
underpin the operation and efficiency of sophisticated production networks. ASEAN’s 
and East Asia’s successful advances in TF will be disseminated to the other parts of 
developing world. As ASEAN countries correctly recognize, trade facilitation is far 
from being a developed country agenda. Quite the contrary, it is developing countries 
that stand to be the main beneficiaries of a global TF deal at the WTO, as their 
participation in regional and global supply chains would be significantly enhanced. 
This, of course, will require technical assistance from bilateral, regional and 
multilateral donors, as has been the case for ASEAN countries. Any WTO deal on TF 
must thus feature a complementary set of novel aid-for-trade provisions that are 
adequately funded.  
 
For ASEAN and East Asia countries, a WTO TF agreement implies a strengthening 
of the region’s TF architecture. Several features of the existing ASEAN TF landscape 
were embedded in the July 2013 WTO TF text. This includes issues such as single 
windows and enhanced transparency provisions. A WTO agreement can usefully 
complete the ASEAN TF regime by codifying best global practices, for instance on 
advance rulings. All of the above TF components are in line with ASEAN’s and East 
Asia’s objective of enhanced trade facilitation and connectivity. 
 
13 
 
3.2 Agreeing on a package for least developed countries  
A second point of emerging consensus among this e-book’s contributing scholars is 
that Bali must deliver a credible package on the most pressing needs of the WTO’s 
weakest members – the least developed countries (LDCs).   
 
These matters are familiar to ASEAN, whose membership includes three LDCs – 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Viet Nam was formerly an LDC but two decades 
of trade-centric reforms have played a major role in the country’s graduation to 
middle-income status. There is increasing evidence that even the poorest countries 
within ASEAN have been able to steadily increase their participation in – and benefits 
from – production networks in the region. This has involved the implementation of 
several supporting measures beyond trade facilitation initiatives. A first crucial 
component has been the significant reduction and elimination of tariffs through AFTA 
and the ASEAN+1 PTAs. Second, the adoption of liberal rules of origin allowing for 
regional cumulation has exerted a decisive trade-facilitating influence on regional 
integration patterns. First introduced in AFTA, such rules were later adopted in 
ASEAN+1 PTAs. Yet, it bears recalling that even in the narrower confines of ASEAN 
and East Asia, the quest for duty-free/quota-free (DFQF) treatment foreseen for 
LDCs at the WTO’s 2005 Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong have yet to be fully 
realized. Tariffs are indeed maintained on certain products (though accounting for 
less than 10% of tariff lines, in the case of ASEAN+1 FTAs, at the HS 6-digit level), 
and stricter rules of origin continue to apply to a range of sensitive products which 
are often of priority interest to the region’s LDCs.  
 
The difficulties ASEAN Member States have encountered on this front offer a 
cautionary tale ahead of the Bali gathering, suggesting continued tensions in the run-
up to the Ministerial on an issue of considerable symbolic value in a development 
round.   
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Like many other deep integration compacts, ASEAN members have achieved much 
deeper liberalization in the realm of trade and investment in services than is the case 
under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), though the 
benefits of market opening in services for LDC exporting firms have yet to materialize 
in a significant manner (nor have the latter countries undertaken significant 
liberalization themselves). While all three of ASEAN’s LDCs have been successfully 
participating – and contributing (albeit on the basis of novel, variable geometry, 
provisions) – in regional economic integration in services, the situation elsewhere is 
far from satisfactory. As Philippine RIN Member Dr. Erlinda Medalla pointed out in her 
e-book contribution, LDCs are typically constrained by acute shortcomings in 
negotiating capacity. Furthermore, most LDCs are shackled by domestic markets 
whose size and income level fail to attract negotiating attention from developed and 
developing countries alike. This results in a process of marginalization and weak 
involvement in preferential trade negotiations. For Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, 
it is the ASEAN (and ASEAN+1 PTAs) that have provided a critical conduit for 
engaging the region and the world economy. For those LDCs left out from any 
regional economic integration process, the multilateral trading system embodied by 
the WTO offers the sole route to expanded market access opportunities in goods and 
services alike.  
 
The LDC package proposed by LDC Group11 calls for: (i) implementation of the duty-
free/quota-free (DFQF) market access Decision taken by WTO Members at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, (ii) a tightening of multilateral disciplines on 
preferential rules of origin, (iii) operationalization of the LDC services waiver, and (iv) 
addressing trade distorting subsidies on cotton.  
 
All four elements above are expected to benefit LDCs, albeit to a different degree.12 
Perhaps the most intractable issue before Ministers on the LDC front - DFQF - would 
                                                              
11 WTO (2013), LDC Package for Bali: Communication by Nepal, on behalf of the LDC Group, Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/C/W/63, 31 May. 
12 See Chapters II.11 (Dr. Biswajit Dhar) and II.12 (Dr. Zakariah Rashid). 
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clearly benefit LDCs. The challenge remains as it has since Hong Kong to reach 
agreement on those products representing 97% of tariff lines that are to benefit from 
DFQF treatment, an issue on which differing views prevail even among LDCs. There 
are significant overlaps between the priority product lists of ASEAN and their African 
LDC counterparts, an issue to which the quest for greater flexibility in preferential 
rules of origin is closely linked.  
 
The benefits to be derived from the services waiver, the contours of which were 
agreed at the WTO’s last Ministerial gathering, appear less straightforward both to 
identify and produce. While an approach based on relative reciprocity could help 
LDCs develop their own service sectors, significant export gains continue to be held 
back in many LDCs as a result of limitations in export (supply) capacity and the 
concentration of LDC negotiating interests on the mode of supplying services (Mode 
4 trade) and categories of service providers (low and medium-skilled workers) that 
continue to rank among the most problematic to address in a trade policy setting. Still, 
some (limited) movement on this front, including once more through targeted forms of 
technical assistance, will be necessary for Bali to be seen as a step forward on the 
LDC front.  
 
Meanwhile, a deal on cotton continues to be challenging both because of strong 
forces of protectionist capture in some developed country markets and the 
concentration of potential gains in a relatively small sub-set of WTO Members, the 
so-called “cotton-4” countries in West Africa. 
  
Despite the above challenges, the acuteness of which should not be underestimated, 
agreeing to an LDC package is likely to be a central element defining success in Bali. 
Moreover, it bears noting that ultimate value of a Bali deliverable on LDCs lies not 
only in the direct and immediate economic benefits on offer but more systemically in 
its ability to offer tangible proof of the benefits to be derived from greater LDC 
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engagement in multilateral trade diplomacy and the international community’s 
recognition of the genuine obstacles that continue to impair such engagement.  
 
Considering the fact that two of the four major proposals advanced by the LDC 
Group relate to the implementation and operationalization of pre-agreed 
commitments (DFQF and the services waiver), and bearing in mind the irreplaceable 
value of the WTO for LDCs, the Bali Ministerial Conference must deliver credible 
advances. Failure on this defining element of the DDA could well cripple advances on 
most other negotiating fronts, a risk WTO Members would be well advised to avoid.     
 
3.3 Agriculture and food security 
Agriculture is generally perceived as a further key component of the Bali deliverables. 
Yet, interestingly, ERIA RIN members have paid relatively lesser attention to this 
agenda item, particularly when compared to a possible TF Agreement and the LDC 
package. This is somewhat paradoxical given the fact that agricultural trade, probably 
more than any other negotiating issue, lies behind the Doha deadlock.  
 
It is also paradoxical when one considers that agriculture dominates the landscape of 
ASEAN economies, accounting for a large share of output and absorbing an even 
larger share of the ASEAN workforce. While agro-based products have been 
identified as one of the priority integration sectors (PISs) within ASEAN, agricultural 
products (especially rice and sugar) are listed on the Sensitive List and Highly 
Sensitive List of ATIGA (ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement) in many countries.  
 
ASEAN has a long record of cooperation in the area of food security. As far back as 
1979, Member States signed the Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve. 
ASEAN cooperation in this area has intensified noticeably in the wake of the sharp 
increase in international food prices in 2007/2008, leading to region-wide agreement 
on two important fronts: (a) ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework, and (b) 
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Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS). The SPA-
FS focuses on enhancing food production, promoting greater availability and 
enhanced accessibility to agriculture inputs, and operationalizing regional food 
emergency relief arrangements.  
 
The issue of subsidy disciplines is not addressed by these programs since the matter 
is anchored in the rules of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and thus a regional 
forum does not appear tailor-made for such a purpose.  
 
Another important regional initiative is the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice 
Reserve (APTERR) to which China, Japan and Korea participate alongside ASEAN 
Member States. Rice occupies a special place in these cooperation mechanisms 
because, as ERIA (2012) noted, the ASEAN region all at once hosts important 
importers (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia) and exporters (Thailand and 
Viet Nam) as well as potential world suppliers (Cambodia, Myanmar) of rice.  
 
The critical importance of food security to the Bali Ministerial was eloquently taken up 
in the contributions of Dr. Vo Tri Thanh (Chapter II.7) and Dr. Biswajit Dhar (Chapter 
II.11). Both contributions recall the differing views the issue elicits among the WTO 
membership. The notion of allowing targeted subsidy support for the purpose of 
ensuring food security proposed by the G-33 group has complex implications for the 
ASEAN and East Asia region. 13  Some countries in the region have already 
introduced such subsidies (e.g., India). On the other hand, poorer countries with 
limited fiscal capacity harbor genuine concerns over the potentially negative distortive 
effects of such support measures. Food importing countries can doubtless benefit 
from the ensuing cheaper prices of imported food but domestic producers may also 
suffer from such subsidies when potentially large public stockpiles indirectly induce 
exports to third countries.  
                                                              
13 Five countries (China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR and the Philippines) are members to the G‐33 group. 
18 
 
 
India’s demand for linking the agriculture-food security nexus to other issues up for 
decision in Bali, especially TF, represents a genuine risk hanging over the entire 
MC9. In recalling the need to break this key logjam, Prof. Jin Kyo Suh, the RIN 
Member from South Korea, has argued that the adoption of a peace clause could 
represent a feasible and realistic approach. His contribution further recalled how the 
G-20 proposal on improving tariff-quota transparency procedures would also likely 
form part of the Bali deliverables on agricultural trade.  
 
As Japan RIN Member Mr. Daisuke Hiratsuka argued in his e-book contribution, and 
as the ASEAN experience itself has shown, agricultural trade can play a crucial role 
in poverty alleviation and in narrowing development gaps. Regional efforts, although 
important within ASEAN, cannot however offer definitive solutions to all negotiating 
issues at play in the Bali discussions. Accordingly, it is up to the WTO membership to 
start delivering better and more balanced disciplines on agricultural trade. 
 
3.4  Information Technology Agreement 
The WTO’s 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is widely recognized as 
one of the multilateral trade body’s early and lasting success stories. Following a 
critical mass-based approach within a plurilateral construct, the benefits of which 
were subsequently extended to all WTO Members on a most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment basis, the Agreement saw major IT-manufacturing countries commit to a 
process of complete tariff elimination on an MFN basis. Most countries in East Asia 
are ITA signatories and have benefited handsomely from the arrangement and the 
opportunity it affords for inserting regional firms into global value chains in the 
industry.14 Today, an estimated 86% of smart-phones and 100% of digital cameras 
are produced in the region. The East Asian region is now the center of EEE 
(electrical electronic equipment) product manufacturing of the world, and the value 
                                                              
14 Among ASEAN Member States, Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar are not members to the ITA.  
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chains created extend much beyond the region with strong ties to Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as North America [Ando and Kimura, 2013].  
 
ASEAN, in its regional economic integration efforts, also places high value on ICT 
products and has made them a priority integration sector (PIS). The PIS initiative 
covers not just trade-in-goods but also extends to liberalization of trade in related 
services and investment. The e-ASEAN Framework (signed in 2000) also addresses 
issues relating to ICT infrastructure, e-commerce, facilitation of trade in ICT products 
and services, capacity building and e-Society, as well as e-Government.  
 
ASEAN Member States have further deepened cooperation within the ASEAN ICT 
Master Plan 2015 (AIM2015). As such, trade and investment in ICT products (goods 
and services) represents a centrally important element of ASEAN initiatives in this 
area but the vision ASEAN Member States share extends far beyond trade through 
various endeavors to promote the production, diffusion and application of high 
technology industries throughout the region.  
 
Signed in 1996, the ITA currently lags behind the phenomenal innovations that have 
taken place in the ICT sector in recent years. New products need to be added to the 
Agreement’s scope of coverage, its membership should expand to take in new 
important industry players and determined efforts need to be directed towards 
tackling the complex mosaic of non-tariff measures affecting producers and 
consumers of IT-related goods and services.  
 
Given the global intensity of competitive forces in the sector, any revised ITA (“ITA2”) 
would bring large benefits to manufacturers in the region and beyond and more 
importantly enhance global productivity levels by accelerating the diffusion and 
adoption of new technologies.  
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Again somewhat oddly given the central salience of the ICT sector to the region’s 
cross-border trade and investment dynamism, only a few scholars in this e-book 
project touched upon ITA2. This is perhaps not so much because they are opposed 
to the idea of an ITA2. Rather, it might well highlight how many contributors view the 
ITA as representing a new model of trade governance allowing for greater doses of 
variable geometry within the WTO system as a whole, an issue of more systemic 
reform unlikely to be at the center of Bali discussions among ministers.  
 
4. Implications of East Asian integration for the WTO 
Several contributions in this e-book recall how the WTO can usefully tap into and 
attempt to replicate on a global basis many of the useful steps taken by countries in 
East Asia in responding to the manifold challenges of deep integration and trade 
governance reforms. First, the process of East Asian integration, and especially the 
quest to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, has compelled 
governments throughout the region to seriously addresses the many barriers 
impeding the smooth functioning of production networks rather than focusing too 
narrowly on barriers to trade.  
 
As was discussed above, trade facilitation is a clear case in point. ASEAN’s definition 
of trade facilitation extends much beyond customs procedures (Wong and Pellan, 
2012), as it embraces in a holistic manner several key components of related 
services liberalization (through GATS+ commitments). Indeed, it considers TF as 
very much a supply chain in itself. In tackling the services dimension of the TF 
agenda, ASEAN Member States have innovatively abandoned the “request and offer” 
approach of trade negotiations and instead pursued concerted efforts of market 
opening via a formula-based approach, as noted in the contribution by Singapore 
RIN Member Hank Lim.  
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Here again, production network facilitative services such as logistics have been 
treated as priority integration sectors commanding greater and earlier liberalization 
efforts, as befits key input industries. Governments from the region have also started 
to address a number of related regulatory issues through the 2007 AEC Blueprint, 
most notably through cooperation in the fields of intellectual property protection and 
competition policy. ASEAN+1 PTAs follow a similar path.  
 
In turn, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiative linking 
ASEAN Members states to its six key regional partners (Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) represents a unique initiative aimed at 
establishing a harmonized regional PTA linking all ASEAN+1 PTAs. Although 
ASEAN Member States already have PTAs with all of their +1 partners, the RCEP 
aims at elevating the quality of the region’s existing PTA ecosystem (rather than 
falling into the least-common-denominator trap) and more importantly at harmonizing 
the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs.15 RCEP would be an open accession PTA as agreed 
by the compact’s sixteen Economic Ministers in 2012, and thus may expand the 
benefits of the integration it sustains beyond the region. If RCEP is successfully 
concluded without lowering its current level of ambition, it may provide a new way of 
consolidating, improving and expanding on existing PTAs. Just like the TPP, which 
also aims at addressing a “21st century trade agenda”, the RCEP will do much to 
multilateralize regional advances and pave the way through policy experimentation 
for novel rule-making and market-opening steps at the global level. The WTO has 
thus much to gain from ongoing attempts at deep integration in East Asia.16  
 
At the same time, there is no denying that genuine risks may derive from the 
constitution of mega-regional deals like the TPP and RCEP. Such risks include the 
scope for potentially incompatible rules among them. Equally important are the 
                                                              
15 Fukunaga and Isono (2013). 
16 While the TPP is also an open accession PTA, Prof. Gary Hawke has nonetheless raised a number of concerns 
over the design of the TPP’s accession clause. See Chapter II.6 (Prof. Gary Hawke).  
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systemic risks that mega-regionals imply in regard to incentives for continued 
engagement in multilateral trade diplomacy.   
 
There is currently no truly credible mechanism to ensure (and enforce) the 
compatibility of PTAs with multilateral rules. APEC members have started to call for 
greater transparency of ongoing negotiations but its own geographical remit cannot 
naturally extend to the newly launched Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The WTO is without doubt the natural go-to place to minimize the 
risks potentially arising from mega-regional incompatibilities. As New Zealand RIN 
Member Prof. Gary Hawke correctly pointed out:  
 
“A central role of the WTO would be to ensure that the rules agreed by these 
mega-agreements are not incompatible, and continually simplifying them 
where possible into a single set of rules.” (Chapter II.6) 
 
Also, Dr. Erlinda Medalla from the Philippines correctly stressed: 
 
“Production networks and the supply chain extend beyond the region. Their 
dynamism cannot be sustained without orderly global trade, best managed 
under the WTO framework.” (Chapter II.10) 
 
5. Looking ahead 
Almost all the contributors to this e-book share strong concerns over the systemic 
implications of a failed Bali meeting. For example, Korean RIN Member Dr. Jin Kyo 
Suh noted: 
 
“The inability of Members to secure a credible package will not only mean 
failure in Bali but spell the end of the Doha negotiations and seriously 
jeopardize the multilateral system as a whole.” (Chapter II.2) 
 
Contributors agree that the failure of the Bali Ministerial would translate into a 
seriously weakened WTO and prompt recourse to more mega-regional deals, 
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bringing with them non-negligible risks of serious fragmentation along regional and 
preferential lines. 
 
A contrario, should the Bali MC9 be concluded successfully, the WTO would regain 
much needed momentum as a negotiating forum and global trade legislature. Yet 
even such an outcome cannot guarantee a bright future for the world trade body 
absent its embracing of a forward-looking reform agenda. Accordingly, many 
contributors concur that the Bali Meeting should also mark the launch of a longer-
term journey of governance reforms able to impart the necessary flexibility required 
for the WTO to remain relevant and attuned to a world of ever heightened diversity of 
collective preferences and development levels.  
 
The WTO will long continue to provide a critically important global public good: the 
legal infrastructure through which the global governance of trade relations is made 
possible. Yet, like any living organism, the WTO needs to adapt to a fast changing 
environment for it to continue to bear fruits more effectively, more efficiently and 
more promptly. Simply put, the WTO must practice what it preaches: to adjust to – 
and embrace – the tectonic structural changes buffeting global commerce today, with 
new actors and technologies ushering in a new geography of trade.  
 
This e-book features several novel ideas calling for a new operating system in the 
WTO. One such idea is to promote greater recourse to plurilateral negotiations 
involving coalitions of like-minded countries who share a common wish to move 
forward, either in a closed manner or on an MFN basis once critical mass thresholds 
are met.17 As noted earlier, the 1996 ITA has provided a tested model of the latter 
approach. Another model of plurilateral governance, one that limits reciprocal 
benefits solely to those undertaking its obligations, is the WTO’s Government 
Procurement Agreement. Meanwhile, the ongoing Trade in Services Agreement 
                                                              
17 Nakatomi [2013] also emphasize the possibility of plurilateral deals in the WTO. 
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(TiSA), initially conceived along ITA lines but conducted outside the institutional remit 
of the WTO in the manner of a GATS Article V PTA in services, offers a third model 
of variable geometry approach.  
 
A second major governance challenge confronting WTO Members concerns the 
critically important question of how decisions are made in the trade body. This chiefly 
concerns the vexatious questions of how consensus is reached and whether 
negotiations should proceed on the basis of a single undertaking approach – where 
nothing is agreed until all is agreed. The sheer size of the WTO membership and the 
diverse collective preferences such size naturally entails is increasingly seen as one 
of the many reasons for the DDA’s deadlocked situation.  
 
In his e-book contribution, New Zealand RIN Member Prof. Gary Hawke recalls that 
the real challenge lies in the evolving nature of the world’s economic integration 
agenda: “[the single undertaking] cannot be accommodated in a rolling agenda of 
collaboration in which new issues arise and are incorporated.” (Chapter II.6) Two 
related issues in governance reform concern, first, the basis on which decisions are 
to be taken by Members: consensus vs. majority voting and, as Chinese RIN 
Member Prof. Zhang Yunling noted, how best to ensure that a more equitable 
sharing of leadership arises in global trade governance, one that is able to assign a 
progressively larger role to emerging economies.  
 
While it is almost certain that Ministers in Bali will not delve deeply – if at all – into the 
thorny issues of WTO governance reforms, most contributors of this e-book feel that 
such discussions are very much needed, such that strong signals on the desirability 
of tackling them by the time of the next Ministerial gathering should be sent already in 
Bali. Indeed, the e-book contributors almost unanimously call for a far-reaching 
change in mindsets. New Zealand RIN Member Prof. Gary Hawke says it well when 
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arguing that “[the WTO] should also begin to adapt to the contemporary world by 
seeing its field of responsibility as ‘economic integration’ rather than ‘trade’.”  
 
The above sentiment is echoed in Japanese RIN member Mr. Daisuke Hiratsuka’s 
call to situate trade policy discussions against the backdrop of the new geography of 
global commerce that production fragmentation and trade in intermediate goods and 
services is making possible (Chapter II.4). His contribution stresses the analytical 
importance of the “trade-in-value-added” (TiVA) concept. Taking a TiVA lense, 
imports and services become “essential ingredients” of competitive exports. This in 
effect turns the conventional mercantilist view of trade upside down. In the new 
reality of production networks and value chains, he recalled how “[e]ven a small 
economy can invite a few production processes to start industrialization by improving 
connectivity.” That is exactly what is happening in the ASEAN and East Asia region.  
 
Responding to such new trade horizons, which Professor Richard Baldwin (2011) 
has famously called the “second unbundling”, WTO members must embrace 
production network enhancing policies to reduce “services link costs” (Kimura and 
Ando, 2005). Such an approach is one that, not surprisingly, assigns a key 
integrating role to trade facilitation, trade in services and cross-border investment. 
Seen through this enlarged, interconnected, lens, other issues such as intellectual 
property protection, product standards, and competition policy all become 
considerably more salient, not so much in the conventional sense of international 
negotiations but as key domestic policy measures that need to be aligned in such a 
way as to increase the scope for meaningful insertion in production networks. 
 
Finally, and doubtless also unlikely on the plates of Ministers in Bali but critically in 
need of their future attention, is how the WTO retains relevance in regard to the 
increasing panoply of PTAs, particularly the recent trend towards mega-regional 
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constructs.18  While the WTO lays down the fundamental legal requirements that 
PTAs have to meet in order to be deemed WTO compatible (i.e., Article XXIV of 
GATT and Article V of GATS), there have been very few instances in which the 
legality of PTAs has been questioned before the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism. Although the Committee of Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) does 
afford opportunities for all WTO members to discuss and learn about newly notified 
PTAs, not all agreements are fully reviewed, particularly those negotiated between 
developing countries. While the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) assesses 
the PTAs of WTO Members and thus enhances the transparency surrounding the 
process of preferential market opening and rule-making, it cannot meaningfully 
analyze advances on “new issues” (e.g., investment) that fall outside the WTO’s 
current substantive remit. Accordingly, the WTO’s capacity to discipline potentially 
harmful or distortive forms of preference granting remains significantly constrained. It 
is doubtless for this reason that several contributors to this e-book argued in favor of 
strengthened multilateral surveillance and disciplines targeting PTAs. As Myanmar’s 
Drs. Sandar Oo and Zin Zin Naing noted: “[the TPRM is] underexploited and its role 
should be extended to help the WTO better address new and essential issues of the 
international economic order such as the uncontrolled proliferation of PTAs […]” 
(Chapter II.10).  
 
In their Australian RIN contribution, Malcolm Bosworth, Greg Cutbush and Jenny 
Corbett go further by emphasizing the importance of the TPR process to enhancing 
the transparency of trade rules more broadly rather than focusing solely or primarily 
on PTAs) (Chapter II.14).  
 
Despite their proliferating nature, regional integration initiatives often remain opaque 
for non-members. Drawing on its analytical capacity and the legitimacy that flows 
from its global membership, the WTO is here again uniquely placed to supply such 
                                                              
18 See for example Chapter II.7 (Dr. Erlinda Medalla) 
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good governance-enhancing benefits. Yet to do so, its own disciplinary remit may 
need to be expanded and keep up with the many new issues taken up by preferential 
trade and investment agreements. That Ministers in Bali seem likely to eschew such 
a debate in no way lessens the need for continued institutional and legislative 
adaptation if the WTO is to retain its role as the world’s undisputed anchor of global 
trade governance.  
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II. Contributions by ERIA Research Institute Network (RIN) Members 
II.1 Challenges to the WTO and a Trade Facilitation Agreement 
Zhang Yunling, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)19 
 
1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), like the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) before it have both played a crucial role in creating an open and rules-
based world market since the Second World War. Such a market environment 
facilitates economic integration and the long-term growth of the global economy. 
However, as more and more economies have joined the multilateral trading system, 
its structure has changed, and the interests of its Members have also diversified. 
When the Doha Development Round was launched in 2001, Members of WTO 
committed themselves to working hard on this new agenda. But the negotiating 
process has become very complex due to the diversity of interests of WTO Members. 
Originally, the deadline for conclusion of the Round was 2005, but little progress has 
been made so far. Pessimism about the successful conclusion of the negotiations 
seems to prevail. The reasons for such pessimism include a lack of political will to 
revive the negotiations, the difficulty in finding a balance across a range of complex 
issues, and the emerging trend towards preferential trade arrangements, among 
others. The Doha Round is a ‘development round’ aiming at creating a better global 
environment for global economic integration and reducing development gaps. 
Negotiations on eliminating or reducing heavy agricultural subsidies on agriculture 
offered in the developed economies show no progress. The failure of these 
negotiations has angered the developing countries since they consider such 
subsidies as reflecting the protectionist policy of the developed countries.20 On the 
other hand, the developed countries, especially the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU), have strongly urged the emerging economies, especially 
                                                              
19 Zhang Yunling, Professor, Director of International Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. E-
mail: zhangyl58@163.com  
20 Leaders of 25 world farming organizations signed a letter to Pascal Lamy, then Director General of 
WTO criticizing the protectionist attitude of the US and EU. 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/actions-and-events-mainmenu-26/10-years-of-wto-is-enough-
mainmenu 
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China and India, to take a more pro-active stance on liberalization. Currently, it 
appears very difficult to provide sufficient impetus to the leaders of WTO Members to 
make a success of the Doha Round. Without active leadership, it is impossible to 
achieve a breakthrough, although there is increasing concern that the failure of the 
round will create a risk to the WTO system and to the world economy more broadly.  
 
While the multilateral process has stagnated, preferential arrangements have 
proliferated. The major interests and efforts of the US, the EU, Japan and other 
developed economies such as Australia and Canada have shifted towards 
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Canada-EU Trade Agreement and the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). These so-called ‘mega regional 
arrangements’ are intended to increase trade and investment among the parties 
themselves and to lay down the new rules for a future new global agenda. Meanwhile, 
the East Asian economies have also been busy initiating new preferential 
arrangements. In addition to bilateral agreements, a mega-regional free trade 
agreement (FTA), namely the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) encompassing 16 members in East Asia was launched in 2012.21 Although 
PTAs have a role to play in deepening regional liberalization and cooperation and 
help create a regional trade and economic development environment, at the same 
time they turn attention away from the main efforts at multilateral negotiations and 
more seriously damage the credibility of the WTO while putting at risk the very future 
of the multilateral system.  
 
As the conclusion of the Doha Round becomes ever more difficult to achieve, efforts 
at negotiating the plurilateral agreements have been given more emphasis. It is 
widely considered that concluding more plurilateral agreements based on “coalitions 
of the willing” among WTO Members is a way to deal with a host of new trade-related 
                                                              
21 ASEAN 10 plus China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
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issues within the framework of the existing world trade system. Plurilateral 
agreements that include only a fraction of WTO Members are, however, considered 
as no more than a second-best option.22 The Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA) is considered a good example in this respect, since it achieved duty free access 
on 97% of world trade in information technology products.23 The ITA operates on a 
‘critical mass basis and this applied to all on a non-discriminatory basis.24  
 
At the same time, calls for reforming the WTO system have also been increasing. 
Views on WTO reform are varied, including the need to adjust current practices to 
ensure a more equitable sharing of responsibility for the leadership, with a greater 
role for emerging economies.25 Other proposals would turn the WTO into a more 
modest, flexible, and equitable organization; rather than focusing on further 
liberalization, the WTO rather focus on building its institutional capabilities in order to 
serve as the global governance structure for world trade.26  
 
However, it is vital to keep the multilateral trading system working and effective since 
no the other institution can serve the needs of both the developed and developing 
economies. As a single undertaking, agreement under the WTO Doha Round seems 
to be difficult to achieve, a trade facilitation agreement should be sought by the end 
of the year. Such an agreement could produce significant gains for all WTO Members 
and impart needed dynamism to the global economy.  
 
2. A trade facilitation agreement 
Trade facilitation (TF) forms an integral part of the Doha Round and the negotiation 
                                                              
22 James Bacchus proposed to negotiate the Anti‐counterfeiting Trade Agreement going beyond TRIPS, A 
sustainable energy agreement aiming at eliminating the barriers to trade and investment in the green energy area, 
TPP opening to all WTO Members. See A way forward for WTO, in Ricardo Meléndez‐Ortiz (ed.), Global challenges 
and the future of WTO, pp.7–8, www.ictsd.org 
23 The expanding agenda for ITA, i.e. ITA2, is under discussion. 
24 The GPA is only applied to the Members. 
25 A way forward for WTO, in Ricardo Meléndez‐Ortiz (ed.), Global challenges and the future of WTO, p.9, 
www.ictsd.org 
26 Kevin P. Gallagher, Challenging opportunities for the Multilateral Trade Regime, in Ricardo Meléndez‐Ortiz (ed.), 
Global challenges and the future of WTO, P.16, www.ictsd.org 
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was launched in 2004. Various definitions of trade facilitation have been used. TF not 
only includes at-the-border issues but also beyond-the-border issues, dealing for 
instance with the business environment, the quality of infrastructure, transparency, 
and domestic regulations. 27  According to both the WTO and the OECD, trade 
facilitation involves the simplification and harmonization of procedures including ‘the 
activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, communicating and 
processing data and other information required for the movement of goods in 
international trade.’ 28  For measurement of trade facilitation, there are four major 
indicators: port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment and e-
commerce. 29  The negotiations on trade facilitation are aimed to facilitate trade 
transactions and reduce the business costs by eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
which hinder trade transactions, enhancing technical assistance, supporting capacity 
building and also developing provisions for effective cooperation between customs 
and any other appropriate authorities. TF action plans should clearly define the 
objectives and framework for implementation so as to encourage the broadest 
participation by Members. It is important for all economies to take timely policy 
actions to facilitate progress. In the spirit of developed and developing economies 
complementing each other, it is essential to support the engagement of all key 
stakeholders, in particular, the establishment of partnerships between government, 
business, academic and training institutions. The importance of well-targeted 
assistance to help developing economies make progress towards greater openness 
and transparency cannot be underestimated. This in turn will help developing 
members improve their capability to implement their trade facilitation commitments. 
 
Customs procedures lie at the core of trade facilitation measures, since effective 
trade facilitation depends upon effective customs measures to simplify import, export 
                                                              
27 Alberto Portugal‐Perez and John S. Wilson, Export Performance and Trade Facilitation Reform: Hard 
and Soft Infrastructure, World Development, Vol. 40, No. 7, p. 1295, 2012. 
28 Christopher Findlay (ed.), ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia, ERIA Research Project Report 
2010 No.29, p.55. 
29 John S. Wilson, Catherine L. Mann & Tsunehiro Otsuki, Trade facilitation and Economic Development: a new 
approach to quantifying the impact, The World Bank Economic Review Vol. 17,No.3, p. 368, 2003. 
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and transit procedures for trade operators and to make  information about those 
procedures readily available to trade operators and their agents. Trade logistics, i.e. 
effective leverage of the hard infrastructure and streamlined border formalities, 
requires the parallel development of the logistics value chain.  
 
Considering the diversity of WTO Members, the TF negotiations must take fully into 
account the principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-
developed countries. In fact, many developing WTO Members raised concerns about 
the impact of trade facilitation negotiations since they are worried that they do not 
possess sufficient capacity to implement such commitments and that the needed 
technical assistance would not materialize. Thus, developing countries have 
repeatedly stressed the importance of special and differential treatment and technical 
assistance provisions for a successful outcome to the negotiations. As former WTO 
Deputy Director General Alejandro Jara pointed out recently, to achieve balance is 
the key to agreement in the talks on trade facilitation.30  
 
Studies have shown that the reduction in trade transaction costs through trade 
facilitation can bring significant gains, and that the TF talks could produce greater 
benefits than tariff reductions. 31  In fact, trade facilitation plays a crucial role in 
reducing costs and promoting regulatory reforms as the character of international 
trade is increasingly becoming one of trade in intermediate products and value 
chains. The expansion of regional and global value chains means that most products 
are assembled with inputs from many countries and products cross borders 
frequently during various stages of assembly. Trade in intermediate goods has 
become the most dynamic and dominant sector of international trade. Reducing 
supply-chain barriers can thus generate considerable benefits. . Reforms relating to 
trade facilitation, such as the simplification and harmonization of customs procedures, 
                                                              
30 The balance means the legal obligations of the implementation and capacity building and assistance to the 
developing countries. See Balance key to Bali trade talks, Jakarta Post, 6 May 2013. 
31 Christopher Findlay (ed.), ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia, ERIA Research Project Report 
2010 No. 29, p. 57. 
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the improvement of border infrastructure and management systems would enhance 
the capacity to trade and would assist traders to compete with or better integrate into 
global supply chains. Thus, trade facilitation measures will significantly reduce the 
cost of supply-chain activities. 
 
The cost of non-tariff barriers to trade is much greater than that of tariff barriers. Thus, 
trade facilitation measures become a broad policy-based subject, encompassing a 
range of administrative, financial, transportation, security, business-model and e-
commerce concerns, and with implications for trade’s potential for economic 
development. Across-the-border or behind-the-border barriers to trade facilitation 
come in many forms, covering aspects of the institutional and regulatory framework. 
Among the most important barriers to trade and investment are: excessive regulation, 
inconsistent standards, undisclosed information related to trade and investment rules, 
policy uncertainty, weak legal systems, poor protection of property rights and 
ineffective contract enforcement, regulatory barriers to market entry, corruption, 
policies that suppress competition and allow anti-competitive behavior, poorly 
functioning financial markets and poor infrastructure.  
 
Removing such barriers requires capacity building, especially the capacity of trade 
facilitation, and improvements in infrastructure, human resources and TF-related 
institutions. Lowering NTMs requires the political will of the governments concerned. 
Despite widespread consensus on desirability of a TF agreement and some 
significant progress in the negotiations, more efforts are needed to clinch a deal in 
Bali in December, as important gaps between developed and developing Members 
continue to prevail. 
 
3. APEC and Asia’s experience 
APEC has made important strides to facilitate trade by identifying obstacles that 
hinder trade and by implementing activities and actions to address these obstacles. 
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As a non-rules-based institution founded on the principle of voluntary co-operation 
and compliance, APEC’s role is to encourage its members to commit collectively to 
reducing barriers to trade and investment. It provides an environment for member 
economies to consider innovative ways to address similar problems. In 2001, APEC 
members committed to achieve a reduction in trade transaction costs of 5 per cent 
across the APEC region between 2002 and 2006. They drew up a menu of actions 
and measures to reduce transaction costs and simplify administrative and procedural 
requirements over a specified period of time. Actions were taken in the priority areas 
of customs procedures, standards and conformity assessment, business mobility and 
electronic commerce. By 2006, the 5 per cent reduction target was achieved. Starting 
in 2007, another trade facilitation action plan was initiated for a reduction of trade 
transaction costs by a further 5 per cent over the 2007–2010 period based on new 
actions and measures added to the elements of the previous plan. To monitor 
compliance, key performance indicators (KPIs) were introduced.  
 
ASEAN has also registered forward movement on trade facilitation. In 2009, ASEAN 
adopted a Trade in Goods Agreement that made significant progress on trade 
liberalization and trade facilitation, especially on eliminating TF-impeding NTMs. The 
chapter on trade facilitation sets out actions and measures to be implemented in 
areas such as custom procedures, trade regulations and procedures, standards, 
conformity assessments, SPS measures and the ASEAN single window.32 ASEAN 
adopted an ASEAN harmonized tariff nomenclature (AHTN) and product-specific 
mutual recognition arrangements on conformity assessment so that product-related 
standards and regulations no longer hold the potential of technical barriers to trade. 
In order to help the newer ASEAN member countries, a series of trade-facilitation-
related technical assistance training and advisory programs have also been 
organized and conducted.  
 
                                                              
32 Marn-Heong Wong and Marie Isabelle Pellan, Trade facilitation: the way forward for ASEAN and its FTA 
partners, ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2012-04, p. 3. 
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Recent PTAs in East Asia have also made efforts on trade facilitation since they all 
include trade and investment facilitation measures. Table 1 below shows that the 
ASEAN FTA (AFTA) and five ASEAN+1 FTAs include substantive provisions relating 
to trade facilitation. 
 
Table 1. Trade facilitation provisions in ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs 
 
 ASEAN ASEAN-
Australia & New 
Zealand 
ASEAN-
China 
ASEAN-
India 
ASEAN-
Japan 
ASEAN-
Korea 
Trade facilitation 
coverage 
※ ※ ※ ※ ※ ※ 
Customs 
procedure and 
cooperation 
※ ※ ※ ※ ※ ※ 
Technical 
regulation, 
standards, SPS 
※ ※  ※ ※ ※ 
NTBs, especially 
administrative 
fees and 
charges 
※ ※ ※ ※ ※ ※ 
Transparency of 
laws, regulations 
and 
administrative 
rulings 
※ ※ ※  ※ ※ 
Use of ITC and 
E-commerce 
※ ※ ※  ※ ※ 
※ Indicates the presence of provisions. 
 
Source: Marn-Heong Wong and Marie-Isabelle Pellan, Trade facilitation: the way forward for 
ASEAN and its FTA partners, ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2012-04, p. 3. 
 
Trade facilitation in the Great Mekong Sub-region (GMS) has achieved remarkable 
progress. The measures taken on TF cover wider areas than other arrangements, 
including the development of physical transport and trade infrastructure, efficient 
clearance procedures at border crossings, improved trade administration systems 
and institutions, and the active and extensive application of information technology to 
promote transparency and efficiency in trade transactions. The most important trade 
facilitation initiative in the GMS program is the Framework Agreement on Facilitating 
Cross-Border Transport of Goods and People (CBTA), which covers all the relevant 
aspects of cross-border transport facilitation, including single-stop inspection, cross-
border movement of persons, transit traffic regimes (such as exemptions from 
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physical customs inspection, bond deposit, escort, and phyto-sanitary and veterinary 
inspection, and requirements that road vehicles have to meet for expedited border 
crossings, exchange of commercial traffic rights, infrastructure, including road and 
bridge design standards, road signs and signals etc. For customs procedures, GMS 
countries committed to simplifying customs laws, regulations and procedures by 
aligning them with international standards and developing harmonized procedures, 
forms and formats among all GMS partners. For inspection and quarantine measures, 
the aim is to enhance the compliance of GMS countries with the WTO’s TBT and 
SPS Agreements, technical regulations, and standards in line with their current or 
future WTO commitments, and to improve cooperation and exchange of information 
among enquiry points or the national notification authority. For trade logistics, 
measures include reviewing, simplifying and harmonizing GMS cross-border 
transport regulations by accelerating the finalization of the Cross-Border Transport 
Agreement (CBTA) and carrying out its initial implementation at the pilot border-
crossing points along GMS economic corridors, improving and developing facilities to 
support the development of an efficient and integrated GMS trade logistics network, 
as well as upgrading and building capacity within the logistics/freight forwarding 
industry through human resource development. As for the mobility of business people, 
the measures include streamlining and simplifying the formalities for visa application, 
deferral and temporary stay for GMS citizens conducting business activities in the 
sub-region and considering and developing a GMS business visa scheme allowing 
multiple entry for GMS citizens in the sub-region and improving the transparency of 
relevant laws and regulations for business travellers.33 
 
Although PTAs have made some progress in the area of trade facilitation, the WTO’s 
role at the multilateral level remains essential since the global market needs an 
integrated and non-discriminatory global trading system.   
                                                              
33 Susan Stone and Anna Strutt, “Transport infrastructure and trade facilitation in the Greater Mekong Sub‐region”, 
in Douglas H. Brooks & Susan F. Stone (eds), Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation in Asia, ADB Institute 
and Edward Elgar, 2010, p. 170. 
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II.2 The WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration: A Korean Perspective 
Jin Kyo Suh, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) 34 
 
1. Introduction 
The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9) will be held in Bali, Indonesia in 
December 2013. Unlike the other ministerial meetings held since the 2005 Hong 
Kong Ministerial Conference, the Bali Ministerial Conference will be a litmus test for 
the future of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations and that of the WTO 
itself.  
 
If WTO Members want to succeed in reaching a compromise in Bali, a so-called a 
‘Bali package’, which is vital to avoid a collapse of the DDA negotiations, will be 
necessary to infuse new life into the dying DDA negotiations thus enabling the talks  
to get back on track post-Bali. If this does not happen, however, it is only a matter of 
time until the Doha Round shrivels up. The US will strive for the completion of the 
ongoing negotiations towards a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) with the EU. The 
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) talks and negotiations on a revamped and 
enlarged Information Technology Agreement (ITA) are even more appealing to the 
US.  
 
For these reasons, WTO Members have worked hard in recent months to generate a 
package of deliverables for the success of the Bali Ministerial meeting. The following 
section advances a number of thoughts to key questions relating to the Bali 
Ministerial meeting and the role that ERIA members can play in the run-up to Bali. 
This is followed in section 3 by some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Short answers to seven questions 
                                                              
34 Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), jksuh@kiep.go.kr 
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2.1. What do ERIA’s Research Institute Network (RIN) members expect from 
the Bali Ministerial meeting by way of tangible outcomes? Are certain 
negotiating agenda items ripe for early harvesting? 
 
At this juncture, it would appear that the prospects for the Bali ministerial 
conference are somewhat somber. It is time for WTO Members to engage more 
directly in negotiating solutions and to move closer to the middle ground in 
finalizing a Bali package. However, many key WTO Members still stick to their old 
position and ask other Members to move closer to where they are. There is only a 
very short working time left during which to reach a feasible and doable 
compromise. It thus not currently appear realistic to expect the Bali ministerial 
meeting to be successfully concluded unless there are big changes in the 
negotiating attitude of major countries, particularly in the political will of the US, 
India, and China.  
 
However, the window of opportunity for success in Bali is still very much open. 
WTO Members are now seeking to forge a deal in Bali on the following three core 
areas: trade facilitation, issues related to agriculture, and areas of special interest 
to developing countries.  
 
2.1.1 Trade facilitation 
Trade facilitation has been viewed by many as a cornerstone of a Bali package, 
which in turn is considered vital to jump-starting the stalled Doha Round of trade 
talks. Thus, an agreement on trade facilitation should be the centerpiece of a 
proposed deliverables package which WTO Members are hoping to conclude in 
Bali. If the WTO membership is collectively unable to reach a deal on something 
as beneficial as trade facilitation, it is very hard to see how it can come to an 
agreement on anything else. 
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Therefore, WTO Members should focus on reducing and eliminating as many 
square brackets in the trade facilitation text as possible ahead of Bali. Although 
there were still more than 500 brackets in the text by the end of the summer, quick 
progress is within reach on at least half of them. Many of the remaining brackets 
could be removed following a handful of decisions relating to the level of ambition 
and the question of whether commitments should be binding or implemented on a 
best endeavors basis.  
 
2.1.2 Agricultural issues 
An eventual deal in Bali will not just depend on trade facilitation. Several issues 
related to agriculture and special provisions for LDCs are likely to be included, and 
finding the right balance to make a package acceptable to all is likely to be a 
challenge for WTO Members.  
 
The fate of the G-33 proposal on food security in agricultural issues is closely 
linked to progress of a trade facilitation deal. This proposal would allow 
government stockholding and purchases from low-income farmers at subsidized 
prices to be excluded from WTO subsidy spending limits. The US, the EU and 
others argue that it is not possible to agree to such fundamental changes in the 
WTO agricultural subsidy rules in the short time remaining before Bali, and have 
proposed instead to establish a work program to address the G-33’s concerns. 
 
The G-33 food stockholding proposal has now become a gateway issue for the 
Bali meeting. India has expressed support for a trade facilitation deal which would 
generally benefit Members, on the condition of a proper consideration of the food 
stockholding proposal. The US, together with other developed country members, 
however, has cautioned against any fundamental rebalancing in the existing 
agricultural subsidy disciplines. Since there is not much time left to address any 
amendments, members should focus instead on a post-Bali work program which 
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includes the G-33 proposal. 
 
A peace clause could be an effective and feasible alternative means by which to 
reflect the interests of both the US and India. Although a peace clause is an 
interim solution, India and Indonesia could avoid arguments between WTO 
Members over domestic subsidies on agriculture. At the same time, it does not 
require any changes to current disciplines on domestic support in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and could thus serve the interests of 
developed countries.  
 
On the other hand, the G-20 proposal on agricultural TRQ (tariff rate quota) 
administration will be part of the Bali package. There has so far been no 
significant opposition to the G-20 proposal on improving tariff-quota transparency 
procedures.  
 
However, the US and the EU both have clearly expressed their opposition to the 
G-20 farm export competition proposal on the grounds that it would upset the 
balance of the DDA’s agricultural package. 
 
Therefore, one can reasonably expect both the G-33 proposal on food security for 
low-income farmers in developing countries and the G-20 proposal on agricultural 
TRQ administration to be included in the Bali package. 
 
2.1.3 Addressing the special interests of LDCs 
The least-developed country (LDC) group has put forward a proposal on duty-free 
and quota-free (DFQF) treatment on imports from LDCs. They have also called for 
a Bali decision on simplified and flexible preferential rules of origin to enhance 
LDC exports under the DFQF system, and the convening of a signaling 
conference in order to operationalize a 2001 waiver granting preferential treatment 
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to LDC services and service suppliers. It is reported that a further proposal on 
cotton can be expected from the Cotton 4 countries. 
 
Although DFQF is key to the interests of LDCs, it is a very sensitive issue for the 
US, which is under pressure from its domestic textile producers not to cede 
additional market access to major LDC textile exporters. As it has throughout the 
DDA, the US continues to oppose the proposed DFQF market access initiative for 
the LDC package. Furthermore, the US insists that any future DFQF commitments 
would have to be made not only by rich countries, but also major by emerging 
economies, such as Brazil, China, and India. It would appear unlikely that 
developed countries unilaterally open their markets without some sort of 
reciprocity from the highly competitive emerging economies. 
 
There seems at this stage little likelihood of forward movement on DFQF or on 
agricultural export support measures in Bali. However, such LDC interests of 
LDCs could usefully be included in a post-Bali work program. A similar outcome 
appears likely on the cotton issue.   
 
The Doha Round being a development round, it is not realistic to expect a 
compromise without genuine advances on issues of priority LDC interest.  There 
are, as it happens, several potential items for the LDC pillar of the Bali package. 
These include: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) waiver as well as the services waiver for LDCs. Fortunately, WTO 
members have already agreed to extend the TRIPs waiver for a further eight years 
– until 2021 – for its poorest members. The services waiver for LDCs is ripe for a 
meaningful outcome in Bali and responds to a strong push by the LDC grouping.  
Tangible deliverables on Aid for trade could usefully complete the Bali package for 
LDCs. 
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2.2. How can WTO Members use the Bali Ministerial meeting to impart 
renewed vigor to multilateral cooperation (including not only rule-making 
but also monitoring and dispute settlement functions) in the trade field?  
 
The Bali ministerial meeting in December cannot be a mere ‘housekeeping’ 
exercise like the last ministerial in 2011. The inability of Members to secure a 
credible package will not only mean failure in Bali but spell the end of the Doha 
negotiations and seriously jeopardize the multilateral system as a whole. Thus, 
the Bali ministerial meeting will not be able to impart renewed vigor to multilateral 
cooperation in the trade field without a successful outcome of Bali itself. 
 
Accordingly, WTO Members need to apply pressure on major members, and 
particularly the US, India, and China to commit more resolutely to an intensive 
and serious engagement in the Bali Ministerial conference. 
 
On the other hand, WTO Members need to agree a standstill in Bali. The global 
economic recession, which was triggered by the global financial crisis and has 
dragged in the wake of the euro-zone’s fiscal turmoil, is projected to continue for 
longer than expected. As the world economy languishes and growth in emerging 
countries decelerates, protectionist pressures are mounting in many quarters. A 
commitment to eschew such backsliding and stand still would send a strong 
signal in Bali. Growing concerns are indeed being expressed that the more recent 
wave of trade restrictions is no longer a temporary response to the crisis, but is 
rather becoming a means for countries to reclaim policy space with a view to 
providing industry support measures while shielding them from external 
competition. Not only have traditional trade remedy measures such as anti-
dumping and safeguard measures grown but other import restrictions, such as 
measures in the form of technology standards, government procurement or 
customs clearance, are also on the rise. In order to respond effectively to the 
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increasing number of trade restrictions, it is important for WTO Members to draw 
up preventive action plans. In particular, the Bali ministerial declaration should 
emphasize a substantial reduction in trade-restrictive measures accompanied by 
strong enforcement and surveillance, including under the trade policy review 
mechanism. 
 
2.3. What priorities should ASEAN and East Asian countries pursue at the 
Bali Ministerial? 
 
It is vital for ASEAN and East Asian countries to recognize that the Bali package is 
just an interim agreement, not the final outcome of the DDA negotiations. A 
number of ASEAN countries belong to both the G-33 and the G-20. East Asian 
countries group together countries that are both developed and developing. 
Indonesia, for instance, is not only a key member of the G-33 alliance, but also 
one of the major players in ASEAN. Taking all these facts into account, ASEAN 
and East Asian countries are well placed to serve as mediators between 
developing and developed country Members in the DDA talks. 
  
Accordingly, ASEAN and East Asian countries should give priority to reaching a 
compromise on a balanced set of deliverables in Bali. For example, Indonesia 
could persuade India to move towards the middle ground in finalizing a Bali 
package on the food security issue. A compromise on the issues of trade 
facilitation and food security between the US and India would likely unblock 
negotiations and pave the way for a successful conclusion of the Bali ministerial 
meeting. On the other hand, it is important to adjust the level of ambition of 
Members on every key issue, precisely because Bali is not the DDA’s final 
destination. 
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2.4. How relevant does the WTO remain to the process of deepening 
economic integration in ASEAN and East Asia, and to the trade governance 
priorities of ERIA member governments more broadly?  
 
With the WTO’s DDA negotiations languishing, the world has witnessed a 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) all over the world in the past 
two decades. More recently, efforts towards regional economic integration have 
intensified, particularly in East Asia, by some ongoing negotiations on PTAs 
involving several countries, such as the TPP, the regional comprehensive 
economic partnership (RCEP), and the China–Japan–Korea (CJK) FTA 
negotiations. While such regional economic integration efforts are somewhat 
decoupled from the WTO, they are not irrelevant to the WTO and to the Doha 
Round.  
 
The multilateral trading system retains considerable relevance to the process of 
deepening economic integration in ASEAN and East Asia by virtue of its non-
discriminatory and comprehensive moorings. In pursuing regional economic 
integration, therefore, ASEAN and East Asian countries must keep these 
principles in mind and embed them as much as can be in the trade governance of 
ERIA member governments.  
 
The benefits of multilateralism and the limitations of regional deals are well known. 
Any meaningful advance of the WTO’s DDA negotiations in Bali will have a 
positive influence on regional economic integration in East Asia by providing 
useful guidelines on future directions for trade and investment liberalization and 
rule-making in the region.   
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2.5. How and in what areas can multilateral advances in Bali best serve and 
complement ASEAN’s march towards the realization of the ASEAN 
Economic Community by 2015?  
 
As already mentioned above, trade facilitation, services and DFQF for LDCs will 
help ASEAN’s efforts to form the ASEAN Economic Community. One of the 
outstanding issues for ASEAN in forming the ASEAN economic community is how 
to resolve issues that stem from the development gap among its member 
countries. A successful outcome in Bali would mean that the WTO would provide a 
potential solution to the development gap issue for ASEAN countries. If the Bali 
Ministerial Conference can deliver a credible outcome on issues dear to LDCs, it 
will help ASEAN to find a way to narrow the development gap among its members 
and to accelerate the pace of negotiations on the ASEAN Economic Community.  
 
2.6. Can soon-to-begin RCEP negotiations facilitate the process of 
multilateralizing regional advances?  
 
The process of multilateralizing regionalism is obviously related to the promotion 
of the non-discriminatory extension of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to 
other countries that do not participate in such talks. Issues taken up in a novel 
manner in PTAs should help to facilitate the process of multilateralizing 
preferential agreements.  
 
With 10 ASEAN members plus 6 countries in its membership, successful RCEP 
negotiations will shed light on multilateralism and help advance the WTO Doha 
Round negotiations. RCEP can serve as a test bed for multilateral trade 
negotiations since it has countries that vary in terms of the development levels, 
including major WTO players such as China and India as well as developed 
countries such as Japan and Australia, and some LDCs such as Lao PDR, 
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Cambodia, and Myanmar. Considering the representativeness of RCEP’s 
membership, RCEP negotiations can be relatively easily reflected in the WTO 
negotiations. 
 
Nonetheless, there are many challenges ahead for the RCEP negotiations. One of 
the most significant challenges is the lack of political leadership in RCEP 
negotiations. ASEAN on face of it is supposed to be a leader in this initiative. It is 
unclear however which members of ASEAN will drive the negotiations. Although 
China, Japan, and Korea are potential candidates for positions as a leader or 
mediator, they all remain silent at this point. Consequently, the facilitation effect of 
RCEP negotiations in the process of multilateralizing regionalism is still blurry. 
 
2.7. Can ongoing negotiations towards a TPP facilitate the process of 
multilateralizing regional advances? 
 
By the same token as discussed in the previous question and answer, the TPP will 
work similarly to the RCEP in facilitating the process of multilateralizing regional 
deals. Unlike RCEP, however, TPP involves members outside Asia. In particular, 
TPP is driven primarily by the US with the ambitious goal of achieving a WTO-plus 
agreement, emphasizing new rules and regulations and deeper market opening 
commitments. The negotiations are more or less concentrated on rule-setting and 
promoting the coherence of regulations including the adoption of region-wide rules 
of origin, intellectual property rights, and many other behind-the-border issues.  
 
If the TPP can produce a high quality outcome with high standards – touted by the 
desire of the US craft a “21st century comprehensive trade agreement” – the 
impact of the agreement on the WTO and the multilateral trading system will likely 
be significant. A WTO-+ TPP agreement will work as a potential stimulus for the 
WTO negotiations by putting more pressure on other Members to follow suit.  
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Since details of the TPP negotiations are not publicly available, however, the 
facilitating effect of the negotiation on the process of multilateralizing regionalism 
will be limited until the TPP agreement is finalized and opens its negotiation texts. 
As is well known, the transparency of PTAs is an important element in the process 
of multilateralizing regionalism.  
 
If both the RCEP and TPP negotiations are concluded separately, the remaining 
question will be how to converge or harmonize them so that the benefits from 
those deals can be maximized for participants. Another issue is how to extend the 
agreements to other countries that have not been a part of the two PTAs, so that 
more countries can benefit from them. In this respect, APEC’s vision of a Free 
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) may play an important role in merging 
RCEP and the TPP.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
WTO Members have fallen behind in their efforts to forge a deal on a package of 
deliverables for the December 2013 Ministerial Conference in Bali. Delegations still 
hold on to their earlier positions rather than engaging meaningfully in negotiations on 
the issues to be addressed in Bali. Thus, at this juncture, without accelerating the 
work on all fronts, shifting to a higher gear and showing greater determination, WTO 
Members seem unlikely to arrive in Bali with a relevant package of deliverables in 
hand.  
 
Such an impasse is largely due to the lack of engagement among Members on three 
pillars – agriculture, the LDC package and trade facilitation. Political will is needed to 
end the impasse. In particular, major countries should demonstrate some political will 
and take the lead in promoting policy convergence in Bali.  
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Everybody knows that failure in Bali is not an option. Failure to agree on a balanced 
package of concrete deliverables in Bali will make it extremely difficult to find a way 
forward for the Doha Round. Indeed, failure to secure a package in Bali will likely 
further erode the credibility of the WTO as a forum for negotiations and possibly spell 
the end of the moribund Doha Round of trade talks. Thus, the deliverables package 
must be designed to rebuild confidence in the WTO and serve as a stepping stone to 
an eventual Doha Round deal.  
 
In this respect, WTO Members must recognize that the time has come for all of its 
influential Members to show flexibility and respect for each other’s proposals. The 
key to bringing convergence to all three potential items is ‘honest’ engagement by all 
Members to ensure that the outcome delivers what is intended without undermining 
overall disciplines.   
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II.3 Singaporean Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration 
Hank Lim, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and Chair of ERIA 
Academic Advisory Council 
 
1. Introduction 
World trade governance is at a crossroads. For more than 60 years, the GATT/WTO 
advanced through two processes, liberalization and rule-making. In the past, the 
liberalization of world trade has been followed by a regular updating of trade rules to 
reflect the new realities of the world trading system. This twin process appears to 
have come to a halt as the Doha Development Round (DDR), launched in December 
2001, is still not finished and appears unlikely to become so anytime soon. 
  
Since the start of the 21st century, the WTO has achieved little success in 
negotiations on opening global markets. For the past 12 years, WTO Members have 
tried various negotiating modes and resorted to many different levels of engagement, 
including significant high-level participation. Yet many issues remain unresolved. The 
Doha Development Agenda is often cited as the most urgent task of the WTO at 
present. Underlying the immediate task of completing the DDR, the WTO is faced 
with major and unprecedented structural changes in the global trade landscape. 
Firstly, emerging economies and regions have become major growth poles. Secondly, 
the mode and process of trade have been changing and evolving. The recent work 
done on measuring trade in value added, by the WTO, the OECD and others, shows 
that global value chains are increasingly determining production location and trade 
and investment flows. Thirdly, another challenge for the WTO is the increase in the 
number of preferential agreements - bilateral and regional - that WTO Members are a 
party to. Lastly, global trade has become more complex as environmental, food and 
energy security issues have become intertwined with traditional trade issues. 
 
2. Addressing key challenges 
2.1 What should be the main agenda of the Bali Ministerial Conference if it 
51 
 
is to produce tangible outcomes? 
It is often argued that one of the main objectives of the 9th WTO Ministerial 
Conference is to conclude the long-delayed Doha Development Round (DDR). 
Having considered that there is as yet no general consensus on the issues of 
market access for agricultural products, services, and the linkage of trade and 
development, the odds are very much against a successful completion of the 
DDR any time soon. There is also a policy focus on putting together an ‘early 
harvest’ package to be agreed at the 9th Ministerial Conference (MC9) in Bali. It 
has been agreed that a balanced early harvest package would cover trade 
facilitation, including capacity-building components, together with development 
components in agriculture and a least-developed countries (LDCs) package. A 
successful outcome of the early harvest package will necessitate an intensive 
process of negotiations on its various elements in Geneva. 
 
At a minimum, the outcome of MC9 should be a strong reaffirmation and a 
concrete follow-up of the WTO principle of simplicity and predictability that comes 
with a single set of global trading rules that have benefited all countries and 
stakeholders for more than 60 years. Such an outcome, by maintaining 
confidence in an open, rule-based, fair and balanced trading system, would be in 
the shared interests of countries that have assigned to trade a central role as an 
engine of global economic growth. 
 
The DDR impasse is attributable to the process as much as the outcome. Due to 
rapid and major changes in the global economic situation and the global trade 
structure, plurilateral, regional and bilateral free trade agreements (PTAs) have 
become major components of the trading system’s landscape. Conceptually, the 
WTO-anchored multilateral trading system should remain the overarching 
framework to guide preferential trade agreements based on the basic principles 
of the WTO. Alternatively, the PTAs should serve as WTO building blocks  rather 
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than representing potential stumbling blocks. The regional economic integration 
(REI) process could serve as the mechanism for achieving the eventual outcome 
of a transparent, high-quality, and comprehensive trade regime, on the 
assumption that REI is based on and consistent with core WTO principles 
 
2.2 How can WTO Members use the Bali Conference to impart vigor to 
multilateral cooperation? 
It is the intrinsic responsibility of WTO Members, despite the recent proliferation 
of PTAs, to respect certain principles and governance edicts embedded in the 
WTO. For example, global value chains will function more efficiently under the 
multilateral trading system with one set of rules, standards and market access 
commitments. This can be contrasted to the more inefficient and higher costs of 
doing business based on multiple rules, standards and schedules of tariff 
reduction under PTAs. A recent survey conducted by the WTO indicated that a 
large majority of businesses believed that the WTO was vital for doing business. 
In addition, feedback from various sources has clearly demonstrated that the role 
of the rules-based trading system, the WTO’s unique dispute settlement 
procedures, and the monitoring of WTO commitments through peer review is 
important evidence of the continued relevance of the WTO. The current WTO 
system is deemed fair and equitable by the private sector, which is the driving 
force of trade as an engine of growth. Therefore, the Bali Ministerial needs to 
secure strong support from the private sector, consumers and other international 
organizations to impart vigor and strengthen international and domestic 
constituencies in support of multilateral cooperation. 
 
In order to reap the full benefits of trade, the multilateral trading system has to be 
inclusive. This entails involving the LDCs so that they can also benefit from 
greater market access opportunities. For trade to support structural 
transformation, an appropriate international and domestic enabling environment 
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must be established to provide a level playing field enabling LDCs to overcome 
their many structural challenges. In other words, WTO Members have to re-affirm 
and supply operational forms of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, for example, through aid for trade and the effective implementation of 
the existing Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for LDCs. Special and 
differential treatment should be based on providing a longer period for LDCs to 
adjust, rather than lowering the standards aspired to by various WTO agreements. 
 
2.3 What priorities should ASEAN and East Asian countries pursue at the 
Bali Ministerial? 
For the past sixty years, ASEAN and East Asia have hugely benefited from an 
open and multilateral trading system. The economic prosperity and dynamism of 
the region owes much to the WTO system. It is, therefore, incumbent on ASEAN 
and East Asian countries to strengthen the process and applicability of the WTO 
system by aligning and harmonizing their many PTAs to make them consistent 
with WTO rules and obligations. 
  
Specifically, as an open and dynamic region, it is advantageous to promote 
comprehensive, transparent, simple, rules-based and high-quality PTAs. For 
example, the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should 
strictly adhere to and be guided by the basic WTO principles. From an economic 
perspective, preferentialism is almost certainly sub-optimal, but from a political 
economy or practical viewpoint it offers a more feasible and convenient way of 
achieving desired integration outcomes. 
 
ASEAN and East Asian countries should strive for the adoption of regional 
dispute settlement procedures, as well as for transparent and predictable rules-
based trade and investment regimes consistent with WTO rules. In moving 
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forward on trade in services, ASEAN is striving to conclude a WTO-plus 
agreement. Many of the 29 chapters under negotiation in the TPP are new and 
are outside of the WTO’s disciplinary purview, such as ‘behind-the-borders’ 
horizontal issues of competition policy, new aspects of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and global value chains. 
These offer useful initial platforms for further, subsequent, discussions at the 
multilateral level. 
 
ASEAN and East Asian countries should strive to build a solid consensus among 
their members for strengthening WTO principles and rules by negotiating on trade 
in goods and services, investment and behind-the-border horizontal rules and 
regulations that would facilitate global value chain production, trade and 
investment. Even though PTAs are proliferating, WTO principles remain valid and 
would facilitate the negotiations and conclusions of the AEC, RCEP and TPP. It 
often appears as though the WTO and preferential initiatives are at odds with 
each other and going in opposite directions. In fact, it is both feasible and 
desirable that the WTO and PTAs be complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
PTAs can serve as useful experimental platforms to eventually ratchet up existing 
WTO agreements (or adopt new ones) to cover more sectors and involve more 
WTO Members based on an open accession principle as embedded in RCEP 
and the TPP. 
 
2.4 How relevant is the WTO to the process of deepening economic 
integration in ASEAN and East Asia and the trade governance priorities of 
EAS member countries? 
The process of deepening economic integration involves a lot of behind-the-
border issues such as competition policy, IPRs, standards and conformity 
assessment, harmonization and standardization of trade policies and domestic 
adjustment measures. The issue of relative benefits and costs is crucial to 
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participating members engaged in deepening economic integration. The rules-
based, predictable and transparent (uniformity of rules to stakeholders) system of 
the WTO is better adjusted and more effective in distributing the relative benefits 
and costs of deeper integration as there is wider policy space for Members to 
negotiate than there often is under PTAs. 
 
ASEAN and East Asia is a region of great diversity in terms development levels, 
modes of governance and the sophistication of public administrations. Therefore, 
by strengthening the WTO principles of transparency and harmonized trade 
governance, the AEC and RCEP processes would be facilitated and reinforced. In 
a situation of diversity and global economic uncertainties, a reinforced multilateral 
trading system can significantly contribute towards more global growth through a 
more efficient allocation of resources, division of labor and production networks. 
In fact, with the existence of a robust multilateral trading system, PTAs would be 
facilitated as the former provide guidelines, safeguards and a dispute settlement 
mechanism. The WTO system is a ‘first-best’ solution for engendering global 
growth, increasing employment, providing trade facilitation and achieving 
development goals. 
 
2.5 How do the TPP, RCEP and the realization of the ASEAN Economic 
Community facilitate the process of multilateralizing regional advances? 
The WTO is based on the most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment 
principles embedded in the multilateral trading system. These principles are the 
‘first-order-conditions’ for advancing and maintaining a rules-based, fair, and 
transparent global trading system. Paradoxically, this system is being gradually 
abandoned and eroded. If the multilateral trading system is robust and supported 
by its members, particularly by the world’s major economic powers, the 
proliferation of PTAs would not pose a threat to the WTO. Rather, such 
agreements can serve as important building blocks of the multilateral system. 
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Therefore, it is vital to initiate and structure PTAs based on the principles of the 
WTO and, if necessary, through the WTO’s variable geometry and other 
innovative approaches. 
 
The variable geometry approach relates to suggestions to pursue sectoral 
agreements. Examples include an agreement on environmental goods and 
services and the Information Technology Agreement 2 (ITA2). Another approach 
would be to pursue a plurilateral agreement on services outside the Doha 
mandate. The objective is to continue the process of opening up trade in a 
gradual, step by step, manner within a subset of like-minded Members. The vital 
issue is how these different approaches can be taken while at the same time 
respecting the principles of transparency and inclusiveness that are embedded in 
the WTO. 
 
Sectoral agreements among a subset of members are feasible if these members 
account for a critical mass of trade in the sector and if the benefits of the 
negotiations are extended to all WTO Members on an MFN basis. The ITA and 
the proposed Agreement on environmental goods and services are designed to 
be applied on an MFN basis. Both the ITA and the EGS (environmental goods 
services) were brokered within APEC and then taken to the WTO for multilateral 
adoption. These approaches are good examples of the complementarity that can 
and should be nurtured between regional and multilateral processes. In the same 
manner, many chapters being negotiated in the TPP, RCEP and the AEC can be 
extended on an MFN basis if they meet the criteria applied in the ITA and 
proposed agreement on EGS. Specifically, objectives relating to trade facilitation, 
to narrowing development gaps, as well as formula-based approaches to 
services negotiations in the AEC process could all lead to WTO-plus agreements. 
Many chapters being negotiated under the TPP are WTO-plus in design, and new 
issues outside the purview of the WTO can gradually be integrated into the WTO 
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process. 
 
In the second category, on a non-MFN basis, are formal plurilateral agreements 
under the auspices of the WTO. One example is the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), which was approved by all Members in Marrakesh and was 
recently upgraded and expanded in Geneva. Such non-MFN agreements may be 
negotiated within or even outside the WTO if they do not impinge on existing 
WTO rights and obligations. A plurilateral agreement on services that is currently 
being negotiated by a group of countries interested in deeper liberalization in 
services trade offers another example. Its application to other (non-participating) 
WTO Members has not yet been determined. If the negotiations are successful, 
the agreement could be structured as an Article V-compatible PTA agreement 
under the GATS. 
 
Indeed, high-level and non-discriminatory agreements in the TPP, in some 
chapters of the RCEP, and in the AEC, can serve as initial platforms to devise 
agreed negotiating modalities to widen the scope and application of new 
agreements on an MFN basis to all WTO Members. With increasing faith and 
confidence in the virtues and benefits of the multilateral trading system the 
process would, in turn, facilitate and expedite the ongoing process of PTA talks.  
In an increasingly polarized, uncertain and fluctuating global economy, there is a 
clear and convincing imperative for a workable and functioning WTO. Without its 
overarching global framework, regional integration through PTAs may engender 
instability and uncertainty in the global economy. Ultimately, the role of trade as 
an engine of growth could be greatly diminished. 
 
It is one of the great paradoxes of our time that we live in an interdependent 
world, but one that is administered and ruled by a governance system often 
driven by geo-political and geo-economic considerations. Such a fragmented 
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system is intrinsically non-transparent, arbitrary and unpredictable. 
 
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is based on the AEC Blueprint and its 
various pillars to achieve its objectives by 2015. The second AEC pillar relates to 
the creation of a competitive region and the fourth pillar concerns connectivity to 
the global market. The AEC concerns the regional economic integration of 10 
Southeast Asian Member States, but it subscribes strongly to the idea of an open 
region. The strengthening of the WTO would facilitate the realization of the AEC 
and subsequently of RCEP. In turn, ASEAN-initiated PTAs would become one of 
the building blocks of the multilateral trading system. 
 
The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference provides a strategic opportunity with 
potentially far-reaching implications for global growth over the next 20 years. With 
Roberto Azevedo of Brazil as the new WTO Director-General and holding the 
Ministerial in Bali, the birthplace of the ASEAN Economic Community and RCEP, 
all WTO stakeholders harbor high expectations that an important benchmark 
could be reached. Such a spark of confidence would instill faith in and impart 
dynamism to the WTO at this critical juncture of its young history. 
 
3. Conclusions 
At the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference, Trade Ministers must agree on innovative 
and workable mechanisms by which to reach a consensus on moving forward 
with the DDR and beyond. The traditional approach to negotiations has not been 
successful in concluding the DDR, as the WTO’s increasingly diverse 
membership has not been able to reach a consensus on a number of important 
issues. The central contention is not so much on the objectives of the DDR per se 
but on the process and approach to negotiations and the trade-offs needed to 
reach a consensus. Trade Ministers should seriously consider a confidence- 
restoring ‘early harvest’ package, and explore avenues where WTO-anchored 
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variable geometry and other innovative approaches may be pursued beyond Bali. 
Forward movement at MC9 would go a long way towards restoring trust and 
confidence in the validity and applicability of a transparent, fair, rules-based and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. It is particularly incumbent on East 
Asia and the Asia Pacific region, as the most dynamic economic region in the 
world, to take a pro-active, leading, role in restoring confidence in the WTO. In so 
doing, PTAs, at least initially those pursued in the region, must set visible and 
important examples by clearly upholding WTO principle and rules. The re-
affirmation of such a commitment requires an important agreement on the 
negotiating approach towards the DDR and beyond at MC9. Failure to reach a 
concrete milestone to move the WTO forward would further erode and undermine 
the principles that have served the world economy so well for more than 60 years.  
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II.4 ERIA Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration: a View 
from Japan 
Daisuke Hiratsuka, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) 
 
 
1. The new reality of global trade 
One of the prominent features of global trade is the rapid growth of intermediate 
trade. Roughly speaking, two things have shaped the current growth in global trade. 
First, firms are globalizing. Firms generally prefer multi-plant production to a single 
production plant. There are several reasons for this, two of which appear worth of 
emphasis in the context of global supply chains. One is the desire of firms to locate 
their production facilities near to their markets, which decreases the production risk 
for the firm and the transportation costs incurred by a customer, as well as enabling it 
to respond more quickly to complaints about a defective product. The other is the 
wish to escape from congestion, such as increases in wage rates and land prices, 
and traffic jams, by seeking a more reasonable production location. Indeed, 
Japanese automobile makers have a total of 169 plants overseas: 97 are located in 
Asia, 19 in Europe and 19 in North America. 
 
Second, firms are specializing. Global competition has forced firms to achieve 
economies of scale by specializing in a few production processes, and outsourcing 
others according to location advantages. Keeping ‘headquarter services’ such as 
R&D, design, marketing, financing, and selection of first tier-suppliers in their home 
countries, multinational enterprises have located assembly facilities where labor is 
abundant. Due to specialization and outsourcing, production fragmentation has 
progressed not only at the final production stage, but also in other sequential 
production stages. Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) argue that if the service link costs 
of linking separated production blocks within a country and across countries fall, this 
will encourage production fragmentation. 
 
The combined result of firms globalizing and outsourcing has shaped a new reality of 
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global trade characterized by the emergence of global supply chains, operated by a 
final assembler and multi-tiered suppliers, based on either intra-firm or arm’s length 
trade. In particular, due to specialization and outsourcing, a large number of arm’s 
length suppliers participate in global supply chains. Furthermore, global competition 
has provided great opportunities to indigenous suppliers to participate indirectly in 
global supply chains. Therefore, the labor and capital of many countries are directly 
and indirectly employed in producing final export products. Now, global trade is not 
only a trade issue but also an issue of location of firms and industry. 
 
2. A misleading conventional view  
Conventional customs based trade data cannot adequately account for today’s global 
trade conducted by assemblers and multi-tier suppliers, and in which the labor and 
capital of many countries are engaged.  
 
First, the same product can be both an input and a final good. However, customs 
data cannot classify a particular product used as an input or a final good. An example 
of such a good is car tires: they are purchased both by firms, as an input into car 
production, and by final consumers who fit tires to their cars.  
 
Second, and more importantly, in global supply chains, customs data counts the 
value of the same product each time it crosses a border for further processing. As a 
result, the value of a final export product increases, which has led to the 
misunderstanding in an importing country that jobs are lost by an exporting country. 
The new trade reality is that labor and capital of many countries are employed either 
as inputs of goods or inputs of services, although the tasks of labor vary from 
economy to economy according to the stage of industrialization: the tasks of the US 
include ‘headquarter services’; R&D, design, marketing (financing, global production 
planning, including allocation of production by economy and region, and selection of 
first-tier suppliers), while one of China’s tasks is final assembly., One of ASEAN’s 
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tasks is providing inputs, while that of Japan is to provide materials.  
 
Discussions based on conventional customs based trade data might mislead trade 
and industrial policy-makers. We need a new measurement to allow us to see a real 
picture of global trade and to discuss trade and industrial policies in the context of 
global supply chains.  
 
3. Policy implications of TiVA for developing economies 
Trade in value-added (TiVA) data, which can be obtained by the application of the 
Leontief inverse matrix to international input–output (I–O) tables, make it possible to 
calculate the direct and indirect value-added generated by country’s exports.  
 
The Institute of Developing Economies–Japan External Trade Organization (IDE–
JETRO) and WTO (2011) estimated TiVA by using the Asian International Input-
Output Tables developed by IDE-JETRO. The above study by observed a 
fundamental change ‘from trade in goods to trade in tasks’ that has been taking place 
in the structure of international trade. This fundamental change suggests that the 
conventional way of thinking about imports and exports, based on customs data is 
increasingly outmoded.  
 
The second release of the OECD–WTO TiVA data in May 2013 covers 57 economies, 
including China, Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Noteworthy findings on Europe and Asia include 
the following: 
  
- Imports are inputs of exports. The foreign content of exports in Europe and Asia 
increased from 1995 to 2009. Thirty-three percent of all Chinese exports in 2009 
embedded foreign content, up significantly from 12% in 1995. The figures for 
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Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2009 were 50%, 38%, and 35% 
respectively.  
- Many economies are engaged directly or indirectly in producing a final exported 
product.  
- Services are inputs of exports. The service sector contributes over 50% of total 
exports of the US, France, Germany, and Italy, and nearly one-third of China’s 
exports, are provided by both domestic and foreign service providers. 
 
The above facts suggest that, in order to build a resilient economy or an export 
platform, imports and services are essential ingredients. What then are the policy 
implications of TiVA for developing economies? In the earlier age of international 
production, a large economy was an advantage for industrialization. But in these 
days of global supply chains and production fragmentation, it is a different story. 
Even a small economy can invite a few production processes to start industrialization 
by improving connectivity. Multinational enterprises are continually assessing the 
location advantage of each city and economy. Indeed, in 2003, there was no modern 
manufacturer in Lao PDR or Cambodia. But now there are many. Nikon operates in 
Laos, and Minebea, a world market leader in the manufacturing of ball bearings, 
does so in Cambodia. Both ASEAN Member countries are today industrializing 
rapidly.  
 
4. Theories of firm location in globalization  
Considering how the globalizing and outsourcing strategies of firms is shaping 
current global trade patterns via global supply chains, a critical matter for trade 
increasingly concerns the issue of firm location.  Not surprisingly, the theory of firm 
location in the age of globalization has been undergoing rapid change.  
 
Krugman (1991) argued that, in order to realize economies of scale while minimizing 
transportation costs, manufacturing firms tended to locate in regions with large 
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markets. Therefore a country can be differentiated into an industrialized core region 
and an agricultural periphery region. This theoretical argument on the geographical 
concentration of manufacturing based on the interaction of economies of scale with 
transportation costs concludes that in a high transportation cost economy, a small 
share of manufacturing tends to result in the presence of weak economies of scale. A 
contrario, with low transportation costs, a higher manufacturing share and strong 
economies of scale arise, such that circular causation sets in, and manufacturing will 
concentrate in whichever region gets a head start.  
 
The concentration of manufacturing, however, will tend to cause congestion, as 
mentioned above, and such congestion will increase not only production but also 
transportation costs. What will happen next as a consequence of the increase in total 
costs of firms? Congestion in a country’s industrialized core will generate dispersion 
forces to move manufacturing elsewhere. But where? 
 
Krugman and Venables (1995) provided an answer to this question by arguing that if 
transportation costs between two countries fall enough to offset the disadvantage of 
being further away from the market and suppliers, manufacturing will move out of a 
core industrialized region to another location. The international dispersion of 
manufacturing is more likely than dispersion from a core region to a peripheral region 
within the same country, because differences in wage rates between countries are 
larger than those within a country. Firms thus tend to explore new locations in foreign 
countries. 
 
The term ‘service link costs’ used by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) is equivalent to 
the term ‘transportation costs’ used by Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables 
(1995), although the former focuses on trade, while the latter pertains to geographical 
location. 
 
65 
 
To sum up, policies to decrease transportation costs, or ‘service link costs’, within a 
country lead to industrialization with concentration of manufacturing in a core city and 
thereby encourage production fragmentation. The above developments on a new 
reality of global trade and the location of firms provide insights that could be useful 
with respect to the Bali Ministerial meeting.  
 
The Bali Ministerial meeting should share a common understanding that current 
global trade proceeds along global supply chains in which a large number of 
countries are directly and indirectly engaged in producing final products. In other 
words, the labor and capital of many countries are employed, although tasks are 
different according to the location advantage and/or development stage of host 
countries. WTO Members can use the Bali Ministerial meeting to discuss issues 
beyond trade policy so that developing countries can better attract global production  
and insert themselves more meaningfully into global supply chains.  
 
Trade facilitation measures should be pursued by ASEAN and East Asia at the Bali 
Ministerial meeting. In order to reduce transportation costs, or ‘service link costs’, 
trade facilitation measures are the most effective. In particular, if a single-window 
system of export and import custom clearance procedures is launched at each border, 
this would improve the connectivity of periphery regions, accelerate economic 
activities, and eventually reduce development gaps not only between but also within 
countries.  
 
Agreement on the expansion of the Information technology agreement (ITA) should 
also be reached at the Bali Ministerial meeting. This would contribute to further 
develop global supply chains and strengthen ‘Asia’s World Factory’. 
 
In order to build a resilient economy and a strong export platform, connectivity 
between countries is critical. The WTO can contribute to changing the mindset from a 
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‘conventional view’ to a ‘new reality of trade’, that imports and services are necessary 
inputs for exports. The agglomeration of industry in China is a property of Asia that 
allows the region to increase its presence in world production: Asia accounts for more 
than 50% of the world’s automobile production, 62% of liquid display screens, 86% of 
smartphones and 100% of digital cameras.  
 
In global supply chains, services are vital inputs for exports. One of the major pillars 
of the ASEAN Economic Community is the liberalization of trade in services, but it is 
not as ambitious as compared to the AEC’s tariff elimination program under which 
tariffs will be eliminated (i.e. 0%) for almost all products. The liberalization of trade in 
services beyond 2015 will be necessary to realize the ASEAN Economic Community. 
Multilateral advances in the liberalization of services trade in the WTO will inspire 
further service liberalization by ASEAN. 
 
Currently, the AEC has achieved a high-level PTA among the ASEAN-6 members 
and the new members will reach a similar level by 2015. However, in pursuing 
economies of scale, the relevant markets of Asian firms is expanding from China and 
several ASEAN countries to the whole of East Asia, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and India. RCEP will be a new trade arrangement to facilitate such 
expansion and foster the emergence of leading regional and global firms. For this, 
RCEP should be a high-level PTA with cumulative rules of origin and common 
concession tariff schemes for goods and services liberalization, in particular, for 
Mode 3 (commercial presence). Therefore, the earlier RCEP is completed, the earlier 
and bigger the benefits to member economies.  
 
The on-going TPP negotiations have led to a discussion on global trade governance. 
Two mega PTAs (TPP and RCEP) are on-going alongside the US-EU TTIP. New 
international trade rules and market opening commitments have been developing 
outside the WTO. Several Asian countries are negotiating RCEP and the TPP. If 
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these two mega-PTAs feature divergent trade and investment disciplines, this would 
increase transaction costs and generate a confusing situation in business arising 
from overlapping and competing rules of the game. The harmonization of trade rules 
and negotiations among mega-PTAs will be a necessary step towards advancing 
such multinational trade arrangements. However, if such harmonization were to 
proceed as between the TPP and TTIP, ii would likely be rejected by developing 
countries as an attempt on the part of the US and the EU to impose their standards 
on the rest of the world. RCEP will play a very important role in providing a template 
for a PTA involving a large number of economies at different stages of development.  
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II.5 Towards the WTO’s Bali Ministerial Meeting: a View from Phnom Penh 
Vannarith Chheang, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) 
 
1. Expectations  
The upcoming WTO Ministerial Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, will be a milestone event 
and an important step towards the strengthening of the functions and practices of the 
global multilateral trading system and its increasing linkages with regional economic 
integration in East Asia. It is expected to deliver concrete results with practical and 
clear action plans based on the political will of WTO Members It is time to seriously 
reform the WTO. It needs to better respond to the dynamic changes in international 
trade and strengthen the nexus between trade liberalization, poverty reduction and 
sustainable development.  
 
Early harvest is an initiative to reap low-hanging fruits first before agreeing on other 
more complicated issues. The WTO should identify certain areas for early harvest, 
such as concrete measures to link trade with poverty reduction, further promote pro-
poor trade initiatives and their implementation, closely link trade with job creation and 
social protection systems, and integrate trade with an inclusive and green growth 
agenda. 
 
ASEAN and the WTO have intermittent but mutually beneficial relationships. The 
successful reform of the WTO will greatly benefit regional arrangements and 
integration. In return, successful and inclusive regional integration will contribute to 
promoting the global trading system. However, there are still challenges that need to 
be addressed. In the wake of the global economic crisis, trade protectionism through 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is on the rise in certain countries and there is a lack of 
political will to deepen the linkages between trade openness and investment and 
services liberalization. 
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2. WTO reform  
As a member-driven organization, the WTO is consensus based. The expansion of 
its membership reflects the relevance of this institution in promoting development and 
peace through trade facilitation and openness. Cambodia was the first least-
developed economy to join the WTO. It has shared some experiences and lessons 
learned with other least developed economies. 
 
Surveillance and dispute settlement are the core functions of the WTO. They have 
contributed to enforcing rules of international trade under the organization. However, 
the WTO needs to provide more and better technical support to the least-developed 
and developing countries.  
 
The negotiating function of the WTO has not progressed well due to the stalling of 
the Doha round, which was launched in 2001. Progress is mainly constrained by a 
lack of political will. The road ahead remains uncertain depending on whether the 
WTO Members can reach consensus on various trade- and services-related issues, 
particularly on non-tariff trade barriers and agricultural products.  
 
The WTO needs to improve the functioning of its governance system with collective 
and consensual coalition or a coalition of the willing on certain complicated issues.  
 
Preferential trade arrangements complement the slow progress of global trade 
negotiations. These arrangements are easier to negotiate and can more easily 
generate advances on new areas such as trade facilitation, with higher standards 
and levels of commitments.  
 
3. ASEAN priorities in Bali 
Trade openness and liberalization is the key driving force in economic development 
in East Asia. As the economic center of gravity shifts towards East Asia, it has greater 
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stakes and more responsibility for promoting the free-trade-based common rules and 
standards of the WTO. It is believed that through the promotion of preferential trade 
arrangements and negotiations, East Asia contributes to implementing and 
strengthening the rules and regulations of the WTO and, more importantly, facilitates 
common positions on certain complicated global trade issues, such as trade in 
services and agricultural products. In addition, economies in the region also 
challenge the global trading system to keep reforming in order to respond more 
promptly and effectively to the new dynamics of the international trade–investment–
services nexus. 
 
As regional production networks are closely interlinked with global supply chains, 
realizing the East Asian Community will require not only stronger internal integration 
but also strengthened ties between the region and the rest of the world. It is therefore 
necessary for the countries of the region to operationalize the roadmap for linking 
regional economic community building with the global trading system.  
 
The Doha Round needs to be re-energized with new momentum and commitment. 
Trade in agriculture plays a crucial role in poverty reduction and in narrowing 
development gaps. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) need to be collectively addressed 
otherwise they adversely impact on the development of international trade and 
investment. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the key to economic 
development and poverty reduction in the region. ASEAN and East Asian countries 
need to follow a common approach to linking the multilateral trading system with 
regional production networks, mainly supported by SMEs. 
 
Inclusive and green growth should be the ultimate goal of international trade. ASEAN, 
as a regional grouping, should take the lead in facilitating dialogue and building 
consensus within the wider Asia-Pacific region to promote pro-poor trade and green 
growth. A widening development gap is threatening peace and stability in the region. 
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It is therefore necessary to link trade with development in the region through the 
provision of technical support and market openness to pro-poor industries and 
sectors such as the agricultural sector and SMEs. 
 
4. The WTO: still relevant for ASEAN and East Asia?  
The WTO has played a significant role in facilitating trade liberalization and 
increasing the capacity of its member states to adapt to trade rules and norms. The 
member states of ASEAN have benefited significantly from their membership in the 
WTO. The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and other regional economic 
integration schemes use WTO rules as basic guiding principles.  
 
Due to the increasing need for trade and investment liberalization, ASEAN and East 
Asian countries have moved beyond the WTO by introducing a more open and 
preferential regional trading arrangement among themselves. However, ASEAN and 
East Asian integration is inclusive and has played an important role in promoting the 
norms and rules of the global trading system.  
 
5. Bali and the road to the ASEAN Economic Community  
Regional economic integration is part of global economic cooperation and norms. 
Adherence to the rules-based global system of trade and investment is required more 
than ever in a world of PTA proliferation.  Sustaining open and inclusive regionalism 
forms an integral part of the ASEAN community building process. By closely linking a 
single regional production network and a single market within global supply chains of 
production, services, and investment, ASEAN can maximize its economic potential 
and realize its inclusive regional economic integration aims.  
 
The upcoming multilateral trade discussions and negotiations in Bali should focus on 
reforming the WTO, especially in the field of linking trade with investment and 
services; with regional and global production networks; with exchange rate 
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governance; as well as linking trade with poverty reduction and green growth. It is 
necessary to find new ways and means to revive the Doha Round negotiations. This 
requires bold leadership with strong political commitment to push for an inclusive 
negotiation based on trust, mutual benefits, and transparent and fair rules. 
 
Linking trade with a reduction of development gaps in the region is fundamental to 
maintain peace, stability, and sustainable development. Trade and development need 
to go hand in hand with economic and social inclusion in order to be sustainable.  
 
6. Multilateralizing regional advances: RCEP and TPP 
The deadlock in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations has led some countries to look 
for alternative trade arrangements at the bilateral and regional levels. The Asia-
Pacific region, regarded as the most dynamic region in the world, has developed 
different layers of regional economic integration frameworks, such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) proposed by ASEAN and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) proposed by the United States.  
 
However, it is necessary to ensure that such PTAs do not become protectionist blocs. 
Such arrangements need to remain open, inclusive and outward-oriented. RCEP and 
TPP can complement each other in promoting regional economic integration and 
production networks although differences in standards and compliance levels may be 
expected to flow from them. It is expected that the realization of RCEP and TPP will 
help to boost trade and investment in the region and to tackle the issues of rules of 
origin and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The positive steps and developments taking 
place in trade and investment liberalization in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific will put 
pressure on the WTO to quickly reform and become more responsive to the 
demands for more trade openness and liberalization. 
 
7. How can regional trade arrangements complement the WTO? 
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Preferential trade arrangements need to be inclusive and open so that they 
complement the WTO. By producing a high-standard trading environment, the Asia- 
Pacific region will inspire other regions to follow suit. The inter-regional economic 
cooperation mechanisms, such as those between East Asia and Europe or East Asia 
and Latin America, can play an important role in linking different regional economies. 
Such trans-regionalism contributes to global trade and investment cooperation and 
integration. Moreover, regional trade negotiations can help to build consensus at the 
global level.  
 
The regional institutions need to have a section within their secretariats mandated to 
deal with WTO affairs. For instance, within the ASEAN Secretariat, a new section on 
ASEAN–WTO coordination should be created to ensure that WTO rules and 
regulations are observed and to facilitate discussions on WTO reforms at both the 
regional and multilateral levels.  
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II.6 ERIA Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration 
Gary Hawke, Senior Fellow, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
and Member of ERIA Academic Advisory Council 
 
1. Multilateralizing regional organizations 
Little can be expected from the WTO Ministerial in Bali in December 2013. However, 
global economic governance will be no less important in the future than it was in the 
past. The WTO should retain its position as the central coordinating institution. It 
should also retain important functions, including dispute resolution. Some minor 
agreements in Bali would be useful for maintaining the WTO as an institution. But 
‘business as usual’ cannot be sustained, and at Bali, the WTO should begin the 
process of converting itself into an institution that ensures the compatibility of a 
number of regional network institutions. It should also begin to adapt to the 
contemporary world by seeing its field of responsibility as ‘economic integration’ 
rather than ‘trade’. 
 
The world has changed. Politicians everywhere still think of ‘trade’ as putting things in 
boxes and sending them to customers who live in other countries, thereby gaining 
domestic jobs from wider market access. But the world is now one in which 
international production networks combine the resources of producers in several 
economies to serve customers who may be widely dispersed. Production networks 
depend on just-in-time manufacturing to common standards and consumer welfare 
depends on competition, mobilization of resources in relatively undeveloped 
economies, and innovation, which is spread among producers along a chain from 
initial innovator to final consumer. The issue is not ‘trade liberalization’ but integration. 
The task is not to cope with add-ons to the core business of market access for trade 
in goods, but to deal with an integrated package of goods, services, investment, and 
the whole range of regulatory issues which affect the ease of doing business across 
international boundaries.  
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We expect the WTO to manage the multilateral system directly in a way which deals 
with integration so-defined. The needs of economic integration as enunciated above 
require collaborative efforts by governments. Such efforts taking place 
simultaneously among 200 or so economies are hard to conceive, even with skilled 
negotiators rather than simplistic commentators. The participation of more parties 
makes any negotiation more difficult and this is sometimes offered as a reason why 
the WTO is unable to move beyond what was agreed in the Uruguay Round. There is 
undoubtedly some weight in this argument, but it is not complete. First, CGE 
modeling generates an equally persuasive argument that in general the more parties 
there are to a trade agreement, the greater the aggregate gains available. Secondly, 
GATT and WTO bargaining was never a debate among an increasing number of 
equals. The fundamental dynamic of GATT was bargaining among the ‘Quad’, 
Canada, the EU, Japan and the US, modified by adjustment to cater for undeniably 
important impacts on other economies. At the very least, we should amend the 
starting argument, that the WTO is paralyzed simply by increased membership, to 
the assertion that changes in the relative significance of specific economies have 
prevented the emergence in the WTO of a modified Quad. But more important is how 
economic integration has focused attention on the fact that what was previously seen 
as a matter of domestic regulation is now central to the management of international 
business. Economic diplomacy deals above all with knowledge and trust shared by 
participating governments. This is more likely to exist among smaller groups than 
among the whole membership of the WTO. The WTO will remain important as the 
guardian of the multilateral system, and in particular of the dispute resolution system, 
but it is likely to be a coordinator of a set of networks rather than a centralized 
hierarchy.  
 
Collaborative efforts among governments will probably be known as ‘negotiations’ – 
the word is used in the ‘Guiding Principles and Objectives’ agreed among ASEAN 
and its trading partners and endorsed by ASEAN leaders when RCEP was launched, 
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and it is standard terminology in the context of the TPP, TTIP and other proposed 
agreements. Because ‘trade’ will continue to be used as shorthand for economic 
integration diplomacy – the misplaced concreteness with which ‘trade’ has been used 
in much political and media commentary has become absurdly misleading but the 
word is too common to be displaced – we can be sure that ‘trade negotiations’ will be 
part of the vocabulary used to discuss those collaborative efforts. However, they 
need not resemble what became standard practices in WTO Rounds or in PTA 
‘studies’ and ‘negotiations’. (‘Studies’ have become the early stages of ‘negotiations’ 
in which governments retain the option of withdrawing without investing political 
capital in the achievement of a successful outcome.) In particular, conventional 
language with a known relationship to legal precedents need not be used, and as 
there does not need to be a single document recording everything that is agreed, 
there may be no ‘single undertaking’. This change should not be made lightly. 
Agreement that nothing is agreed until all is agreed was central to the institution of 
‘GATT rounds. The single undertaking was formalized in the Uruguay Round in 
response to dissatisfaction with the decision of many members of GATT to remain 
aloof from various codes which had been negotiated in previous rounds, to prevent 
opting out from agreements on new agenda items, and to dignify the transition from 
GATT to the WTO. However, its essentials go back to the origins of GATT and the 
idea that a comprehensive package allowed trade-offs among components and 
facilitated consensus. It has also been important in maintaining a genuine multilateral 
system which accords equal treatment to all participating economies. However, the 
MFN system was always qualified – by the Article 24 provision for PTAs, by the 
political adjustments for the ‘agricultural waiver’ to suit US interests, acceptance of 
the EEC to serve the geo-strategic interests of the US and its allies, acceptance of 
‘special and differential treatment’ for developing countries, and through the use of 
variable transitional periods in PTAs. Modern PTA developments, and now the move 
to economic integration clubs, are merely the latest modifications, and the crucial 
issue is preserving what remains relevant in a conventional understanding of 
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multilateralism.  
 
A ‘single undertaking’ remains attractive, not least to participants who give high 
importance to a component which other participants find especially difficult, notably 
agriculture. However, it cannot be accommodated in a rolling agenda of collaboration 
in which new issues arise and are incorporated. In a continuous process, there is no 
place for a ‘single’ conclusion. Negotiators have to find new ways to ensure that their 
particular concerns do not slip off the international agenda. This is one of several 
ways in which ‘trade negotiators’ will have to adapt to major changes in their task. 
And we have to expect that the continuation of ‘trade negotiations’ will disguise from 
many commentators how much the agenda of economic diplomacy has changed. 
(And overcome the nostalgia for the familiar, which leads to comments such as ‘you 
cannot negotiate trade facilitation’ or ‘I don’t know how to negotiate for supply chain 
operation.’ To which the appropriate reply is, ‘the modern international economy 
requires lifetime learning everywhere’.) While we might well criticize the content of 
many ‘trade negotiations’ it is unwise to overlook the continued potential contribution 
to desirable economic integration of such interactions. 
 
Some kind of club management will emerge. In the Asia and Asia Pacific regions, the 
leading candidates are TPP and RCEP. An ideal TPP would lead to a Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific. Another proposed mega-agreement is the Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP, and so two major players in future world 
economic governance could have the US at their center. The US initiative to seek 
closer engagement with ASEAN, announced in late 2012, may be an alternative path 
to the same end. The ‘Expanded Economic Engagement with ASEAN’ places 
emphasis on facilitation and collaboration on appropriate regulatory regimes, but it 
also suggests a focus on investment and standards that could easily distract ASEAN 
as a whole to the kind of wrangling already happening in the TPP discussions. The 
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balance of positive and negative effects is far from obvious.35 Alternatively, RCEP 
could make Asia one central player, along with NAFTA, the EU, and whatever 
evolves in Latin America and Africa. A central role of the WTO would be to ensure 
that the rules agreed by these mega-agreements are not incompatible, and 
continually simplifying them where possible into a single set of rules. The objective 
remains a multilateral trading system but its meaning should be updated to reflect the 
modern world. 
 
2. Facilitation, liberalization and integration 
The WTO would certainly benefit from some more immediate gains, but they are not 
easy to determine. It may be possible to extend the agreement on market access for 
information technology goods proposed under the ITA2 negotiating process. This is 
worth doing, perhaps more for the symbolism of success than for any major gains in 
consumer welfare. Entrenching a boundary between ‘information technology’ and 
goods and services in general creates an arbitrary definition which will later have to 
be removed. Furthermore, the usual theory of the second best warns us that 
liberalizing market access for a subset of commodities is not necessarily welfare 
enhancing. Nevertheless, the demonstration effect of enhanced cooperation across 
boundaries makes the dangers worth risking. 
 
More is to be gained by exploring whether there are not better ways to deal with 
services than by trying to extend the traditional approach of trading concessions that 
has been used for trade in goods. While international trade in services can be done 
directly through cross-border supply, as with some business services; through 
movement across borders to engage in consumption, as with education and health 
services; or through movement of natural persons across borders to perform a 
service, as with some engineering operations, a commercial presence in the 
destination market is often necessary, and commercial presence usually requires 
                                                              
35  Cf. Andrew Elek ‘US commits to ASEAN integration’ East Asia Forum (25 November 2012). 
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supporting investment. There is a direct link between trade in services and an 
increasing flow of international investment. It is well known that conventional 
statistical measurement of trade in services is underestimated because of 
conventions that record some transactions as investments rather than trade flows. 
Statistical mis-measurement is an inconvenience; international trade in services is a 
potential source of enhanced productivity in both source and destination economies. 
We know that gains are possible – since marginal equivalences across borders have 
not been realized. We also know that the traditional practice of ‘requests and offers’ 
in WTO negotiations have not been fruitful and that no alternative procedures have 
yet been adopted. For example, it might be worth changing the burden of proof and 
require parties to reduce barriers to international service flows identified by possible 
trading partners unless a convincing rationale for the barrier can be generated. 
Obviously that would require a great deal of experience in developing the idea of 
‘convincing’ but it is no more than a development of the accepted idea of 
transparency, and the idea of a ‘bound’ tariff rate was just as experimental in the 
1950s. 
 
The close connection between services and investment highlights the need for the 
WTO to begin more intimate dialogue with global financial institutions. For 
international production networks, services trade is not a minor supplement to trade 
in goods but is essential to business operations, and because services trade cannot 
be separated from international investment flows, trade and investment have to be 
considered together. The conventional separation of real and financial integration is 
deeply entrenched in international economic governance through the WTO on the 
one hand and the World Bank and IMF on the other, but it is incompatible with how 
the global economy has changed.  Quick or easy fix are not readily available but the 
WTO should begin familiarizing all its Members with what is at stake. Asian members 
could usefully discuss the learning processes associated with AMRO, and ASEAN 
members could usefully discuss their individual experiences of how financial 
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regulators learn to consider regional interests rather than only the application of 
entirely domestic rules. These may seem to be small steps, but they will help the 
WTO to begin what will necessarily be a lengthy process. It will exemplify the process 
of ‘learning together’ which is needed for progress in global economic governance, 
something very different from conventional discussion of capital controls and 
exchange rate regimes divorced from the needs of international business. 
 
A similar refocusing is required if the WTO is to make a real contribution to reducing 
development gaps. There may be some gains available through market access for 
the exports of the least-developed countries or other aspects of ‘special and 
differential’ treatment but the effects of what can be agreed are unlikely to be large. 
More is likely to be gained by facilitating the spread of production networks to utilize 
the relatively low-cost labor which is available in those economies. 
 
This will require unilateral attention to the conditions under which foreign and 
multinational business can operate, but it also requires appropriate management of 
intellectual property and standards. These are the frameworks for innovation, not just 
introducing processes and products which are new to the global economy as a whole, 
but also introducing ways of doing business which are new in least-developed 
economies and which are the means by which incomes grow. However, participation 
in production networks requires access to standards and intellectual property. 
 
Standards have long been part of the agenda of technical barriers to trade since 
standards purportedly adopted for consumer safety or to provide for interconnectivity 
among products (between for example fire hydrants and fire-hoses) could be used to 
preclude competition between imports and domestic products. But standards have 
become much more important because of the need for interoperability among 
members of international production networks. In turn, standards can be private 
property and thus an important part of intellectual property (IP) rules. Public policy 
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conceives IP as finding the optimal balance between encouraging invention and 
disseminating knowledge so as to promote the efficient use of resources. But there 
can well be conflicts between economies where patents are held and economies 
which seek to innovate. 
 
The demands for adjustment are enormous. One of the three competing 3-G 
standards is protected by more than 2000 patent families comprising more than 6000 
patents from 50 companies and consortia. A smart phone involves hundreds of 
standards coming from dozens of standard-setting organizations – camera, video, 
web browser, PDA, Wi-Fi etc. Eight thousand patents for smart phones are held by 
41 companies.36 Patents are merely part of the issue; they are much used in some 
industries such as pharmaceuticals whereas other industries rely on continual 
innovation for firms to remain ahead of the competition.37 For some industries, not 
only the print media, but also films, software developers and internet service 
providers, it is copyright which is crucial and whereas economists tend to think of 
‘intellectual property regimes’, IPR lawyers have a long tradition of separate rules for 
copyright and patents.  
 
The economic issue is the same, balancing incentives offered to creators of new 
knowledge with the public interest in disseminating knowledge of how to make the 
most effective use of resources in generating consumer welfare. The ideal or even a 
‘high-quality’ IPR provision is not the one which provides the longest period of 
protection to the existing property holder, but the one which strikes the best balance 
between incentives to innovators and facilitation for knowledge-users. 
 
We read American complaints about stolen intellectual property but the biggest 
                                                              
36  Dieter Ernst Indigenous Innovation and Globalization: The Challenge for China’s 
Standardization Strategy (UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and East-West 
Center, June 2011), p. 44. 
37  Bronwyn H. Hall, Christian Helmers, and Thomas Juster ‘The Importance (or Not) of Patents to 
UK Firms’ NBER Working Paper No. w19089 (May 2013). 
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engine of change in the Chinese intellectual property regime is the challenge to 
legitimate Chinese businesses as they respond to attacks from illegal producers.38 
The process is one which has occurred many times before,39 but it can also be 
facilitated by international agreements. They must deal with the desired balance and 
not merely with the enforcement of unduly lengthy protection for property holders. 
International agreements include commitments by firms and the governments of 
advanced economies to ensure ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory’ access to 
standards and patents and the elucidation and application of such clauses is 
important. There have been legal cases in the US about corresponding provisions in 
US law in which judges have assessed their own valuation of royalties which may 
induce companies to be more accommodating40 and the US has also experienced 
the problems of writing rules which are operational but do not encourage 
opportunistic behavior.41 
 
The above problems are inherently more difficult to solve in an international setting. 
What we should look for in Bali is for the WTO to initiate a process by which it joins 
with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in the search for optimal 
international IPR rules. 
 
‘Technology transfer’ is still widely understood as it was in the 1960s, to refer to 
vehicles for official aid. It now relates to the terms of participation in international 
supply chains. In any case, the term is antiquated: the better conception is 
‘technology sourcing: strategies of technology-using companies and countries that 
involve search, absorption, learning, diffusion, as well as innovations – especially 
incremental innovations – that convert ideas, inventions, and discoveries into new 
                                                              
38   Ernst, p.82.  
39  David Clayton ‘Trade-offs and rip-offs: Imitation-led industrialization and the evolution of 
trademark law in Hong Kong’, Australian Economic History Review 51(2) (July 2011), pp. 178–
98. The same story can be told in terms of US economic history. 
40  ‘Free exchange: Standard procedure’, Economist 407 (8835) (11 May 2013). 
41  Edward Wyatt ‘Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out “Patent Trolls”’, New York Times (4 June 
2013); editorial ‘Fighting “Patent Trolls”’, New York Times (5 June 2013). 
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products, services, processes, and business models.’42 
 
We cannot avoid the tension between standards and innovation. Standards can 
freeze technology. That can be an incidental by-product of the search for ‘fitness for 
purpose’ and interoperability. Or it can be the deliberate result of firms seeking 
competitive advantage by manipulating access to intellectual property. An 
international regime for managing Intellectual Property and Standards is an essential 
component for economic integration. But it is no easy task. Any idea of a uniform 
international intellectual property regime has to be complex. For most economies, 
economic development is a matter of catching up with the frontier. In poor countries, 
a weak IPR regime is optimal to encourage dissemination, utilization of knowledge 
from abroad should be preferred to incentives for innovation. Advanced economies 
will naturally prefer stronger IPR regimes. That can be derived as an abstract 
argument, or it could be deduced from the economic history of many countries, 
including the US, which was not known for its ready adoption of European copyright 
agreements in the nineteenth century. American practice then – and well into the 
twentieth century – is a useful antidote to USTR advocacy now. It is not surprising 
that patents and intellectual property issues are among the issues proving to be 
contentious in the TPP negotiations,43 but they will be even more problematic when 
considered in conjunction with China’s participation in moving from TPP to FTAAP.44 
 
As well as genuinely addressing development gaps in this way, the WTO at Bali 
could seek progress on trade facilitation. The aim should be simply to supplant the 
current narrow WTO conception of ‘facilitation’ in terms of customs procedures with 
the wider concept of extending ‘ease of doing business’ which is explicit in APEC and 
                                                              
42  Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton ‘Global Technology Sourcing in China’s Integrated Circuit 
Design Industry: A Conceptual Frame-work and Preliminary Findings’, East-West Center 
Working Papers Economics Series No. 131 (August 2012). 
43 Claude Barfield ‘The TPP: A model for 21st century trade agreements?’ East Asia Forum 25 
July 2011. 
44  A similar argument can be developed relating intellectual property rules and attractiveness to 
FDI. Cf. Hodaka Morita ‘FDI and Technology Spillovers Under Vertical Product 
Differentiation’, APEC Economies Newsletter Vol.15 No. 08 (September 2011). 
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at least implicit in both the TPP and RCEP. Streamlining customs procedures is only 
part of the wider ‘logistics improvements’ which has been extensively documented in 
ERIA research and which connects readily with ASEAN ideas of ‘connectivity’ and 
hence the pursuit of inclusive growth through narrowing development gaps. The 
WTO could well benefit from all this Asian experience, perhaps beginning by seeking 
a dialogue with the World Customs Organization in parallel with that with WIPO. 
 
3. Undertakings, single and otherwise 
The ideal institution for facilitating economic integration in the modern global 
economy would have a wide mandate. Its central focus would be promoting positive 
interactions that reconcile important social and cultural customs with the removal of 
barriers to international commerce. It would seek to promote competition wherever 
this could be expected to enhance consumer welfare. It would look especially 
towards reducing impediments to the operation of international production networks. 
It would seek to resolve disputes and issues that arise in managing intellectual 
property rights, including accessibility and dissemination of standards. It would deal 
with impediments to flows of services and therefore of investment which facilitate 
cross-border business. And its mandate would extend to the movement of people, 
especially those with skills which are needed by international production networks in 
specific places, but also as skill-acquisition in employment grows in significance 
relative to basic education, to movement of people able to acquire new skills. The 
institution would understand that its task is not simply to implement well-understood 
rules but to evolve new rules as issues not foreseen are encountered. It would be an 
institution suited to a world of networks rather than of established organizations and 
hierarchies, and a world of relational contracting rather than black-letter law. The 
ideal is some distance away.  
 
My emphasis has been on persuading WTO Members in Bali to establish paths 
towards securing the long-term future of the multilateral trading system. That means 
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embracing the concept of economic integration rather than being satisfied with trade 
negotiations aiming at market access. It means embracing plurilateral agreements 
while ensuring that regions remain active participants in world economic governance. 
 
A particular challenge is preserving the possibility of new adherents joining the major 
plurilateral agreements. This amounts to no more than maintaining the most 
elementary component of the widely accepted ideal of ‘open regionalism’. 
 
Especially worrying is the likely provision in TPP for widening its membership. US 
leadership really matters here. While several parties to the TPP negotiation support it 
only as a step towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and so look forward to 
membership by the North Asian economies of China, Japan and South Korea, some 
observers of US political processes see Chinese and even Japanese membership as 
unlikely or problematic. (This is distinct from the point that several noneconomic 
commentators, in the US and elsewhere, see TPP as an instrument for the 
containment of China. While there are certainly proponents of such a position, it is 
not supported by the Administration.) But US processes require Congressional 
endorsement of economic agreements, and If the TPP ends up being a set of related 
bilateral agreements (a bowl of noodles within a bowl of noodles), for which the US 
has thus far revealed a preference, China will have to negotiate bilaterally with the 
US in order to join a broader TPP – no matter what the wishes of other members; 
and any agreement would require separate approval by the United States Congress. 
That is rightly viewed by China as a set‐up.45 
 
It is somewhat ironic given the political situation in Washington, that to get the TPP to 
                                                              
45  Shiro Armstrong ‘China’s Participation in TPP’ APEC Economies Newsletter Vol.16 No. 05 
(July 2012). Sourabh Gupta has also commented, ‘Once/if TPP is signed and implemented, 
inviting new members (China) will require a change in existing law ... which means a vote in 
Congress to change the law ... which will not happen because in White House–Congress 
consultations, the former will not be given formal or informal authority to negotiate in the first 
place.) And to suggest that it could, or should, will be seen as unrealistic, and ultimately 
therefore, unserious.’ (I am grateful for permission to quote this extract from private 
correspondence.) 
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the starting line as a potential positive step towards economic integration in the 
modern world, a major change in US legal procedures (and probably in US law) is 
required.  
 
RCEP is less advanced than the TPP. The modalities which will be used are not yet 
apparent. The agreed objectives, which were negotiated by all ASEAN members with 
the existing ASEAN FTA partners, include provisions for delayed entry by an ASEAN 
PTA partner that did not participate at the outset. ‘The RCEP agreement will also 
have an open accession clause to enable the participation of any ASEAN PTA 
partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations and any other external 
economic partners after the completion of the RCEP negotiations’. The term ‘any 
other economic partners’ is ambiguous, but the emphasis on ASEAN centrality 
elsewhere in the document probably means that accession will require a PTA with 
ASEAN. The experience of Hong Kong’s proposed accession to the China-ASEAN 
FTA points in the same direction. 
 
In practice, accession of any but a very small economy to an existing agreement 
requires some consultation on how the terms of the agreement apply in the particular 
circumstances of the acceding economy. (The US did not even consider using the 
open accession clause of P4 before initiating negotiations to join P4 and make it into 
the TPP.) There is therefore the possibility of political gamesmanship in any 
accession, and RCEP too needs some further consideration of its accession 
provision. There is, however, a useful precedent in the evolution of the ASEAN 
Economic Community. 
 
The ASEAN Economic Community is scheduled to be complete in 2015. In this 
context, ‘complete’ is not a precise term, but we need appropriate monitoring to know 
what tasks remain to be done and which of these are most important. Governments 
and their officials do not readily acknowledge that targets will not be met. Officials like 
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to count what is simple and can be presented in a good light. 
 
To their credit, the governments and officials of ASEAN sought honest assessment 
rather than comfort in distorted data. ERIA was commissioned to conduct a Mid-Term 
Review of the ASEAN Economic Community. It constructed a Scorecard which is not 
a checklist of declared objectives but a genuine scrutiny of what was intended, a 
careful review of whether declared intentions have been implemented, and an 
assessment of whether the expected economic outcomes are being realized. 
 
The resulting review provides a generally positive assessment of how the ASEAN 
Economic Community will be in place in 2015. There will be gaps, and governments 
have been given guidance on what they should set as their priorities. 
 
This exercise has several interesting implications. It shows that reaching a desired 
end does not depend on an external agency able to impose sanctions. Learning from 
European experience requires effort, and notions that ASEAN is copying the EU are 
simplistic. Nobody can look at European experience in recent years and think that 
making obligations subject to supranational monitoring guarantees implementation. 
What is important is not declarations and signed agreements, but commitment to 
shared objectives and frequent discussion of how barriers to implementation can be 
overcome, including through cooperation. The ‘ASEAN Way' has a great future. 
 
Secondly, engagement of an independent but ‘inside’ agent like ERIA can help to 
reconcile technocratic expertise with democratic control. ASEAN governments retain 
control and answer directly to their electorates. ‘Track 1.5’ ERIA benefits from official 
information and respects confidentiality, but informs governments, officials and the 
public about where expectations are not being realized and what can best be done 
about it. 
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There are many areas of economic diplomacy where a similar mechanism could be 
useful. An especially important one relates to accession clauses in plurilateral 
agreements. Make the process of entry as technocratic as possible by engaging a 
track 1.5 institution like ERIA to assess whether an applicant is indeed reforming its 
own institutions and processes in a sensible way so as to satisfy the collective's 
ambitions. There will still be plenty of room for political debate, but it will be 
constrained. 
 
One of the tasks for the WTO as it seeks to ensure that plurilateral agreements are 
open to new members is to endorse a process such as the one ASEAN used for the 
mid-Term Review and to compile a list of institutions which could be entrusted with a 
technocratic assessment (the OECD might well serve a similar purpose for European 
and trans-Atlantic agreements, ERIA for Asian ones, etc.) 
 
4. Conclusion 
At Bali, WTO members should take whatever gains in liberalization are available, but 
they are likely to be small.46 It is more important to establish a positive start on 
longer-run strategies for preserving the multilateral trading system by positioning the 
WTO as its guardian at the center of a network of plurilateral clubs which can 
experiment with the regulatory changes needed for economic integration in a world of 
production networks, with special emphasis on services and investment, shared 
global governance with financial institutions and organizations like WIPO and WCO, 
standards and IP regimes, and open accession clauses. 
 
  
                                                              
46  Claude Barfield ‘A Realist's View of the Global Trading System’, Real Clear Markets (1 May 
2013). 
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II.7 A Small Country Perspective from ASEAN 
Erlinda M. Medalla, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) 
 
1. The WTO and PTAs: the Philippine perspective 
There is deepening pessimism, if not downright despondency, about the prospects 
for achieving progress in the Doha Round of the World Trading Organization (WTO) 
and consequently, a growing concern about the future of the world trading system. 
Accordingly, a lot has been written about the current state of the WTO, what could lie 
ahead, and what possible actions could be taken. The ninth WTO Ministerial meeting 
will be held in Bali in December 2013 to once again try to find effective ways forward. 
This short chapter aims to contribute to the discussion leading to the Bali meeting, 
from the perspective of an ASEAN country like the Philippines. 
 
With the protracted stalemate in concluding the Doha Round, different forms of 
alliances and agreements have emerged. Among the most documented is the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) during the past two decades. 
Debates abound about whether these are likely to become building blocks or 
stumbling blocks for multilateralism, and certainly, there could be both centrifugal and 
centripetal forces which could work either way in determining the final outcome.  
 
Like many other countries, the Philippines was characterized in the past by a heavily 
protectionist trade regime. Starting in the 1980s, it embarked on unilateral trade 
liberalization reforms, even before joining the WTO. It has been a firm supporter of 
the WTO principles, and continues to place primary importance on multilateralism. It 
is a latecomer to PTAs, and even now, is only active in pursuing preferential 
arrangements as part of ASEAN, except for its lone bilateral agreement with Japan.  
 
From the perspective of a developing country like the Philippines, the direct 
challenge it faces is how to deal with the changing global trading system, a stalled 
WTO Doha Round and evolving regionalism. Given its own domestic constraints, it 
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needs to sort out what trade policy options are available and which of these would be 
most suitable and complementary to its own development goals. 
 
The Philippines is a developing country with limited resources for engaging in 
negotiations. Its first priority is to improve its domestic conditions, upgrade its 
capability and ease domestic constraints, actions which are also necessary to enable 
the country to maximize the benefits from PTAs. At the same time, with the slow 
progress in the WTO and the negotiations that are already ongoing, it realizes that it 
needs to contend with possible negative impacts of being left out of certain PTAs and 
missing out on opportunities from positive investment and the trade creation effects 
of joining the latter agreements. Hence, while the WTO remains the basic framework 
of its trade policy, the current stance is to be open to possible PTAs while at the 
same time being cautious and selective with regard to its partners.  
 
The prospective PTAs with significant potential benefits, complemented with 
elements of cooperation and technical assistance, would be its priority. At the top of 
the list would be the ASEAN initiative to establish a Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) with the other six East Asian Dialogue 
partners. It will be forging an agreement with already existing FTA partners, and 
could eliminate the messy noodle bowl effect of these ASEAN+1 FTAs. Even where it 
needs to commit more, RCEP also takes into consideration the different levels of 
development of participating countries, thereby offering appropriate forms of flexibility. 
Finally, it adheres to WTO principles, especially with its open accession principle that 
allows participation of any of the ASEAN dialogue partners. 
 
To sum up, the Philippines still looks to the WTO to provide the basic global trading 
framework and the WTO remains the primary trade forum for the country. In addition, 
the Philippines already has the necessary bureaucracy, capacity and experience to 
deal with the WTO. Nonetheless, it recognizes the advantages of regionalism.  
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2. Multilateralism and regionalism: ASEAN and East Asian perspectives 
In East Asia, regional economic integration, which was mainly market-driven at the 
start, has adopted a more formal process of regionalism (Medalla and Balboa, 
2011).47 While the formation of PTAs is likely to continue, the good news, especially 
in East Asia, is that there is a conscious effort being made to minimize the risks in 
such arrangements. The ‘new age’ regionalism, at least in terms of the concept and 
the policy process, has adopted some features to mitigate some of these risks. For 
example, despite the loose WTO (and GATS) provisions governing PTAs, these 
agreements are generally explicit about being WTO consistent. This being adopted 
among the basic principles of the PTAs (however seemingly contradictory in nature) 
is no small matter. In addition, many small countries entering into such agreements 
are aware of the risks and see PTAs more as a testing ground and a mechanism for 
capacity building to face eventual global competition. Hence, there is scope for a 
mutually reinforcing interface between multilateralism and regionalism. 
 
Nonetheless, while ‘new age’ regionalism thus far appears to be a viable option, and 
possible support to waning multilateralism, any further erosion of the multilateral 
trading system could dissolve their complementary interface. In addition, there is 
some doubt about the eventual form of the mega-blocs currently under negotiation –
particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving the US and the other Asia-
Pacific countries, the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP) – 
and how they will affect the global economic and political landscape. The US-led TPP 
and the US-EU compact could become what Joseph Stiglitz refers to as ‘free-trade 
charades’ whose goal is a ‘managed trade regime – managed, that is, to serve the 
special interests that have long dominated trade policy in the West.’ Yet, participation 
of developing countries in the TPP need not be tepid. And regionalism is not 
exclusive to the West. 
                                                              
47 Medalla, E.M., and J.D. Balboa (2011), ‘Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Progress and Pathways’, PIDS 
Discussion Paper Series No.2011‐23. Manila: PIDS. 
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Hence, to promote the complementarity between regionalism and multilateralism, 
PTAs need to be structured as building blocks and the WTO must keep moving 
forward. PTAs should uphold the aim of WTO consistency and represent substantive 
improvements. The objective is to guard against the possibility of creating an ‘inward-
looking, self-contained fortress.’ RCEP has the potential to become a model PTA that 
would complement multilateralism. Its guiding principles include consistency and 
support for WTO and open accession. Its goal is to become a high-quality PTA, with 
some flexibility for developing and least-developed countries, cooperation, and 
provision of technical assistance and capacity building.  
 
3. Ways forward? 
Many factors have led to standstill in the Doha Round. The most immediate cause is 
the continuing deadlock in the area of agricultural subsidies and the ‘new issues’ of 
investment, IPRs, and government procurement. However, the root of the problem is 
structural in nature: the number of countries involved in the negotiations is too large, 
making it difficult to arrive at a consensus, and the number of issues is too big to be 
tackled under a ‘single undertaking,’ which exacerbates the difficulty still further. 
Given the numerous attempts to address these issues in previous Ministerial 
meetings, what could be done differently in the Bali Ministerial meeting to move the 
process forward? 
 
One possible way forward is to follow a set of recommendations similar to the 
suggestions made by the recent Expert Roundtable on RCEP organized by ERIA on 
approaches to the negotiations of RCEP and its implementation. One 
recommendation in particular, which could address the difficulty of a ‘single 
undertaking’ covering many issues, is to approach negotiations as an ‘evolutionary 
process’. This means rather than strictly adopting a ‘single undertaking,’ negotiations 
will produce ‘a set of linked agreements that are reached over differing timetables’. 
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Operationally, this could be achieved using a layered approach. The layers are not 
necessarily sequential, although they could be configured such that the first layer 
would include significant objectives that are feasible in the shortest time. This would 
offer a concrete and substantial way forward, enough for a meaningful down-
payment. There could be a second layer of issues whose implementation would 
require more time, and a third layer to tackle the most difficult areas.  
 
A good down-payment in the first layer that comes to mind is the conclusion of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. This is a clear area where everybody wins, developed 
and developing countries alike, although some technical assistance and capacity 
building for developing countries would be needed to ensure that benefits are 
realized. This is also one agreement where a lot has already been done and which 
appears ‘ripe for early harvest.’ 
 
Another possible option is the ‘plurilateral’ approach, whereby areas for negotiation 
are broken up, and any Member is free to join. However, in contrast with the usual 
plurilateral agreements, reciprocity is provided only temporarily and the MFN clause 
should be applied, whether immediately, or at a predetermined date in the future. 
This will reduce the risk usually associated with PTAs while still providing some 
incentive for members to join. Hence, benefits would be felt by all and could later 
encourage other members to join as a result of the demonstration effect of the 
agreement.  These approaches are especially relevant, useful and important from the 
perspective of developing countries. 
 
Finally, in addition to finding ways to move the WTO agenda forward, improvements 
and clarifications, even of existing WTO rules and disciplines, are needed. These 
include the WTO rules governing PTAs: GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause 
and GATS Article V. ‘Systemic issues’ remain about how to define ‘substantial 
sectoral coverage’ and ‘absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination’. 
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Another improvement needed is in the dispute settlement mechanism, particularly in 
terms of improving access for developing countries. 
 
As then WTO Director-General Dr Supachai said when he addressed the Third LDC 
Trade Ministers' Meeting in Dakar, Senegal: ‘If governments and their constituents 
lose faith in the ability of the DDA to deliver results we shall, no doubt, see a growing 
imbalance between multilateral and bilateral deal making. This could rock the 
foundations of non-discrimination and transparency upon which the multilateral 
system is built. These core principles not only help level the playing field between 
developed and developing countries, but also make the international trading 
environment a more predictable and less complex place to do business. I am 
convinced that the world ́s poorest and most vulnerable countries would be the 
biggest losers from a focus on bilateral deals at the expense of multilateralism.’ 
 
ASEAN and East Asian regionalism is an illustration of how regionalism can 
complement and support the multilateral trading system. While there is increasing 
intraregional trade, interregional trade remains crucial and substantial. Production 
networks and the supply chain extend beyond the region. Their dynamism cannot be 
sustained without orderly global trade, best managed under the WTO framework. 
The relationship is a two-way one. A strong ASEAN community and a more 
integrated East Asian region could provide stability not only in the region, but across 
the globe. In addition, the outward orientation of the region would serve the rest of 
the world well. 
 
In the final analysis, forward movement should be characterized by more active 
participation of developing countries and key stakeholders, e. g. business, labor, 
environmental groups, similar to how things are done in APEC. The way forward 
requires inclusive participation and the goal of working towards inclusive and 
sustainable growth. 
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II.8 Reflections on the Role of WTO in a New Context 
Vo Tri Thanh, Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), Vietnam 
 
1. Introduction 
Together with world economic growth, trade and investment have emerged as key 
channels for improving prosperity and people’s living standards. Various international 
institutions, most notably the World Trade Organization (WTO), have been 
established to facilitate trade and investment beyond the national level. Yet the 
development gaps between WTO Members, particularly between developed and 
developing economies, persist partly due to the unequal distribution of trade- and 
investment-related benefits induced by various distorting measures. 
  
With a view to narrowing the gaps by making trade and investment more liberalized, 
but at the same time beneficial to developing economies, the Doha Development 
Round was launched in Doha, Qatar in 2001. The focus of the Doha Round was new 
negotiations, although a significant portion of the agenda also concerns the 
implementation of current agreements within the WTO framework. However, the 
negotiations have not advanced as expected. Despite progress on the Singapore 
issues and agriculture, and in narrowing the differences between Members’ 
approaches, certain gaps remain hardly bridgeable and, after years of languishing, 
may threaten the conclusion of the Doha Round itself.  
 
This chapter reviews the current context and some ideas that may have a bearing on 
the current WTO regime. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 examines the current context and perspectives of the WTO regime. Section 3 then 
reviews some new thoughts on global trade governance. Finally, Section 4 briefly 
notes some priority issues for the top of the next WTO Ministerial Meeting agenda.  
 
2. WTO: Current context and perspectives 
Drawing from past achievements with trade liberalization, the conclusion of the Doha 
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Round is expected to bring about significant benefits to Member economies. Such 
benefits range from direct ones, such as improved market access and decreased 
vulnerability to unfavorable changes in foreign trade and investment regimes, to more 
indirect ones gained from domestic reforms and trade facilitation. It is worth noting 
that PTAs, although important, are by themselves not a replacement for multilateral 
agreements. They just seek to enhance trade and related opportunities between 
much smaller groups of economies. Nevertheless, PTAs typically fail to enforce 
disciplines, particularly on anti-dumping, agricultural subsidies, and rules of origin. 
This can only be done at the multilateral level. More seriously, different PTAs with 
different levels of commitments may distort the allocation of resources to the 
economies involved. As such, members have turned to the Doha Round for a more 
coordinated framework for trade liberalization. 
 
ASEAN and East Asia remain, and should continue to be, open to the whole world. 
Meanwhile, countries within the region have deepened economic integration. ASEAN 
has set a target for building up the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, and its 
Members are taking concrete steps towards meeting this target. Moreover, countries 
in ASEAN and East Asia also enjoy close cooperation and connectivity which go well 
beyond that foreseen under traditional PTAs. Replicating such efforts at the 
multilateral level is hardly possible at this stage, but it should be a target for all 
parties in Doha Round to aspire to.  
 
Notwithstanding the original hopes of its progress, the Doha Development Round 
now seems to be heading for failure. Various meetings of Trade Ministers have failed 
to bring about significant progress. Talks on liberalizing agricultural trade are still 
stalled. Special and differential treatment proposals for developing economies have 
been deemed inadequate. Meanwhile, the negotiations under the Doha Development 
Round have so far failed to make way for a rebalancing of the power of major 
developed countries (such as the US and the EU) and that of the newly emerging 
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markets (especially Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the global 
trading system. Disagreements on these issues, with the underlying concern about 
uncertainty of a win–win situation following further multilateral trade and investment 
liberalization, are impeding the progress of the Doha Development Round. 
 
As a result of this stagnation, Member economies are searching for alternatives, 
albeit less so multilaterally, for moving the liberalization agenda forward. Preferential  
trade agreements (PTAs) are proliferating, with participation of various economies 
irrespective of their development levels. The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) agreement has attracted a wide membership. Other recent notable efforts 
include the negotiation of a US-EU PTA (TTIP), the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the trilateral China-Japan-Korea PTA (CJK FTA). 
This is not to mention a number of other smaller PTAs, which contribute to 
exacerbating the so-called spaghetti-bowl syndrome. The increase in PTAs – an 
exception provided for under the WTO regime – seemingly undermines Member 
economies’ deference to WTO as the lead forum for global trade liberalization. 
 
Nevertheless, the WTO, as the multilateral trading regime with the widest scope, 
maintains its relevance even in light of the current contextual changes. The regime 
serves as the best available foundation for promoting and deepening efforts towards 
trade liberalization, while still allowing for efforts to promote trade PTAs. Even with 
the increasing number of PTAs and plurilateral initiatives designed in an attempt to 
get around the stalled Doha Round, commitments made by WTO Member 
economies under such agreements must still be WTO-consistent. As such, even in 
an indirect sense, the WTO preserves the momentum for moving forward towards 
deeper economic integration.  
 
Also, given its multilateralism, the regime allows less distortion of the trade and 
welfare of member economies. This is demonstrated by the large literature on the ex 
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ante and/or ex post welfare-improving effects of WTO accession for various recently 
acceding Members. Accordingly, the questions now are whether the scope of WTO 
commitments can be expanded, and whether the depth of such commitments can be 
rationalized consistently with Members’ development context, rather than whether the 
WTO process can be reversed. 
 
Moreover, in spite of certain claims that it is limited in power and enforceability, the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is still regarded as instrumental in encouraging 
more rules-based trade practices of Member economies. In turn, this will improve the 
overall transparency of the global trading regime. The increase in the number of 
trade disputes reported in recent years apparently does not show that the current 
trade practices are mutually respected, but it does imply that member economies are 
turning towards a more commonly agreed multilateral mechanism for dispute 
settlement. 
  
Finally, as its name implies, the Doha Development Round incorporates greater 
cooperation for development. Specifically, provisions by more developed Members to 
developing ones constitute an important topic for discussion. These provisions have 
been quite a remarkable characteristic of PTAs in East Asia (Vo and Nguyen 2010), 
but raising their incidence at the global level faces difficulties not only in terms of lack 
of consensus on their necessity, but also in terms of the extent of their applicability. In 
this respect, the WTO still provides the leading global platform on aid for trade. 
Accordingly, the provisions on development cooperation, if adopted, will ensure that 
aid for trade will provide the largest possible improvement of welfare, particularly to 
developing Member economies.  
 
Nonetheless, the WTO regime in general, and the Doha Development Round in 
particular, are facing the strongest ever criticism. There are various dimensions to 
these criticisms. On the one hand, the challenges lie in the attempts of WTO 
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Members to adopt the commonly agreed single undertaking for trade and investment 
liberalization. Given that most of the small and/or developing Member economies are 
rule-takers, this seems to result from failure of major trading partners to propose, 
develop and bring into negotiation such a package. On the other hand, the WTO is 
increasingly referred to as a talking club. Member economies are raising more issues 
related to their development needs and what they expect from other trading partners. 
Meanwhile, the same Member economies have been reluctant to discuss and/or 
make needed concessions on the liberalization front. This problematic Doha-Round-
impeding reluctance is even prevalent among the advanced Member economies, if 
not more so. These issues are real and solvable, but they require more concrete 
actions than talk in order to realize the objectives of the Doha Round. Otherwise, the 
fear is that the stalled Doha Round negotiations could undermine the transparency of 
the WTO as the single global trading regime. 
 
3. New thoughts on global trade 
Although actual progress in terms of improving global trade governance and 
promoting multilateral trade liberalization under the Doha Round has been limited, 
new thoughts on global trade are still being expressed. First, more scholars are 
documenting how improving supply chain connectivity is a means to facilitate global 
trade. Following periods of reducing and/or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers 
against imports as per the old generation of PTAs, impediments to the international 
flow of goods, services, labor and knowledge now lie mainly in various forms of 
domestic policies that exhibit regulatory attempts to segment markets. In fact, these 
impediments are popular in those various developing and newly emerging markets 
that follow a mercantilist approach to promoting exports and restricting imports (see 
Figure 1). Basically, the regulatory impediments either purposely or unintentionally 
impose additional compliance costs on traders and enterprises that may well shift 
their minimum efficient scale. More importantly, these impediments cannot be 
managed at the border. The costs can be larger in the economies which lack strong 
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regulatory coordination across government agencies, which may in turn lead to 
different standards and regulations that affect trade. 
 
Figure 1: Logistics restrictiveness indices, selected economies 
 
Source: Hollweg and Wong (2009). 
 
The scope for reducing supply chain barriers is greater than that available for 
abolishing or reducing prevailing tariffs. In the recent report by the World Economic 
Forum, in collaboration with Bain & Co. and the World Bank, it was found that 
reducing supply chain barriers could have an impact – up to six times larger than that 
of removing all remaining import tariffs – in terms of increasing global GDP. 
Meanwhile, with a projected improvement in both border administration procedures 
and transport and communications infrastructure services,48 global GDP may rise by 
4.7 per cent, as compared with a 0.7 per cent increase in global GDP following 
complete worldwide tariff elimination. 
 
The impacts of non-tariff measures on trade are acknowledged by governments, 
though they tend to adopt measures against imports and intentionally persuade 
partners to facilitate their exports. With insufficient mutual confidence, this may lead 
                                                              
48 All countries raising their performance in these two areas halfway to global best practice as observed in 
Singapore. 
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to a situation in which no one would want to proceed unilaterally towards trade 
liberalization. Moreover, as argued by Hoekman (2013), the current approaches 
jointly pursued by governments are suboptimal because they focus on specific policy 
instruments independently. Small and developing economies that are followers in the 
process, would therefore want to wait to see the offers/actions of major advanced 
economies in the process. Meanwhile, major advanced economies act for their own 
sake and generally refrain from transparently making their concessions or proposals 
for trade liberalization.  
 
An alternative approach would be to have the participating governments thinking 
about moving towards supply chain connectivity. Thanks to trade expansion at the 
global level and the promotion of foreign direct investment at the regional and 
domestic levels in recent decades, the production process of final products is 
increasingly divided into more and more segments and production networks. As such, 
one can hardly imagine a product that is completely produced in any single country. 
Governments also need to alter their perspectives. Encouraged by thought of forming 
an important link in a supply chain, governments should take more action to facilitate 
trade and investment activities. In turn, this may require a change in approach, which 
should no longer be product- or industry-targeted. Underlying this process is the 
willingness of governments to incorporate the participation of the business 
communities at all stages of policy formulation. 
 
Second, the view on agricultural trade liberalization is now increasingly linked to food 
security. In fact, demand for agricultural products in various regions, especially staple 
foods, has increased rapidly while the availability of arable land and/or cultivation 
areas has not expanded significantly. The consequent shortage has to be met either 
through improved productivity of agricultural production, which has almost reached its 
limits, or via imports from other regions that have a surplus of agricultural products. 
Perceptions on agricultural subsidies thus become more complicated, as they involve 
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consideration of food security for local populations (not to mention job security for 
farmers). Undue dependency on imported products can be risky due to the possibility 
of adverse climate shocks in exporting countries, and the extent of risk may be 
subject to political tensions between trading partners. 
 
De Schutter (2009) lists the key challenges in agricultural trade that cannot be 
resolved within the current Doha Round negotiations. The fundamental issue in his 
view is that the negotiations fail to incorporate people’s right to food. This issue could 
have several consequences such as: (i) vulnerabilities to weakening balance of 
agricultural trade, resulting in a loss of foreign exchange reserves, and to increasing 
import prices of agricultural products; (ii) reliance on imports of agricultural products 
leading to greater bargaining power of agricultural traders, which are mostly 
transnational corporations; and (iii) supply chains over long geographical distances 
and unsustainable modes of production. Taking these considerations into account, it 
may require more than the Doha Round to meet the need for jointly promoting 
agricultural trade liberalization and ensuring food security. 
 
Third, recent literature also puts greater emphasis on sustainable development 
issues which need to be integrated into the future trade agenda. On the one hand, 
the lessons from the global financial crisis show that focusing too much on promoting 
exports and achieving a trade surplus may result in prolonged global macroeconomic 
imbalances which, after reaching a certain cumulative level, may hinder the 
economic growth of participating economies. Moreover, the adverse impacts of any 
regional or international crisis may be transmitted more rapidly to member economies 
which, as demonstrated by the experience of the recent financial crisis, failed to 
acquire sufficient resilience. In fact, the crisis even increased incentives for 
economies to revert back to protectionism, thereby undermining the credibility of their 
own recent liberalization efforts. 
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From the perspective of many developing economies, the recent crisis offers an 
opportunity to rethink development paradigms. The target paradigm should retain the 
core components of economic growth, underlying institutions (specifically the right 
interactions between the state–market–integration), and policies for the efficient 
allocation of resources (particularly capital). Market-based institutions, and further 
trade and investment liberalization continue to be of relevance, but are insufficient by 
themselves. Instead, they should be complemented by efforts to establish efficient 
markets of all types, and to develop a system of efficient ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
infrastructure to facilitate and encourage cross-border economic activities. This 
opens up space for newer forms of development cooperation between developing 
and developed economies. 
 
Finally, some ideas about an alternative regime for global trade also need to be 
elaborated. Given the current contextual changes as well as the issues and 
challenges underlying the stalling of the Doha Round, most of the literature contends 
that the current WTO regime is failing to work at its best. Baldwin (2013) suggests 
that a new WTO regime that can address the fragmentation and/or exclusion of 
various major trading partners from mega-PTAs – such as the TPP, RCEP, or the US-
EU TTIP – is necessary. This regime should attain similar multilateralism to the 
current one, but wider scope for participation may also entail more practical 
challenges and difficulties. There is likelihood that such a variable geometry regime 
may never be put in place. Another possible solution involves the adoption of a 
plurilateral approach by a group of like-minded countries or economies to address 
common negotiating issues. This approach is examined by Nakatomi (2013), who 
notes that the key to success lies in including a critical mass of major WTO Members 
as signatories. Although the plurilateral approach may not work as a replacement for 
the WTO it may under certain conditions help to address the trade-related needs of 
developing economies.  
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4. Key issues for the WTO Ministerial Meeting 
Given the insufficient, albeit hard earned, progress made in the previous Ministerial 
meetings, one can hardly expect breakthroughs in the forthcoming WTO Ministerial 
Meeting that can push the Doha Round towards conclusion. Nevertheless, the 
Meeting can lay the foundations for smoother subsequent negotiations by agreeing in 
principle to certain changes. Several specific issues for negotiations in the 
forthcoming Meeting are listed below. 
 
First, the framework for agricultural trade liberalization should be amended. It should 
be brought into line with food security as a public good for concerned economies. 
Specifically, as argued by De Schutter (2009), this framework should address the 
issue of people’s right to food. Merely retaining the current permitted support to 
agriculture, even with some special and differential treatment (SDT) for less 
developed economies, will not be sufficient. 
 
Second, similar to agricultural trade liberalization, negotiations on industrial goods 
(i.e. non-agricultural market access) should also make a critical breakthrough 
towards ensuring that developing economies get a fairer share of access to 
developed country markets. Given that the developing economies vary in terms of 
their own development level as well in terms of their experience with industrial 
production and exporting, the design of an appropriate liberalization roadmap as well 
as provision of SDT for sub-groups of developing economies may be necessary. 
 
Third, services liberalization should be given higher priority on the negotiation 
agenda. This may not happen without a concrete mutual understanding of the scope 
and implications of services liberalization. An ambitious plan for services liberalization 
is still desirable, but may not be feasible at this stage. As such, focusing on 
liberalization of the logistics sector alongside trade facilitation may pave the way 
forward. 
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Fourth, environmental issues should also be a subject for negotiation. While 
Members can agree on the long-term need for protection of the environment, specific 
commitments and associated support mechanisms can facilitate the production of 
environment-friendly goods and services, very few Members see this as being 
different from negotiations on traditional non-tariff measures. Requiring transfer of 
standard-compliant technology from more advanced members should be compulsory, 
although this can be conditioned on the absorptive capacity of receiving economies 
as well. 
 
Fifth, WTO Members need to rethink whether a single undertaking approach is still 
appropriate, or whether they should endeavor to address as many commonly agreed 
priorities as they can. A single undertaking is more transparent and less distorted, but 
it can take forever to make material progress. Meanwhile, given the past delays in 
the negotiating process, achieving any priority now could be pivotal to the success of 
post-Bali negotiating advances. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that the above-described attempts may proceed 
alongside other plurilateral approaches to trade liberalization. From the experience of 
the Asia Pacific region as a dynamic subset of the global trading system, any 
intermediate progress towards the final objective – i.e. trade liberalization for the 
region as a whole – would be considered essential. A decade ago, one would not 
have expected a PTA for the Asia Pacific region (i.e. the FTAAP) to materialize. This 
vision now seems more likely thanks to efforts to negotiate and conclude various 
intermediate PTAs such as ASEAN+1 FTAs, RCEP, CJK FTA, and the TPP. These 
achievements came almost as a surprise given the great diversity of regional 
economies and development levels. In this regard, the capacity to coordinate and 
harmonize integration tracks is essential and, from regional experience, small groups 
of countries can in turn play a key role.  
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II.9 East Asian Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading System 
       Yose Rizal Damuri, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia 
 
1. Introduction 
In the midst of the rapid growth of regionalism, the multilateral trading system (MTS) 
remains important in ensuring a favorable environment for global trade. In fact, the 
increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements has raised various 
issues that could be effectively addressed at the multilateral level. With more than 
400 preferential agreements around the world, mostly of a bilateral nature, it is 
almost impossible to make ensure that all these agreements are compatible with 
each other and with WTO rules. The diversity of the trade concessions and rules has 
limited the benefits of liberalization being realized, not to mention the trade diversion 
effects implicit in preferential treatment. 
 
Regionalism in East Asia is not spared such concerns. Several initiatives have been 
proposed to deal with the above challenges, but at the moment no significant 
program is in place. While the WTO seems quite distant from the recent development 
of regional integration in East Asia, countries in the region could and should utilize it 
to avoid the problems escalating. 
 
This chapter briefly looks at the issues related to regionalism in East Asia and 
examines the role of the multilateral trading system. The key message of this chapter 
is that countries in the region should support multilateral initiatives. This would not 
only help progress the multilateral liberalization process, but also reduce the 
problems and challenges stemming from integration in the region. 
 
2. East Asia and the rise of regionalism 
East Asia is actually a latecomer to regionalism. During the 1990s only one free trade 
agreement (FTA) was in place, formed by several countries in South East Asia under 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Later the AFTA would extend to include all 
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countries in the sub-region. Other countries in East Asia remained devoted to the 
WTO although they have also become involved in so-called open regionalism 
arrangements based on voluntary undertakings taken under the auspices of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Process. 
 
There are several reasons why regionalism did not appeal to a lot of interests in the 
region, including historical, political and economic issues, but mainly because the 
economies did not really see the importance of an intraregional market. Economic 
development in the region owed much to each country pursuing its own export-
oriented strategy. Countries in the region found that the markets for their products 
were mostly located outside the region, where access was based on the most-
favored nation (MFN) principle or non-reciprocal preferential arrangements. 49The 
development of ‘Factory Asia’ since the 1980s increased the significance of intra-
regional trade, especially among countries in South East Asia, becoming important 
production bases for foreign multinationals. 
 
But the first response was not regionalism. Instead, countries in the region pursued 
unilateral liberalization by reducing their applied MFN tariffs in order to facilitate the 
necessary imports of intermediate products. These efforts were driven partly by the 
desire of East Asian countries to attract foreign direct investment (Baldwin 2006). 
 
While unilateral liberalization has served the region well in facilitating the 
development of production networks and the industrialization of many countries, 
there is no assurance that governments would embrace an open trade regime all the 
time. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the governments of those countries 
affected by the crisis raised their tariffs in order to protect domestic production 
sectors. The widening gap between the MFN applied rate and the WTO bound rate – 
                                                              
49 Some new industrializing countries in the region, such as South Korea and Taiwan, made intensive use of the 
Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) to support market access of their products in the early stages of their 
development. Later, other countries in the region also relied on such schemes to enter developed countries’ 
markets. 
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as a result of unilateral liberalization of applied tariffs, together with slow progress in 
multilateral trade negotiations to lower bound tariffs – allows countries to increase 
trade barriers. 
 
This and several other developments prompted East Asian countries to proceed with 
more legally binding and reciprocal commitments typically embedded in a PTA.50 
ASEAN countries reduced the number of excluded products in their existing AFTA 
scheme, leading towards faster and broader coverage of preferential liberalization. 
Bilateral PTAs, especially between individual ASEAN members with other countries 
in the region, started to emerge. ASEAN as an entity also pursued trade agreements 
with its trading partners in the region. By 2010, this group of South East Asian 
countries had managed to form five trade agreements with six important countries: 
China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and India. 
 
Not only has regionalism become prevalent, PTAs in the region also include various 
measures beyond the traditional elimination of trade barriers, such as investment 
provisions, competition policy and protection of intellectual property rights. These are 
common features in the new generation of trade agreements that address a range of 
behind-the-border issues related to the internationalization of production. 
 
3. Issues and challenges of regionalism in East Asia 
The emergence of regionalism has raised concerns over preferential concessions 
and other related aspects of PTAs. Some issues relate to practical aspects of 
regionalism. Currently there are 17 bilateral PTAs among countries in East Asia. 
While ASEAN as a group has formed five trade agreements with six trading partners 
in the region, several individual members have also concluded bilateral agreements 
with those other countries (Figure 2). Some individual members, such as Singapore, 
even have bilateral PTAs with all six partners. 
                                                              
50 Many observers also argue that the crisis created the need for countries in the region to work more closely 
together as they can no longer depend on the EU and US markets; therefore regionalism in East Asia has 
flourished (see for example Baldwin (2006) or Pomfret (2010)). 
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This overlapping arrangement of bilateral and regional PTAs has been the source of 
many difficulties in realizing the potential benefits of trade liberalization. One frequent 
feature of trade agreements in the region is a low utilization rate of tariff preferences. 
Several firm surveys conducted to document the use of preferential treatment under 
East Asian PTAs found that firms in the region did not use PTAs optimally (see for 
example Kawai and Wignaraja 2011).  
 
Various reasons can explain this observation, ranging from a lack of information to 
the difficulties in complying with requirements. All of them boil down to the fact that 
preferential treatment requires certain rules to ensure that preferential tariffs only 
apply to products from trading partners. Those rules of origin (ROO) have to be 
satisfied before the benefits can be obtained. This procedure normally incurs costs 
either to acquire necessary documents, to collect and make use of relevant 
information or to comply with relevant rules. It becomes more tedious and costly 
when overlapping agreements, as depicted in Figure 2 below, use different types of 
ROO, especially when the regional supply chain requires intermediate goods to cross 
borders several times in the process of production. 
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Figure 2. Bilateral and Regional FTAs in East Asia 
 
Source: Author 
 
A less obviously adverse effect of preferential treatment is that it likely does not make 
the members better off. The reason is that the preferential removal of tariffs may lead 
to trade diversion, where the source of some imports changes from the most efficient 
supplier to the country receiving preferential treatment. Empirical studies on East 
Asian PTAs reveal that trade diversion cannot be ignored, although a positive effect 
of trade creation also takes place (see for example Urata and Okabe 2010). 
 
4. The merits of the multilateral trading system 
Aware of the above challenges, East Asian countries have tried to come up with an 
arrangement that would minimize the unfavorable impacts of preferential 
liberalization. Steps to increase the utilization of preferential facilities, as well as to 
simplify rules and procedures, are among the goals of greater integration in the 
region. Harmonizing liberalization coverage and ROO among overlapping trade 
agreements in the region would simplify and facilitate integration further. The launch 
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an ASEAN-led 
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initiative for an East Asia region-wide trade agreement, is an attempt to harmonize 
regionalism in the region. 
 
However, this is much easier said than done. Tariff elimination schedules under five 
ASEAN+1 FTAs are currently so diverse that the countries concerned maintain 55 
different tariff elimination schemes with different implementation timetables. Each 
ASEAN member also schedules a different list of product exclusions with different 
trading partners. There are numerous types of ROO applied in those PTAs and the 
same products are often subject to different ROOs under related PTAs. It will be very 
difficult task and require considerable effort to make RCEP function effectively in 
addressing the above-mentioned challenges. 
 
Multilateral liberalization, on the other hand, is relatively free from most of the 
problems and challenges of preferential regional integration. From a practical point of 
view, such liberalization follows easier procedural requirements: since it applies to 
virtually all countries, the need for ROO can be minimized. The benefits from 
multilateral liberalization can be further realized as the business sector would not 
need to pay attention to how to make use of greater market access in the destination 
market, but could rather focus on producing more competitive products. The biggest 
benefits of multilateralism, however, arise because the process is more likely to 
include the most efficient suppliers of any given product and therefore the possible 
trade diversion resulting from any preferential liberalization would be minimized. 
 
Furthermore, the WTO system offers a more effective monitoring and compliance 
mechanism, including functional dispute settlement. Since this arrangement involves 
a large number of countries with a wide variety of trade interests, there is a greater 
chance of finding members that might be hurt by the harmful acts of other members. 
The smaller number of members in bilateral or regional PTAs reduces such 
incentives, especially where the bargaining powers of PTA members are not equally 
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distributed. Together with an efficient dispute settlement mechanism, the WTO 
system ensures better monitoring of the global trading system and better respect for 
its rules. Penalty and compensation mechanisms may also work better under the 
WTO since it may impose more substantial consequences than when applied 
narrowly among members of a PTA. 
 
Although many PTAs in East Asia provide a dispute settlement mechanism in order 
to ensure that commitments are properly implemented, the mechanism has yet to be 
put to the test. When Thailand and the Philippines, two members of the long-standing 
AFTA, had a dispute over unfair taxation of tobacco from the Philippines, the two 
countries decided to go to the WTO instead of handling their dispute under the 
ASEAN mechanism. 
 
All the above considerations highlight the benefits of the multilateral trading system 
and demonstrate that it is unlikely to be replaced by bilateral and regional 
agreements. The question is how, amidst the ongoing preferential wave, the MTS 
under the WTO can be made attractive to all of its members.  
 
5. The Multilateral Trading System: What Should East Asian Countries Do? 
There are three main ways to restore the WTO to its former important position among 
its Members. The first is to reposition the membership’s attitudes towards new global 
trading issues and the second is to achieve a breakthrough in completing the current 
negotiation round. The third relates to the initiatives to ‘multilateralize’ regionalism. 
East Asian countries can contribute significantly to attempts to revive the multilateral 
trade process. 
 
5.1 Redefining the WTO’s role 
WTO Members should be brave in redefining their position in global trading activities. 
One of the reasons why PTAs are so attractive is that they cover many areas that 
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have not been discussed multilaterally. The current global trading environment has 
moved away from traditional trade in goods liberalization to behind the border 
commitments. To win back the hearts of its Members, the WTO process must also 
begin to tackle such areas, perhaps even encompassing what has been discussed 
under PTAs. East Asian countries have enough capacity to support such ‘new issues’ 
being introduced into the multilateral process; many PTAs in the region have 
commitments in those areas anyway. In addition, these countries can exercise 
considerable leverage to make it more appealing. Having China or Indonesia joining 
plurilateral discussions on an agreement on investment or competition policy would 
increase the likelihood of other countries accepting such a move. 
 
One area where the WTO should play a more important role is in the elimination and 
better disciplining the use of non-tariff measures (NTMs). While NTMs have been 
subject to multilateral disciplines for some time, there is currently no comprehensive 
initiative to reduce the prevalence of such barriers. The approach is simply that 
countries can use NTMs so long as they do not replace bound tariffs with NTMs. 
Other than the non-discrimination principle, there is little by way of stringent 
disciplines attached to the use of non-tariff measures. Since the last financial crisis, 
the use of such measures has been on the rise, and the excessive use of NTMs has 
increased overall levels of protectionism (Evenett 2012). 
 
East Asian countries again have a considerable incentive to push the WTO to 
address NTMs. Appropriate and non-excessive use of these measures is essential 
for further economic integration in the region. However, addressing such issues by 
themselves is not an easy task, due to a lack of sufficient information and political will 
in many countries in the region. Tackling such issues at the multilateral level would 
provide more power to address them. 
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5.2 Completing the Doha Round 
Completion of the Doha Round is necessary to keep the MTS alive and moving 
forward. Concluding the negotiations would help WTO Members realize the benefits 
from all areas that have been discussed in the draft text, including bound tariff 
reductions, disciplines on subsidies and liberalization of trade in services.  This would 
also provide buffers against protectionism that can easily return during periods of 
crisis. 
 
The difficulty in completing the Doha Round is understandable as its goals are 
ambitious: to reach consensus on nine different areas of negotiations, ranging from 
market access to environmental goods and development under the single 
undertaking principle, although some important areas have been left out. It is even 
more difficult considering that there are some 160+ Members involved in the 
negotiations. The deadlock has mostly come from lack of agreement on market 
access and domestic support issues in agriculture. Considering the gap between 
applied and bound tariffs in many developing countries, even substantial cuts would 
not lead to significantly greater market access for more advanced countries, whose 
bound rates are typically aligned to the applied rates. The situation is exacerbated by 
problems concerning domestic support and market access of agricultural products. 
 
Since East Asian countries have formed many preferential trade agreements among 
themselves as well as with countries outside the region, extending greater market 
access to other countries might not lead to significant economic consequences. It all 
depends on the political willingness to proceed with multilateral liberalization. These 
countries should use their existing regional forums, such as ASEAN and the East 
Asia Summit, to come up with real commitments to move forward in completing the 
WTO’s Doha Round, e.g. committing to reducing bound rates below or at least to the 
same level as current MFN rates, as well as commitments to reduce domestic 
support levels. 
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As previously discussed, the central contribution of the MTS is to provide insurance 
against protectionism. While PTAs are meant to embed such disciplines, it is more 
economical and effective to do this at the multilateral level. With the ever-growing 
interconnection of virtually all East Asian economies, it is therefore in their best 
interests to maintain the WTO trading system and deepen their multilateral 
commitments. 
 
5.3 Multilateralizing regionalism in East Asia 
With an increasing number of PTAs there is also a growing need for such 
agreements to be harmonized with each other. The WTO should position itself to 
exert more influence over the formation of PTAs. At the moment, there is an 
obligation for countries that sign preferential agreements to notify and report them to 
the WTO. But despite this obligation, the WTO has little or no influence on the 
contents of the PTAs themselves. Although according to GATT Article XXIV and 
GATS Article V, the WTO can impose a certain number of conditions on PTAs, such 
control is difficult to effect in practice and can be easily circumvented.  
 
Making PTAs WTO-friendlier is an initiative to which countries in the region can 
contribute to significantly. There are two aspects that can be dealt with directly and 
would produce concrete results. The first is simplification of tariff elimination 
coverage and schedules of reduction among overlapping and related agreements in 
East Asia. Each country engaged in RCEP should come up with a single product 
exclusion list for all PTA partners. The schedule of elimination should also be aligned 
so that it reduces confusion during the transition period. The second is to come up 
with business-friendly ROO. Countries need to reduce the number of rules currently 
in place while at the same time offering more flexibility to fulfill the requirements by 
applying rules of accumulation. 
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The next stage is to make regional arrangements less trade-diverting. One way this 
can be done is to reduce local or regional content requirements. This can be 
achieved by applying less stringent ROOs to enable goods from outside the region 
also to enjoy lower trade barriers. Another important aspect is to extend, as far as 
possible, lower trade barriers to non-members of PTAs. Empirical studies have found 
that preferential liberalization is often followed by a reduction in applied MFN tariffs 
(see for example Lendle 2007 for the case of ASEAN).  
 
Alternatively, countries might consider achieving a more harmonious external tariff 
structure. While the region is not, and will not be, a customs union, a more uniform 
tariff structure towards non-members would make the region more open to the rest of 
the world while at the same time accelerating integration even further. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Both from a practical and a philosophical point of view, the multilateral trading 
system, with its liberalization and non-discrimination properties, offers more benefits 
than regionalism. But preferential agreements have a longer history and are often 
more appealing for participating countries as such agreements provide something 
tangible to the governments involved. Therefore the question is not which of the two 
to choose, but rather how to make preferential agreements less discriminatory and 
more supportive of the multilateral negotiating process. Since countries in East Asia 
have embraced regionalism intensively, their active involvement in this initiative can 
provide considerable leverage to the process. 
 
There are three ways in which East Asian countries can contribute to promoting the 
multilateral trading system. The first is to make sure that the Doha Round is 
completed successfully. This is not so much a matter of economic consequence, as 
existing PTAs in the region have promoted openness of the economy. Rather it is 
about the political willingness of countries to pursue multilateral liberalization. The 
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second is by supporting the reform of the WTO by promoting wider coverage of 
negotiations and disciplines. The third is to transform PTAs in the region into 
arrangements that are less trade-diverting and more flexible for non-member 
countries. Such an agenda would not only support a more progressive global trading 
environment but also address many problems and challenges currently faced by 
countries in the region. 
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II.10 Expected Outcomes from the Bali Ministerial Conference: The View from 
Myanmar 
Sandar Oo, Bank Central of Myanmar and Zin Zin Naing, Yangon Institute of 
Economics 
 
1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established to facilitate trade and 
investment within the international economy. Yet marked development gaps between 
WTO Members still persist partly due to the unequal distribution of trade- and 
investment-related benefits induced by trade-distorting measures. The focus of the 
Doha Development Round is to narrow these gaps through more trade and 
investment in developing economies. Tangible progress was made on the issue of 
trade facilitation and some aspects of agricultural trade. However, negotiations aimed 
at narrowing the differences among Members have not progressed sufficiently. 
Developing countries are still threatened by issues such as anti-dumping, agricultural 
subsidies, and onerous rules of origin, among others. 
 
The upcoming WTO Ministerial conference in Bali is being viewed as a chance to 
move some of the less controversial elements of the Doha talks forward, although 
WTO Members have been cautious about placing too much emphasis publicly on the 
Bali preparation process. The core of any Bali outcome is expected to include trade 
facilitation, some agricultural components, and items of special interest to developing 
and least-developed country (LDC) members. 
 
2. Why has the WTO not succeeded to date? 
Since its inception in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been 
successful in establishing the rule of law in the international trading system. Its 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) has produced more than 100 panel rulings and 
the Appellate Body (AB), and the rules established through those decisions 
contribute to the stability and predictability of international trade relationships among 
WTO Members. However, the WTO has not been very successful in international 
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negotiations. In 1999, the Ministerial Conference in Seattle failed, and then the 2003 
Conference in Cancun also failed. Although the Hong King Ministerial Conference of 
2005 did not suffer the same fate, its outcome was still minimalist. Since then, 
negotiations among WTO Members have persistently resulted in stalemate. Many 
commentators now view the Doha Round as ‘dead‘. To no one’s surprise, the Eighth 
Ministerial Conference which took place in December 2011 ended without any 
breakthrough on any of the contentious issues faced by the organization. 
 
Reasons for this rather poor performance are many but, among them, the ‘single 
undertaking‘ and the consensus rule combined with a change in power relationships 
within the WTO are noteworthy. The "single undertaking" principle practiced by the 
WTO does not permit the conclusion and implementation of partial agreements. All 
negotiations must, therefore, end in a single final agreement covering all negotiated 
components. In such a situation, an agreement on a particular area, for example, an 
agreement on agriculture is already highly complex and also very difficult at the 
political level.51 
 
The WTO is at a disadvantage because all of its decisions have to be taken by 
consensus, which has paralyzed the negotiating process. On the one hand, it is 
indisputable that consensus is by its very nature democratic and has an integral role 
to play as every Member can, theoretically, oppose any proposition that comes up for 
discussion. On the other hand, the strategic aspect of consensus is very significant, 
especially during major trade negotiations. Thus, the need for explicit consensus also 
hampers the WTO’s efficacy, as one single Member can paralyze the decision-
making mechanism. It is particularly difficult to apply the rule of consensus to 
negotiations involving 160-plus members. It is a fact that since the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference the pace of multilateral negotiations orchestrated by the WTO has 
                                                              
51 Matthew Kennedy, ‘Two Single Undertakings – Can the WTO Implement the Results of a 
Round? 14 Journal of International Economic Law 77 (2011), at 77. 
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slowed down considerably. The situation encourages some members to resort to 
preferentialism and this approach appears to call into question the future of the 
multilateral trading system.  
 
If the Doha Round fails, there is a danger that some members may move away from 
multilateral negotiations altogether. Leaving the multilateral framework and fuelling 
bilateralism (especially through ambitious preferential trade agreements (PTAs), such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) could pose the threat of resurrecting old 
mechanisms based on the balance of power and of exacerbating inequalities 
between large trading powers and developing countries. In turn, this could jeopardize 
the principle of the rule of law in international relations, which is crucial for the 
constitutionalization of the international community. In this regard, unless some 
innovative negotiation methodologies are adopted, WTO negotiations will continue to 
stagnate and the influence of the WTO on global economic governance will continue 
to wane.  
 
3. The role of the WTO in sustaining Asia’s development process and 
regional integration 
The Bali Ministerial Conference offers a timely moment to reflect on the reform 
challenges that lie ahead for the WTO system and to address a number of priority 
challenges. These include:  
  
(1) The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), which is an existing WTO body, 
incorporated in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, 52  has proven its 
effectiveness. The TPRM is, however, underexploited and its role should be 
extended to help the WTO better address new and essential issues of the 
                                                              
52 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, Trade Policy Review Mechanism (‘TPRM’)  
The purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (‘TPRM’) is to contribute to improved 
adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the 
smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and 
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. 
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international economic order such as the uncontrolled proliferation of PTAs, 
recent efforts to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and other 
environmental policies which have an impact on trade. 
  
(2) Since 2008, a financial crisis has been weakening the world economy, and 
some trading nations, such as the USA, India, and Argentina,53 have resorted to 
protectionist trade measures. In order to warn against protectionism, Pascal 
Lamy, the former Director-General of WTO, made use of the TPRM to gather 
data on the trade-restrictive measures taken by some WTO Members, and took 
this issue to the G20, urging them to deal with the rising trend of 
protectionism.54 G20 countries agreed that this trend was dangerous and, if no 
countermeasures were applied, it would be harmful to the liberal trade order, so 
they decided to impose a ‘standstill‘ on those protectionist measures, i.e. not to 
increase such measures in the future. On 20 April 2009, the G20 Global Plan 
requested WTO to report periodically on the results of the monitoring of trade-
restrictive measures to the G20. The July 2009 report of the WTO’s TPRM 
warned that the WTO membership had not done enough to combat protectionist 
measures. Thus, the discussion on removal of protectionist measures should be 
one important agenda item at the Bali Ministerial Conference, highlighting that 
the WTO should embark on a new and concrete project and promote the role of 
its TPRM. 
 
Nowadays, WTO Members often conclude preferential trade agreements 
instead of multilateral agreements within the WTO framework. Since the failure 
of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, the number of 
PTAs has increased steadily. PTAs really began to come into their own in the 
                                                              
53 In early 2009, the USA announced a "Buy America" policy. Some other countries followed suit. 
India decided to increase tariffs on steel products and bean oil products. The Philippines’ 
introduction of an export licensing system for iron ores and China’s export controls on bauxite and 
zinc are also good examples.  
54 http//www.wto.org/English/news_e/sppl_e.htm 
125 
 
1990s. Prior to that, there were virtually no such agreements until 1970 and 
fewer than 50 in 1990. This suggests that a greater reduction in trade barriers 
(both tariff and non-tariff) was achieved in the earlier rounds of the GATT, which 
precluded the need for countries to resort to PTAs. Once this initial thrust via 
the multilateral route was saturated, however, countries turned to other 
avenues for expanding their trading opportunities. The proliferation of PTAs 
causes two problems to the WTO and to the world trading system. One is that 
PTAs may undermine the very basis of the multilateral trading order. How can 
we keep PTAs within the remit of Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the 
GATS?55 The other problem is that PTAs are bilateral, regional or plurilateral 
agreements and their rules, whether on rules of origin or trade remedies, often 
differ from one PTA to another. This situation can exert a significant impact on 
the international trading system. Because of the differing nature of trade 
policies in across PTAs, firms face increasing transaction costs, as they have to 
follow different policies in the same issue area. That is why the WTO should 
coordinate the activities of harmonizing such trade policies. 
 
(3) Another aspect the WTO should take into account is that of trade and the 
environment where the diversity of trade rules regarding the environment 
affects the international competitiveness of trading nations and may lead to 
trade disputes. It is important to find ways to avoid such conflicts. There are 
currently no undertakings with regard to environmental protection in the WTO. 
We would thus classify an environmental obligation as a so-called “WTO-X” 
issue, i.e. one not governed by existing disciplines. The UN Conference on 
Climate Change convened in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP 15),  in Cancun in 
2010 (COP 16) and in Durban in 2011 (COP 17) to discuss the environmental 
measures that would be the successor of the Kyoto Protocol. The WTO should 
develop a comprehensive agenda to tackle the trade impact of measures taken 
                                                              
55 See Nicholas Lockhart and Andrew Mitchell, ‘Legal Requirements for FTAs under the WTO’. 
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to mitigate environmental and climate change mitigation, such as the 
development of environmental standards; the enforcement of national 
environmental laws; the establishment of sanctions for violation of 
environmental laws; and notification and publication of related laws and 
regulations. 
 
A joint study by the WTO and IDE-JETRO in 2011 highlighted a degree of 
complementarity among Asian industries, which is a cause as well as a 
consequence of deepened economic interdependency between them. The 
Expanded Economic Engagement Initiative, the so-called E3, also recognizes 
the growing importance and potential of South East Asia, and is meant to give 
Asia opportunities to engage economically with the world. This highlights 
logistics services as key components in the operation of supply chains. The 
same priority should be given to trade facilitation, including the tariff structures, 
particularly for industrial products. The forthcoming WTO Ministerial can lay the 
foundations for negotiations, to be followed by agreements on changes in 
principle.  
 
4. ASEAN perspectives on the WTO 
The expected contribution of the Ministerial Conference in Bali is should serve and 
complement ASEAN’s march towards the realization of the ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2015. The possible contribution should be to the harmonization of 
rules of origin (ROO) among ASEAN member states. The TPRM can play an 
important role in such harmonizing activities. At present, there are no agreed 
disciplines on preferential ROOs in the WTO, but each PTA has its own rules. If the 
number of PTAs keeps increasing, there will be yet more ROOs which could be a 
serious issue of trade conflict and needless transaction costs. To address this kind of 
challenge, the TPRB collects information in collaboration with the WTO’s Committee 
on Regional Trade Agreements, compares different policies and explores common 
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policies among them. As a result, the TPRB can point out differences in the ROOs 
incorporated in different PTAs and make recommendations to ASEAN members 
participating in such PTAs in order to harmonize their policies and minimize the 
differences as far as possible. It is to be hoped that, apart from regular reviews of 
trade policies of member countries and recommendations for their improvement, the 
role of the TPRB can be expanded along such lines.  This also would help the WTO 
prepare for the eventual multilateralization of ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
 
Furthermore, several economists in Asia have argued for the consolidation of  
multiple existing PTAs into a single Asia-wide PTA, like the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). A broad-based, region-wide PTA formed by 16 East 
Asian countries could help mitigate the harmful noodle bowl effects described above. 
It could simplify schedules for tariff reductions, exclusion lists, and the myriad rules, 
regulations and standards. Shujiro Urata examined the patterns of commitments in 
trade liberalization in goods in ASEAN’s PTAs with major regional economies and 
pointed out that the RCEP may be difficult to conclude because of differences in 
patterns of tariff elimination and definitions of ROOs adopted in such agreements.  
 
One practical way forward for trade liberalization under RCEP would be to take a 
gradual approach towards tariff elimination and a similar approach to ROO 
harmonization. It is possible however that a region-wide agreement in Asia could 
arise from a series of linked agreements covering various issues and participants. 
RCEP and TPP are key processes in creating a larger Asia-Pacific PTA. The two 
processes are not mutually exclusive and will probably prove to be complementary in 
the long run. A harmonious Asia-Pacific region would likely require the convergence 
of RCEP and TPP. This would be a win–win outcome for the Asia-Pacific community. 
In light of this situation, the WTO could play an active role in exploring coordinated 
international regulatory measures.  
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It is expected that talks at the ninth Bali Ministerial meeting will place emphasis on 
measures to facilitate trade, including the liberalization of agricultural and services 
trade so that the WTO can open up new trading opportunities for every Member. 
Progress on trade facilitation has been made with customs reform although 
corruption remains a serious problem. The ASEAN Single Window is well behind 
schedule and the aimed-for streamlining of product standards has made limited 
progress. On the other hand, PTAs are used to enhance trade and related 
opportunities between much smaller groups of economies. PTAs fail to enforce 
disciplines, particularly in anti-dumping, agricultural subsidies, and ROOs. The issue 
of the alleged benefits of PTAs remains controversial. Different PTAs with different 
levels of commitments may distort the allocation of resources for the economies 
involved in a particular type of PTA.  
 
The Doha Round should place more emphasis on all-inclusive trade liberalization. 
Special and differential treatment for developing economies was perceived as 
inadequate. There is still some room for liberalization of agricultural trade. The 
emphasis on agricultural trade liberalization is closely associated with the issue of 
food security. Demand for agricultural products in various regions, especially staple 
foods, is no longer dependent upon the expansion of cultivation but on agricultural 
productivity which has almost reached its limits. With the increasing importance of 
agricultural trade, the issue of agricultural subsidies becomes more complicated. 
Some risks due to adverse climate and uncertainty are unavoidable in agriculture and 
the extent of riskiness may affect relations among trading partners. The current Doha 
Round negotiations cannot be resolved unless the agricultural fails incorporate 
people’s right to food. Failure to make headway on this issue could have several 
consequences, such as increased reliance on imports of agricultural products leading 
to the greater bargaining power of agricultural traders in transnational corporations, 
and reliance on long supply chains over great geographical distances and using 
unsustainable modes of production. It is expected that there will be discussions in the 
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Ministerial meeting on how the Doha Round can fulfill the need for jointly promoting 
agricultural trade liberalization and ensuring food security. 
 
Careful examination is needed of whether PTAs are beneficial to the exporters of 
primary products. Recent notable efforts on the negotiation of a US-EU PTA, the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the trilateral China-
Japan-Korea FTA (CJK FTA) can be seen as default options for global trade 
liberalization. All members of ASEAN and East Asia should contribute more to the 
international economy as a whole. This calls for deepened economic integration. 
ASEAN is making concrete steps towards completing the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by 2015. Countries in ASEAN and East Asia are expecting to 
enjoy closer cooperation and connectivity through the AEC. Although historically, the 
use of PTAs in Asia has been relatively low, ASEAN has dramatically increased its 
involvement in PTAs over the past decade. While the development of supply chains 
in Asia has been driven by businesses, PTAs are trying to boost the momentum of 
ASEAN businesses through more trade and investment. In fact, PTAs have become 
the key driver of regional integration through reducing the costs of trading and 
improving the quantity and quality of the doing business infrastructure, the quality of 
logistics and of governance institutions, as well as the overall competitiveness of the 
regional economies. As tariffs are generally no longer a significant barrier, these 
agreements have increasingly focused on non-tariff trade facilitation measures, both 
at and behind borders. There has been a wide variation in the practice of 
governments with regard to rules of origin. It has become more important that a 
degree of harmonization is achieved in the practices of members in implementing 
requirements, such as the criterion for a change of tariff classification or the ad-
valorem percentage criterion. Especially in the case of Myanmar, harmonization is 
required in implementing commercial policies notably in areas such as safeguard 
measures and anti-dumping policy. This will also help to determine whether imported 
products shall receive most-favored-nation (MFN) or preferential treatment. 
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Myanmar can expect limited engagement in bilateral PTAs, as most of its trading 
partners are from ASEAN and neighboring countries. Although well-designed PTAs 
can provide demonstrable benefits to member economies, Myanmar can currently 
benefit only from the liberalization of agricultural trade. For ASEAN countries overall, 
revision is required of the price support disciplines and trade-distorting agricultural 
subsidies for public stocks and domestic food aid donated to the domestic poverty-
alleviation schemes. Progress on agricultural trade is expected to take the form of a 
problem-solving stage towards affording Asian developing countries more flexibility in 
food security policies as there are large populations in some parts of south-east Asia 
which are vulnerable to food shortages during frequent natural disasters.  
 
Services liberalization should be given higher priority on the negotiation agenda. In 
fact, the World Economic Forum recently pointed out the beneficial impacts of 
reducing supply-chain barriers. Better supply-chain connectivity may not be achieved 
without concrete mutual understandings of the scope and implications of services 
liberalization. An ambitious plan for services liberalization is needed. Focusing on 
liberalization of the logistics sector alongside trade facilitation may pave the way 
forward. While actual progress has been limited, in terms of improving global trade 
governance and promoting multilateral trade liberalization under the Doha Round, 
improving supply-chain connectivity is suggested as a means to facilitate global trade. 
In fact, impediments to the international flow of goods and services together with the 
limited mobility of labor and knowledge have become major concerns of domestic 
policies. It is observed that the regulatory impediments either purposely or 
unintentionally impose additional compliance costs. Lack of strong regulatory 
coordination across government agencies may in turn lead to different impacts of 
standards and regulations on the trade liberalization process in different countries.  
 
Regarding services liberalization at the WTO, negotiations on the movement of 
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natural persons, including the movement of professionals with some mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) require more discussion. With some MRAs have 
been concluded among ASEAN countries, Mode 4 liberalization is confined to the 
movement of professionals. Liberalization of commercial presence is a crucial item 
for discussion in the forthcoming negotiations. Due to the uncertainty about the 
impact of service liberalization, the fear of the loss of regulatory control colors such 
negotiations. It seems that a general disinclination to liberalize services under Mode 
3 and Mode 4 led to modifications in subsequent services negotiations, which 
resulted in the liberalization of limitations to Mode 1 (cross-border supply) and Mode 
2 (consumption abroad) transactions. There is progressive liberalization regarding 
Mode 3 and Mode 4 but, ASEAN still has some room for movement of companies 
and professionals among member countries.  
 
Trade expansion at the global level, and promotion of foreign direct investment at the 
regional and domestic levels, in recent decades, have contributed to opening more 
market segments and final products. The production process, with an increasing 
degree of international specialization, has been developed in a small group of 
countries. In fact, few countries completely produce a product domestically anymore. 
The proper role of policy is to facilitate trade and investment activities. In turn, this 
may require a change in approach. Services liberalization can help foster sound 
competition and make the business environment more enabling in terms of overall 
economic activities. 
 
Since investment liberalization has also played a big role in the expansion of trade in 
intermediate goods in Asia, ASEAN actively encourages inward foreign direct 
investment. However, the maintenance of large temporary exclusion and sensitive 
product lists are seen as one of the main problems leading to implementation delays. 
An appropriate liberalization framework for the group of small developing economies 
is also necessary. Small developing economies are usually followers in the process 
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set by the regime (rule-takers), while major advanced economies act pursue their 
own interests and set their own agendas. WTO Members need to focus more 
resolutely on commonly agreed priorities in a transparent manner. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The WTO can play a role through the TPRM in shaping the international trade order 
in a way that is different from traditional approaches, such as trade negotiations in 
the WTO ministerial conferences where new binding agreements are negotiated and 
signed and any disputes that arise will be settled by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The trade negotiations in which WTO Members have encountered recurring 
difficulties may be revitalized if appropriate changes are made to the organization’s 
decision-making process. Recent innovations and successful developments open up 
a new horizon for future WTO activities. This suggests that the WTO can act as a 
moderator or coordinator of activities of G20 countries as well as of other 
international organizations. 
  
It is also time to consider another role for the WTO in formulating and promoting 
international trade. This approach can be termed as one of ‘soft law’ rather than ‘hard 
law’. In our view, maintaining the supremacy of the WTO in the international trading 
system requires a new methodology, which should be non-formalistic and non-
binding and could be expected to immediately produce new multilateral trade rules. 
The best strategy for the WTO is to build a constructive relationship with PTAs so 
that both processes reinforce each other and maximize the benefits of open trade to 
the international community. In order to accomplish this, communication and 
coordination between the WTO and PTAs are essential. In this regard, TPRM seems 
to fit the bill.  
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II.11 The Road to 9th WTO Ministerial Conference: Issues and Challenges 
Biswajit Dhar, Research and Information System for Developing Countries 
(RIS), India 
 
1. Introduction 
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will shortly meet congregate in Bali 
for the ninth Ministerial Conference. This meeting will take place 12 years after the 
decision was taken to launch the Doha Round negotiations. The time that has 
elapsed since the commencement of the Doha Round is an eloquent testimony to the 
fact that the current Round has been the most vexatious of all the negotiating rounds 
that the multilateral trading system has witnessed since it was established in 1948. 
The present impasse seems hardly surprising given the wide range of interests 
across the diverse groups of countries that have articulated their views in the 
negotiations.56 This complexity seems to have escaped the architects of the Doha 
Round, for they initially gave the Member countries no more than four years to 
complete the deal, which included at least three major components, in addition to 
several specific issues of critical concern. 
 
The first component was the so-called ‘implementation issues’,57 arising from the 
problems in implementing Uruguay Round commitments, which were mainly 
highlighted by the developing countries. The second component included the agenda 
for furthering the trade liberalization agenda across all sectors, while the third was 
the proposal to include four new areas, namely investment, competition policy, 
government procurement and trade facilitation (the ‘Singapore issues’) within the 
ambit of the WTO. Among the specific issues, the most significant was the threat 
posed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) to the realization of public health imperatives.58 All the components of the 
                                                              
56 A recent count shows that there are 27 groups in the WTO, most of which were formed during the Doha Round. 
For details, see ‘Groups in the WTO’, Updated 2 March 2013, (accessed from: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf). 
57 For details, see, WTO (2001), Implementation‐Related Issues and Concerns, Decision of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/17, 20 November. 
58 This concern was reflected in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
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negotiating mandate were expected to be addressed keeping in view the 
development concerns of developing countries. Reflecting this expectation was the 
fact that the negotiating mandate for the Doha Round came to be better known as 
the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ (DDA).59 
 
An often-ignored aspect of the Doha Round is that its architects envisioned a 
balanced outcome by ensuring that negotiations in all mandated areas would be 
concluded simultaneously. This was reflected in their agreement that the outcome 
would be in the nature of a ‘single undertaking’, which really meant that the ‘Doha 
Deal’ can only be done when WTO Members had concluded agreements in all areas. 
The WTO-speak in this regard said it all: ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. 
In practical terms this approach was extremely significant since it sought to curb the 
tendencies of the more dominant countries to conclude agreements in areas that 
best suited their interests (euphemistically called ‘cherry picking’) and to go slow in 
(or even ignore) areas in which they had to make concessions. Thus, countries could 
engage in inter-sectoral trade-offs, and this was seen as a big step towards ensuring 
a balanced outcome.60 
 
The lofty ambitions set for the Doha Round have eroded rapidly, particularly since the 
breakdown of the negotiations in July 2008. The narrow focus of the issues being 
discussed in the run-up to Bali underlines the extent of the erosion that the 
negotiating mandate has suffered. The agenda that is engaging the membership 
looks thin in relation to the overall negotiating mandate of the Doha Round, as it will 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
For details see, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Adopted on 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November. 
59 The Doha Ministerial Declaration alluded to the development dimension, while stating the following: ‘The 
majority of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of 
the Work Program adopted in this Declaration’; WTO (2001), Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November, paragraph 2. 
60 Ministers of WTO Members agreed that ‘... the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the 
negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage may 
be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing 
the overall balance of the negotiations’. WTO (2001), Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November, paragraph 47. 
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likely be confined to three areas, namely, agriculture, trade facilitation and a package 
for the least-developed countries (LDCs). Furthermore, with regard to agriculture, two 
groups of developing countries have rekindled interest by focusing on specific issues 
with a view to reaching some agreement in the Bali Ministerial. 
 
As they prepare for the Bali Ministerial, WTO Members are faced with two sets of 
challenges. First, it is difficult to conceive of a Ministerial Conference that would have 
such a limited agenda. The challenge is to include other issues in the agenda without 
risking a failed outcome. 
 
While preparing for Bali, what should really concern the WTO membership is the 
future of the organization, in particular how to make it relevant for its membership. In 
our view, this issue has at least two dimensions. The first is to make the organization 
respond to the needs of the new drivers of trade in the 21st century. One way of doing 
so would be to consider the support it can lend to the present-day drivers of trade 
and investment, i.e. the production networks that are increasingly crossing multiple 
national boundaries. The second is to reflect on making the organization more 
efficient in terms of the critical decisions it is able to take. 
 
This chapter reflects on the dimensions referred to above. First, the chapter 
considers the issues that are currently figuring in the discussions and the possibilities 
of arriving at negotiated outcomes at the Ministerial. The second section briefly takes 
up the issue of how best to make the WTO more relevant, keeping in view the trade 
and development imperatives. 
 
2. The current focus areas 
A few weeks ahead of the Bali Ministerial, WTO Members are engaged in 
discussions on three areas- trade facilitation, agriculture and a package for the LDCs. 
Since its inclusion in the negotiating mandate in 2004, trade facilitation has appeared 
137 
 
the most likely area on which WTO Members could reach an agreement. Over the 
past couple of years, text-based negotiations on the issue have made considerable 
progress, though some concerns remain, particularly relating to special and 
differential treatment (S&DT) provisions for developing countries. 
 
Dynamics in the agriculture negotiations have been quite the opposite. Differences 
between the major protagonists have effectively stalled the negotiations since 2008. 
In the run-up to Bali, agriculture has been identified as a priority area by two groups 
of developing countries. While the G-33 is seeking amendments to the domestic 
support provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), aimed at promoting food 
security, the G-20 has proposed strengthening the export competition pillar. 
 
Finally, the LDCs are seeking decisions in several specific areas that would enable 
them to take fuller advantage of the duty-free-quota-free arrangement agreed to in 
the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005. This proposal also seeks to address the problem 
being faced by the Cotton-4 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) arising 
from the subsidies granted by the advanced countries to their producers. 
 
2.1 Trade facilitation 
Although several of its elements form a part of the GATT, trade facilitation (TF) was 
unveiled as an integrated framework to address a range of customs-related issues, 
including that of transit, at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. 
The issue thus became one of the ‘Singapore Issues’, along with investment, 
competition and government procurement. After much discussion, the issue was 
included in the WTO work program in the Doha Ministerial Conference. While the 
other ‘Singapore Issues’ were taken off the table in the Doha Round for want of 
consensus,61 TF was included in negotiations as a part of the ‘July package’ in 
                                                              
61 In respect of each of the ‘Singapore Issues’, the Doha Ministerial Declaration had stated ‘that the negotiations 
will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by 
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations’. See WTO (2001), Ministerial Declaration: 
Adopted on 14 November 2001, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paragraphs 20–27. 
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2004.62 
 
TF negotiations are mandated to produce an appropriate set of rules both from a 
technical point of view and from the perspective of the development imperatives of 
developing countries. In more precise terms, the negotiations ‘aim to clarify and 
improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 with a view to 
further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in 
transit’. The negotiations are also aimed at enhancing ‘technical assistance and 
support for capacity building’ and to develop ‘provisions for effective cooperation 
between customs or any other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and 
customs compliance issues’. The negotiations are expected to ‘take fully into account 
the principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed 
countries’ and in this spirit the mandate clarifies that the countries in question are not 
expected ‘to undertake investments in infrastructure projects beyond their means’. 
 
Developing countries were initially opposed to the expansion of the remit of the WTO 
by including TF in the Doha agenda if adequate efforts were not made to address 
issues arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments. They 
questioned the developmental impact of TF, besides arguing that they did not have 
the resources to implement the commitments that the proposed agreement would 
impose on them.  
 
However, despite the initial skepticism, there seems to be an emerging consensus 
that developing countries would benefit from a WTO Agreement on TF. A widely 
accepted view is that in developing countries customs procedures and the supporting 
infrastructure are generally not very efficient, and that this results in higher 
transaction costs. ‘Doing Business’, the annual survey of the World Bank endorses 
this point. 
                                                              
62 WTO (2004), Doha Work Program: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, 
Annex D, Page D‐1. 
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Given the weight of evidence emerging in favor of the various elements of TF, 
including simplification and harmonization of customs procedures and improvement 
of border infrastructure and management systems, introduction of these measures 
would not only increase developing countries’ capacity to trade, but business 
interests in these countries will also be able to integrate into global supply chains. 
Better coordination amongst the customs authorities would increase operating 
efficiency, and this in turn would enable the system to generate more revenue 
through a transparent mechanism. A recent study conducted by the OECD 
Secretariat using data on ‘trade facilitation indicators’ from 106 non-OECD countries, 
which included 95 WTO Members and 11 WTO observers, showed that the benefits 
accruing to developing countries, as both importers and exporters, can be substantial 
if appropriate reforms are undertaken.63 
  
The negotiations on TF have been dealing with a plethora of issues that could 
eventually form part of the agreement. These include issues relating to transparency, 
release and clearance of cargo, introduction of risk management, post-clearance 
audits, instituting a single window for the clearance of goods, elimination of pre-
shipment and post-shipment inspections, and uniform forms and documentation 
requirements for the clearance of goods. Besides the above-mentioned aspects, 
freedom of transit and customs cooperation are further key elements of discussion. 
 
While the broad contours of an Agreement on TF seem clear, some contentious 
issues are engaging the WTO Members. In recent months, the Draft Consolidated 
Negotiating Text 64  has moved forward by ‘eliminating a further batch of square 
brackets’65. At the same time, however, differences persist, particularly on the extent 
                                                              
63 OECD (2012), Trade Facilitation Indicators: The potential impact of trade facilitation on developing countries’ 
trade, Working Party of the Trade Committee, TAD/TC/WP(2012)24 (accessed from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/TradeFacilitationIndicators_ImpactDevelopingCountries.pdf). 
64 For the most recent version, see WTO (2013), Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/C/W/63, 31 May. 
65 "Members approaching last petrol station before Bali ‐ Lamy", Trade Negotiations Committee Informal Meeting, 
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of flexibilities that are to be included in the agreement, which are of primary interest 
to the developing countries. Moreover, these countries have been insisting on the 
inclusion of effective provisions on special and differential treatment, including firm 
commitments on capacity building and technical assistance, which will enable them 
to rise to the implementation challenges deriving from the proposed agreement.  
 
Despite the progress made in the TF negotiations, there are obstacles in moving the 
negotiating process on TF towards an eventual agreement. Major developing 
countries like India and Brazil are not likely to favor a ‘stand-alone’ outcome as TF is 
an integral part of the Doha package, which is to result in a ‘balanced package’. In 
other words, these countries will be reluctant to agree on a deal on TF without 
agreement on some of the key areas in the Doha negotiating mandate. Again, while 
there is no doubt that most of the less developed countries would benefit from an 
eventual deal on TF, it is also evident that the benefits would accrue to them only if 
adequate doses of technical assistance and capacity building programs are extended. 
It thus appears likely that an eventual agreement on TF critically depends on the 
progress that is made in other areas in the weeks ahead. 
 
2.2 Agriculture 
In the run-up to the Bali Ministerial, both the G-33 and the G-20 have identified areas 
in which they are looking for changes to the AoA. The former group has pushed for 
early agreement to address food security issues, while the latter is seeking clear 
directions for introducing new disciplines in the export competition pillar of the AoA, 
which includes the issues of export subsidies, export credits and international food 
aid. 
 
G-33 proposal on food security 
Towards the end of 2012, the G-33 tabled a proposal for the inclusion of specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
3 June 2013 (accessed from: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/tnc_infstat_03jun13_e.htm). 
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elements in the Draft Modalities addressing the problem of food security.66 Since food 
prices reached record levels in 2007–2008, food security has become a major 
concern in many countries in the Asian region. In the aftermath of the crisis, ASEAN 
Member States adopted the Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN 
Region (SPA-FS) as part of the ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework.67 
Among other things, the SPA-FS focuses on enhancing food production, promoting 
availability and accessibility to agriculture inputs, and operationalizing regional food 
emergency relief arrangements. In recent years, India has also taken measures to 
improve food production, which have resulted in production reaching record levels. At 
the same time, the Government of India has taken measures to help food to reach 
the poorest people through the Food Security Act.68 
 
The G-33 proposal seeks to ensure that the above-mentioned initiatives of the 
governments are implemented successfully through three amendments in the ‘Green 
Box’ (Annex 2 of AoA). These proposals are not new, having been included in the 
Draft Modalities introduced by the then Chair of the Committee on Agriculture in 2008. 
By tabling the proposals now, the G-33 is aiming at a decision in the Bali Ministerial 
comprising the elements they have proposed. 
 
The first of the proposed amendments aims at allowing developing countries to make 
payments on specific activities to promote rural development and poverty alleviation 
without being subjected to any disciplines introduced by the AoA. Thus, an 
amendment of paragraph 2 of Annex 2 of the AoA was proposed to include payments 
by developing countries for farmer settlement, land reforms, rural development and 
rural livelihood security, such as provision of infrastructural services, land 
                                                              
66 WTO (2012), G‐33 Proposal on Some Elements of TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 for Early Agreement to Address Food 
Security Issues, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, 13 November. 
67 ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework and Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN 
Region (SPA‐FS): 2009‐2013 (accessed from: http://aseanfoodsecurity.asean.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2011/08/aifs.pdf). 
68 Government of India (2013), The National Food Security Ordinance 2013, No. 7 of 2013, The Gazette of India, 
Extraordinary, Part II, 5 July (accessed from: 
http://dfpd.nic.in/fcamin/homepage/NationalFoodSecurityOrdinance2013.pdf). 
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rehabilitation, soil conservation and resource management, drought management 
and flood control, rural employment programs, nutritional food security, issuance of 
property titles and settlement programs. 
 
Secondly, the G-33 proposed that the existing provisions relating to public 
stockholding for food security purposes should be amended so that developing 
countries can spend on acquisition of stocks of foodstuffs for supporting low-income 
or resource-poor producers and the cost of so doing will not be accounted for in their 
subsidies’ bills. Two textual amendments that these countries have proposed would 
therefore allow developing countries to implement food security programs ‘with the 
objective of fighting hunger and rural poverty’ by procuring foodstuffs from the poorer 
farmers at administered prices without being subjected to the AoA disciplines. 
 
G-20 proposal on export competition 
One of the major decisions taken at the 6th Ministerial Conference, held in Hong 
Kong in 2006, was that there would be ‘parallel elimination of all forms of export 
subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect … by the end 
of 2013’.69 However, even as recently as 2010–2011, the EU and its Member States, 
which have been the largest users of export subsidies, continued to use such support 
measures.70 
 
In view of the non-implementation of the commitment made by members, the G-20 
has proposed that a Ministerial Decision be adopted on export competition, which 
would include both export subsidies and export credits.71 According to this proposal, 
by the end of 2013, developed country members shall reduce their export subsidy 
                                                              
69 WTO (2005), Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, 
paragraph 6. 
70 The outlay on export subsidies was about € 177 million, while the quantity of subsidized products was nearly 2 
million tons. As compared to 2009–2011, there was a halving of its outlay on export subsidies, but the quantity of 
subsidized exports had declined by a modest amount: from 2.5 million to 2 million tons. For details, see 
G/AG/N/EU/14, 13 June 2013 and G/AG/N/EU/6, 15 March 2012, Table ES.1 
71 WTO (2013), Ministerial Decision on Export Competition: G‐20 Non‐Paper, Committee on Agriculture Special 
Session, JOB/AG/24, 21 April. 
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commitments both in terms of outlay and quantity commitments as follows: (i) 
budgetary outlays shall be reduced by 50%, and (ii) export quantity commitments 
shall be reduced to the actual average of quantity levels in the 2003–2005 base 
period. 
 
As regards export credits, the G-20 proposed that the maximum repayment term for 
developed countries should not be more than 540 days from the ‘starting point of 
credit’72 and ending on the contractual date of the final payment. The proposed 
Ministerial Declaration includes S&DT for developing countries. With regard to export 
subsidies, developing countries would continue to benefit from the provisions of 
Article 9.4 of the AoA73 for five years after the end of all forms of export subsidies. 
Further, the limit for repayments of export credits proposed for developed countries 
would be applicable to the developing countries three years after the former begin 
implementing it. 
 
The G-33 proposal on food security has emerged as a critical component in the run-
up to the Bali Ministerial. Influential members of the G-33, including India, have 
argued that agreement in other areas, particularly trade facilitation, will hinge on the 
stand WTO Members take on their proposal. The United States has provided a 
contrary view, suggesting a work program to address concerns relating to food 
security.74 
 
2.3 The LDC package 
The 34-member group of LDCs in the WTO has presented a package arguing for the 
                                                              
72 The ‘starting point of a credit’ shall be no later than the weighted mean date or actual date of the arrival of the 
goods in the recipient country for a contract under which shipments are made in any consecutive six‐month 
period. 
73 These include provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products and 
internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms 
more favorable than for domestic shipments. 
74 U.S. Blames Other WTO Members For Blocking Bali Deal Over Ag Demands, World Trade Online, 29 May 2013 
(accessed from: http://insidetrade.com/201305292435870/WTO‐Daily‐News/Daily‐News/us‐blames‐other‐wto‐
members‐for‐blocking‐bali‐deal‐over‐ag‐demands/menu‐id‐948.html). 
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inclusion of four areas in the outcome of the Bali Ministerial. 75  These are: (i) 
implementation of the duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access Decision 
taken by Members at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, (ii) preferential 
rules of origin, (iii) operationalization of the LDC Services waiver, and (iv) cotton. The 
LDCs have provided firm proposals on the first three areas for adoption in the Bali 
Ministerial. 
 
In their submission, LDCs have stated that the DFQF Decision must be implemented 
fully so as to enable them to better integrate within the global economy. They have 
therefore argued that the developed countries, which had agreed that 97% of their 
imports from the LDCs would be DFQF, must fulfill their commitment by a date to be 
decided in Bali. The LDCs have also sought additional market access opportunities 
from developing country members. While several developing countries have already 
provided them DFQF market access for products, LDCs have insisted that such 
access should be available for at least 97% of all products originating in their 
respective territories. 
 
Alongside this proposal, the LDCs have argued for an easing of rules of origin, which 
would enable them to take better advantage of the DFQF scheme. The proposal for 
which the LDCs have sought support in the Bali Ministerial is ‘centered on an “across 
the board” Rule of Origin based on a percentage criterion’.76 They have advanced 
this argument in order to avoid the proliferation of product-specific rules of origin. 
According to the LDCs, rules of origin negotiated product by product, and industry by 
industry, open the way for organized industries and lobby groups to devise rules of 
origin that diminish transparency and trade liberalization. 
 
At the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in December 2011, trade ministers 
                                                              
75 WTO (2013), LDC Package for Bali: Communication by Nepal, on behalf of the LDC Group, Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/C/W/63, 31 May. 
76 WTO (2013), LDC Package for Bali: Communication by Nepal, on behalf of the LDC Group, TN/C/W/63, 31 May, 
paragraph 1.26. 
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adopted a decision on a ‘Service Waiver’ in favor of LDCs. This decision allowed 
developed and developing country Members to provide preferential treatment to the 
services and service suppliers of LDCs going beyond the notion of MFN treatment as 
provided for under Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The Waiver, which was agreed for an initial period of 15 years from the date of 
adoption, was intended to release WTO Members from their legal obligation to 
provide non-discriminatory treatment to all trading partners when granting trade 
preferences to LDCs. 
 
LDCs have submitted that a year and half since the decision was adopted, the 
‘Service Waiver’ still awaits operationalization. They point out that in order to 
operationalize the Waiver, LDCs’ trading partners will have to design and effectively 
implement new trade preference schemes covering services. Their view is that the 
extent to which the Waiver will actually lead to development results will not only 
depend on the provision of commercially meaningful preferences but also on the 
LDCs’ ability to overcome their supply-side constrains to effectively benefit from 
those preferences. 
 
2.4 A proactive agenda for the WTO 
Over the past two decades, Global Production Networks (GPNs) have emerged as a 
strong integrating force in the global economy. Not only have GPNs played a 
determining role in bringing economies closer together by stimulating the flows of 
goods and capital across countries, they have contributed to knowledge diffusion and 
have provided opportunities for local capabilities to emerge in countries that are part 
of such networks. This dimension has received relatively less attention in the 
literature on GPNs, which has discussed this new organizational form largely from 
the point of view of trade integration. 
 
GPNs have been seen both as products of the process of liberalization of trade and 
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financial flows and as the catalysts for ensuring a greater degree of openness in the 
global economy. Proponents of this thinking have argued that unshackling of the 
economies has triggered changes in the modus operandi of transnational 
corporations, converting them from ‘tariff-hopping’ investors to ‘global network 
flagships’ that have integrated their dispersed supply, knowledge and customer 
bases into the GPNs. Fragmentation of production caused by the ‘network flagships’ 
is assisted by the existence of a plethora of specialized network suppliers usually 
spread over a large geographical area.77  
 
The logic of the GPNs demands a high degree of competence all along the supply 
chain. The suppliers to the network flagship, which is usually the point of assembly of 
the final product, are not only required to meet the exacting quality standards and the 
price of the intermediates they are responsible for, they also have to comply with rigid 
‘just-in-time’ delivery schedules. But in order to ensure that the suppliers’ 
performances meet expectations, the network flagships need to transfer technical 
and managerial knowledge to them. There is therefore a need to upgrade the 
suppliers’ technical and managerial skills on a continuous basis. The increasing 
speed of product obsolescence seen in a large number of industries, in particular 
those producing products that use information and communications technology, puts 
pressure on the network flagships to upgrade the technologies of their suppliers.78 
 
Network flagships transfer knowledge across borders using a range of mechanisms. 
In the first place, the transfer of knowledge may be mediated through market 
mechanisms, using licensing contracts and outright purchase of both technology and 
plant equipment among others, that may or may not involve FDI. Secondly, the 
network flagships may transfer technologies through the supply chain and, in doing 
                                                              
77 Ernst, Dieter and Linsu Kim (2002), Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local capability 
formation, Research Policy, vol. 31, pp. 1417–1429. 
78 Bernhardt, Thomas and William Milberg (2011), Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Analysis 
of Horticulture, Apparel, Tourism and Mobile Telephones, New School for Social Research The New School – 
Department of Economics, Capturing the Gains Working Paper No. 2011/06 (accessed from: 
http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg‐wp‐2010‐03.pdf). 
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so, exercise control over the manner in which knowledge is disseminated to and 
used by the supplier. The control over the supply chain can be seen by the manner in 
which the operations of original equipment manufacturers, or the so-called ‘Tier I’ 
suppliers, are managed by the network flagships. 
 
Irrespective of the nature of GPNs, i.e. whether they are producer-driven or buyer-
driven, network flagships are able to influence the production process of their 
suppliers by actively transferring knowledge in the form of blueprints and technical 
specifications. The objective is to ensure that suppliers meet the technical standards 
required in the final products. Branded marketers like Nike and Reebok, managing 
their ‘buyer-driven’ networks, maintain close control over their suppliers by setting 
standards, sourcing raw materials, distributing them and, finally, importing the 
finished products. GPNs are also able to encourage firms participating in the 
networks to access knowledge through indirect mechanisms, for instance, through 
the import of sophisticated equipment to improve their production capabilities.  
 
With the maturing of the production networks, the pattern of knowledge acquisition 
has also been undergoing changes. This has led to the phenomenon where firms in 
GPNs engage in innovative activities that have allowed them to move up the value 
chain and thereby given innovating firms greater scope to operate independently. 
The existence of successful GPNs, however, presupposes the existence of local 
suppliers who have the capabilities to absorb the knowledge disseminated by the 
networks. Furthermore, to remain in the GPN, local suppliers must constantly 
upgrade their absorptive capacity. Participation in GPNs cannot therefore be ensured 
unless local suppliers are able to develop their technological capabilities and prepare 
themselves for inclusion in these networks. 
 
The proliferation of GPNs poses a significant challenge to the multilateral trading 
system because its basic construct centers on the existence of localized production 
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within nation states. Production-sharing across national borders of the kind that has 
been spawned by GPNs requires new instruments and institutions that are supportive 
of such networks. This raises the need to focus on three behind-the-border areas, 
namely, trade facilitation measures, investment policy, and non-tariff barriers for the 
adoption possible globally accepted frameworks or agreements.  
 
From the point of view of GPNs, justification for including trade facilitation in this 
group of issues is considerable. Enterprises participating in GPNs are required to 
meet tight delivery schedules. Transparent rules and adequate infrastructure at the 
border are the necessary wherewithal to help them realize their objectives. Reforms 
of existing facilities offered in different jurisdictions with a view to harmonizing them 
to the extent possible, given the resource constraints faced by developing countries 
in particular, are therefore desirable. In fact, negotiations on trade facilitation in the 
WTO are aimed at moving in this direction. 
 
The multilateral agreement on investment became a non-starter after the OECD-
backed proposal for such an agreement met resistance not only from the developing 
countries, but also from within the group of developed countries. Notwithstanding this 
development, there has been an unrelenting movement towards adoption of a de 
facto investment agreement at the global level through the proliferation of bilateral 
investment treaties and preferential trade agreements featuring embedded 
investment chapters. However, in recent years, evidence has been emerging on the 
nature of constraints that these agreements impose on host countries. Not 
surprisingly, there has been a steep increase in the number of disputes involving 
foreign investors and their host states. This development could be detrimental to the 
GPNs, since they are dependent on the cross-boundary movement of enterprises. 
There is therefore a need to better understand the contentious elements of existing 
investment agreements, which could then trigger a move towards a more equitable 
global investment regime. 
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Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have been the insurmountable barrier that the multilateral 
trading system has had to cope with since its establishment. In recent years, 
technical barriers have emerged as the fountainhead of NTBs. This was confirmed in 
the course of the ongoing negotiations on non-agricultural market access. The 
proliferation of technical barriers and standards demands global action to tame them. 
 
3. The road ahead 
There is no doubt that the Bali Ministerial Conference is the most critical meeting that 
the WTO will convene in its less than two decades of existence. Ministers will not 
only be faced with the need to break the Doha Round logjam, they must also take 
decisions that will make the organization able to respond to the needs of the 21st 
century. 
 
The immediate challenge is to steer the preparatory process in a direction that would 
allow the Ministers to take forward-looking initiatives. For this to happen, the agenda 
for Ministers must be significantly larger than the sum total of issues that are 
engaging the negotiators in Geneva. The key point of interest would be the ability of 
the new Director-General to expand the list of issues through the building of mutual 
trust. 
 
There is of course an inherent risk in expanding the number of items on the 
discussion table. Proposals for introducing new items would also bring with them the 
divisive nature of politics that has plagued the Doha Round all these years. One such 
example is President Obama’s proposal to launch plurilateral negotiations on 
environmental goods.79 
 
It will be interesting to see if the Bali Ministerial addresses the most challenging issue 
                                                              
79 The White House (2013), The President’s Climate Action Plan, June 2013, pp. 19–20 (accessed from: 
http://insidetrade.com/iwpfile.html?file=jun2013%2Fwto2013_1996a.pdf). 
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facing the WTO, which is its inability to take decisions. In fact, former Director-
General Pascal Lamy had quipped, in his earlier role as the Chief Negotiator of the 
European Union, that the WTO was a medieval organization in urgent need of 
reform.80 However, despite being mindful of the need for reforms in the decision-
making structures of the WTO, Lamy was unable to effect any change since the 
issue of institutional reforms has remained on the sidelines of WTO discussions. 
Trade Ministers could provide much-needed political support to initiate the process of 
discussions on institutional reforms that the WTO clearly needs. 
 
  
                                                              
80 ‘Brussels urges shakeup of “medieval” WTO’, The Guardian, Tuesday 16 September 2003 (accessed from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/sep/16/europeanunion.wto) 
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II.12  A Malaysian Perspective on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration 
Zakariah Rashid, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) remains centrally relevant within the scheme of 
international trade in today’s global scenario. It is important to safeguard and monitor 
global rules. The simplicity of the single framework that the WTO offers for global 
trade, standards and rules cannot be sufficiently emphasized. In this context, the 
Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali has a special role to play. Members will 
need to harness stronger political to ensure the necessary deliverables required so 
that the Doha Development Agenda can be completed after the Bali meeting. 
 
One of the pressing needs of the Bali Ministerial is to generate renewed momentum 
for a longer-term vision of the WTO. is the WTO’s long-term prospects are under 
pressure because of the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). There 
is a danger that this could lead to the dilution of the strength of the WTO. The main 
concern is that these trends point to a possible lack of interest in the multilateral trade 
agenda. The favored approach to the integration of economies lies in forging bilateral 
and regional agreements, with the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement being one 
such example. Although there is nothing innately wrong with PTAs, these agreements 
should not come at the expense of the multilateral trading system. Indeed, they 
should be complementary to the multilateral system and, certainly not be a risk to the 
robustness of the WTO. 
 
The last Ministerial meeting held in Geneva in 2011 did not bring about much cheer 
to members, since ministers were largely in agreement that the Doha Round of trade 
talks had reached an impasse. The Bali Ministerial, thus, offers the opportunity for 
the Doha talks to be taken forward.  There are various impediments to success in 
Bali. First, there are many technical topics that have been raised in previous 
meetings and on which no clear agreement has emerged. There is a need for closure 
on these issues. Second, there are several outstanding issues, such as trade 
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facilitation, some issues in agriculture and other items of interest to developing 
economies, which need to be addressed. These issues require political will. Third, 
any success at Bali, even if it is achieved, will not be the end of the road, but will only 
be a stepping stone towards the later conclusion of the Doha Round.  
 
As far as ASEAN is concerned, the Ninth Ministerial conference is important because 
it offers a genuine opportunity to put the Doha Round back on track. Forward 
movement in Bali would help foster a fairer global trading environment and re-
energize the negotiation process, ultimately strengthening the multilateral trading 
system.  
 
As an ASEAN member country, Malaysia would like the Bali meeting to raise the 
level of engagement and restore a higher level of ambition to the WTO talks.  This is 
necessary to advance the multilateral trade agenda. In order to achieve this, WTO 
Members should pursue realistic objectives, being cautious in their treatment of other 
Members’ ‘red lines’. It should be remembered that ASEAN is in danger of being 
distracted by its many preferential arrangements, not least the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Program (RCEP). While RCEP is not damaging in itself, it 
could become the focus of attention if sufficient progress were not achieved in the 
Bali meeting. ASEAN member countries are keen to see greater evidence of a 
stronger commitment to the Doha Round at Bali. 
 
There are several areas on which some advances can be made at the Ninth 
Ministerial Meeting. One is trade facilitation. Trade facilitation is a necessary 
instrument to encourage the trading process since it simplifies export and import 
transactions, for example through the creation of trade-friendly customs rules and 
procedures. This is an area that is likely to be less contentious and it is widely 
believed that enough momentum has been created here to bring about an early 
harvest at Bali. The reason for the strong hope that is placed on trade facilitation, and 
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the support that can be expected for this issue from ASEAN members, is that it is in 
the interest of ASEAN to achieve better trade facilitation. This will, among other 
things, facilitate trade within ASEAN itself. 
 
Another important priority for Malaysia, as for other developing economies in ASEAN, 
is meaningful and improved market access for their exports. Most developing 
economies in ASEAN export a narrow range of products and these products often 
face high duties in export markets. It is true that most developed countries offer full or 
high duty free and quota free (DFQF) access to products coming from least 
developed countries. In fact, the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference agreed to 
grant at least 97 per cent DFQF access to LDC exports. 
 
However, there is some disagreement between Asian and African countries over the 
implementation of DFQF. Nevertheless, this need not be an insurmountable obstacle 
to the implementation of DFQF access because there will be few overlapping tariff 
lines between countries in Africa and ASEAN. A meaningful and mutually satisfactory 
solution to this problem has to be found in Bali, such that additional commercial 
market access is given to all LDCs. For their part, the ASEAN countries concerned 
will have to hold discussions on DFQF access with their trading partners. 
 
Related to the question of DFQF is that of preferential rules of origin. There has not 
been much progress on this issue at the WTO; nevertheless, it will have some impact 
on ASEAN member countries. Those developing member countries that are targeting 
the developed countries for their exports will find it useful if some progress is 
achieved in this area in a manner that is favorable to ASEAN countries, especially the 
less developed among them.  
 
A fair and favorable discussion on preferential rules of origin that takes into account 
the needs of ASEAN countries will do much to re-kindle enthusiasm among members 
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on the benefits of multilateral cooperation. A revision of the rules of origin by 
developed countries will have a very positive effect on the export patterns of LDCs. 
Any agreed rules of origin will have to be simple and transparent. They will also have 
to facilitate market access and take into account the realities of global value chains. 
 
At the 2011 Ministerial Conference there was a discussion on a waiver from most-
favored nation (MFN) obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). The point of this waiver would be to provide preferential market access to 
service suppliers from LDCs. This obviously has an impact on ASEAN member 
states for two reasons. First, it would enable a few ASEAN members to develop their 
services sector. Second, it will help service sectors to export to developed countries. 
The waiver will have the outcome of developing the growth of the services industries 
and securing them a bigger share of the global market.  
 
The services waiver is a topic that must be taken up at the 2013 Ministerial Meeting. 
It is likely to enjoy the support of ASEAN member states and help to gain their 
confidence. This is because, granting preferential market access to the services and 
service providers from LDCs, will enable ASEAN countries to develop their services 
sector and make greater contributions to the GDP of these countries. Also it will 
strengthen the participation of ASEAN in the multilateral trading system. 
 
On the downside, extending a services waiver may not be as promising as it sounds. 
First, the areas for which the waiver is granted in the services schedule may not be of 
much interest. The waiver may not apply to activities undertaken by low-skilled 
workers, which is where most LDCs have a comparative advantage. Second, 
developed countries may not be readily able to encourage their citizens to consume 
services in which ASEAN member states have a niche, for example in tourism. 
Nevertheless, the initiative will give renewed confidence to ASEAN countries and 
other LDCs in the multilateral trading system. The steps that will have to accompany 
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this initiative will be the process of identifying relevant sectors and modes of supply 
of priority export interest to LDCs. 
 
It can be expected that trade facilitation will be a key topic for negotiation in Bali. This 
appears to be a matter of much interest to many WTO Members, whether they be 
developed or developing economies. ASEAN is in the process of examining trade 
facilitation and addressing shortcomings in this area because its member states are 
themselves working on trade facilitation within the context of their own regional 
compact and their other bilateral agreements with members from East Asia, Australia, 
New Zealand and India. 
 
ASEAN member states have been taking various steps to improve their trade 
facilitation processes and procedures. There are many aspects of customs 
procedures that ASEAN members have worked upon and improved. Most of the 
members have also initiated national single window policies. In addition, there have 
been many efforts to improve efficiency and openness in the transport and logistics 
sector, with the easing of regulatory burdens and the creation of of more business-
friendly approaches. Generally, there has been a de-regulatory trend in the sector, 
which should enhance trade facilitation. 
 
A move to conclude a Trade Facilitation Agreement in Bali is afoot. This is a fertile 
area for ASEAN to take advantage of, both because there is interest among its 
member states and also because there is interest among other WTO Members. 
While the on-going negotiations in WTO are about the practical aspects of the topic, 
such as measures to simplify processes and procedures, there is still room for LDCs 
to highlight their own concerns. And this is where ASEAN will want to take a stand 
because its primary interest would be to make a claim for technical assistance and 
capacity-building. 
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It should be noted that ASEAN member states are heading towards a Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).  RCEP was announced in 2011, 
during the 19th ASEAN Summit, and is expected to be concluded by 2015. The 
importance of RCEP lies in its objectives. First, RCEP is meant to bring about a 
mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement among ASEAN member states 
together with ASEAN’s key PTA partners. Second, RCEP will deepen economic 
integration in the region and, thereby, boost growth and development. RCEP will 
cover the usual topics of a modern PTA, that is, trade in goods, trade in services, 
investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition 
policy, dispute settlement, and other issues. Thus it is expected to be comprehensive. 
 
However, the problem with RCEP is its expected flexible nature, as RCEP will offer 
numerous flexibility caveats that ensure that no member has to adopt trade policies 
with which it disagrees. Further, the RCEP process appears committed to allowing 
participating governments to protect sensitive industries from exposure to enhanced 
competition. The greatest obstacle to RCEP, however, will come from the different 
stages of development of ASEAN member countries and the differential treatment 
that they will expect. Also, some of the member states may be unable to push 
reforms to the extent expected, particularly Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia.  
 
Nevertheless, ASEAN member states are moving towards liberalizing their 
economies. Many initiatives are being taken in this direction, and efforts such as the 
liberalization of tariffs, trade facilitation and opening up of agricultural trade and 
services markets is on-going, with the objective of meeting the goals of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). The AEC has committed itself to an integrated ASEAN, 
and this cannot be achieved without liberalization of trade in goods and services, IPR 
regimes, dispute settlement and competition policy. The process is likely to be slow, 
but it should facilitate the process of multilateralizing regional advances. 
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On the other hand, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is likely to contain a more stringent 
set of rules and it will have higher standards than those set by the WTO. The TPP will 
be stronger on other issues, too, such as IPR, competition policy, government 
procurement and trade in services. But it must be remembered that not all ASEAN 
member states are involved in the TPP negotiations. Of the ASEAN members, only 
Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are currently involved in both the TPP and 
RCEP. It should also be noted that some of the members negotiating the TPP that is, 
Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Singapore, were part of the P4 grouping. The 
latter Agreement grew out of a US proposal in 1998 for negotiations with this group of 
countries and the US has prior PTAs with all of them except New Zealand. In a sense, 
the TPP is enlarging its membership by including additional members. This is 
consistent with incremental multilateralization.  
 
However, in geographical or regional terms, the TPP’s membership is more diffuse. If 
the TPP’s intention is to simplify and multilateralize regionalism, then this may not be 
the perfect vehicle for accomplishing it. Further, on the matter of rules of origin, the 
US has very different principles, since it differentiates duty free entry on the basis of 
product classifications, whereas in ASEAN it is generally done on the basis of the 
value that is added by the originating country. Thus, if the TPP follows the US 
template, as it is likely to, this could create more confusion in the region. This goes 
against the principle of multilateralizing regionalism. In this respect, the TPP may be 
less effective in multilateralizing regional advances.  
 
In conclusion, there are good grounds for the WTO to work with ASEAN to 
strengthen multilateralism. Of course, the first best option is to revive the Doha 
Round and to make an attempt to sort out the disagreements that have hindered its 
progress. In the interim period, it would be strategic for the WTO to work with ASEAN 
and other PTAs with a view to multilateralizing regional advances. It is not advisable 
for the WTO to take a back seat and simply be a witness to the movement of 
158 
 
initiatives to forge regional integration. There is no doubt that regional integration is 
here to stay. Therefore, the WTO should take note of ongoing negotiations on 
agreements such as RCEP and take advantage of the situation to achieve broader 
goals. 
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II.13 ERIA Perspectives on the WTO, Ministerial and Asian Integration: Lao 
PDR’s Perspectives 
Leeber Leebouapao, National Economic Research Institute (NERI), Lao PDR 
 
1. Introduction 
The WTO was born out of negotiations among its Members to facilitate trade flows 
between member countries and try to solve the trade problems they face with each 
other. It is based on principles which state that the trading system should be without 
discrimination, freer, predictable, more competitive and more beneficial for less 
developed countries.  
Over the past decade, WTO rules, its dispute settlement mechanism and the work of 
its secretariat have become central to the management and smooth functioning of 
global trade. Major WTO agreements have been implemented relatively successfully. 
Many Members have benefited significantly from implementing the WTO’s principles 
and agreements.  
 
However, global trading relations have often involved conflicting interests, challenges 
and obstacles which require further negotiations among member countries. In 
addition, the changing international economic environment creates significant 
challenges for the WTO. The most obvious challenge is that of the current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations aimed to further liberalize trade and reform the WTO. 
The discussion is focused on reducing important trade barriers in sectors, such as 
agriculture, industrial goods and services. Importantly, the Doha Round is particularly 
focused on providing increased market access to goods and services from 
developing countries. 
 
However, all these issues remain to be debated and concluded appropriately. In 
addition, countries have increasingly turned to PTAs, such as the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) to be established by 2015, as well as the Regional Comprehensive 
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Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving 16 countries in East Asia and aimed at helping 
countries gain significant new trade access to each other’s markets and to explore 
new trade-related issues which are currently not addressed within the WTO. As more 
PTAs are being concluded, the central role of the WTO in liberalizing trade has been 
called into question. Moreover, the WTO has played a very limited role in helping 
members address emerging global issues related to trade and sustainable 
development, such as food security, energy, climate change, and regional and global 
trade imbalances. 
 
Hence, the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Bali in December 2013 
should continue to discuss the WTO reform agenda and adapt its trade liberalization 
framework to newly emerging issues and develop concrete road maps and action 
plans for a better functioning, mutually beneficial global trading system.  
 
The Bali Ministerial meeting should address a number of issues on a priority basis. 
These include:  
 
(i) a progress report on the implementation of the Doha Round should be presented 
that will identify the success, failures, challenges, and lessons learnt from the  
implementation of the Doha Round, and make recommendations for possible 
improvement in the future.  
 
(ii) multilateral trade liberalization and reforming the WTO’s decision-making  
framework should be reviewed in accordance with existing WTO principles and 
agreements. A clear vision of WTO reform over the medium-term (5 years) and 
longer-term (10 years) should be considered.  Particular attention should be paid to 
the issues of increased market access for goods and services from developing 
countries.  
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(iii) new ideas on the future of global trade should be discussed by Ministers as well 
as by members in country groups, such as ASEAN and the EU, and by regional and 
global think thanks such as ERIA to express their common views and interests. Such 
new ideas may address areas such as sustainable development, narrowing 
development gaps among member countries, infrastructure connectivity, climate 
change, pro-poor trade, food security, renewable energy and capacity-building. 
 
(iv) an early harvest package of negotiating advances in favor of least developed 
economies should be agreed.   
 
At the Bali Ministerial meeting, WTO Members should take responsibility for raising 
and discussing key issues relating to the implementation of the Doha Round and the 
functioning of existing WTO principles and agreements and advance 
recommendations and proposals for better implementation moving forward. WTO 
Members should review and evaluate their commitments in building stronger 
commercial relations with their trading partners. Importantly, they also have to 
monitor progress made in implementing WTO agreements and discuss proposals 
aimed at enhancing the organization’s unique dispute settlement system. Simply put, 
WTO Members should propose and discuss the common challenges, threats and  
opportunities they face in the trade sphere, and negotiate mutually beneficial 
outcomes in accordance with core WTO principles.  
 
2. Proposed priorities of ASEAN and East Asian countries  
At the Bali Ministerial Meeting, the priorities of ASEAN and East Asian countries 
should be: 
  
(i) The role of AEC and RCEP in the WTO: ASEAN and East Asian countries 
are currently in the process of building the AEC by 2015 based on the 
AEC blueprint and, at the same time, are negotiating the RCEP. This may 
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play a significant role in shaping the framework of global trade 
liberalization and WTO reform.  
(ii) Deepening economic integration in East Asia: East Asia has been, and 
remain, a key driver of global economic growth. East Asia already enjoys 
tremendous advantages and potential in terms of population, strategic 
location, purchasing power, natural resources, and opportunities for 
economic development, among others. ASEAN and East Asian economic 
integration is currently focusing on trade facilitation and liberalization. 
However, efforts need to be made in particular to develop and improve 
infrastructure connectivity and logistics to facilitate trade flows and 
develop the production network into one integrated production base and 
one single market for the AEC and RCEP. 
 
(iii) Narrowing development gaps: Due to the different development levels of 
Members, less developed countries still need help from the more 
advanced Members. This should be one of the priority topics for Bali 
through a renewed commitment at capacity strengthening.   
 
(iv) Sustainable development: The cluster of issues emanating from debates 
over the relationship between trade and the environment need to 
command greater interest in bali and beyond. This includes isues as 
diverse as food security, renewable energy, as well as the trade effects of 
climate change mitigation.  
 
It is important that the WTO remains associated to the process of deepening 
economic integration in ASEAN and East Asia because the WTO plays a particularly 
significant role in the promotion of freer international trade. The crucial role of the 
WTO is to provide a common institutional framework and basic principles for the 
implementation of its agreements. The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade 
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flow freely. Importantly, WTO Members have experienced both success and failure, 
both of which ASEAN and East Asian countries have confronted. So ASEAN and 
East Asia can both share significant benefits and draw useful lessons from the WTO 
institutional framework and experiences while developing a reasonable and 
successful PTA in ASEAN and East Asia.  
 
The trade governance priorities of ERIA member governments should include: (i) 
strengthening the regulatory framework for trade and services liberalization; (ii) 
tackling trade-related investment measures; (iii) designing trade facilitating rules of 
origin; (iv) addressing trade- and investment-inhibiting technical barriers to trade; (v) 
curtailing the use of safeguards, subsidies and countervailing measures; and (vi) 
providing for increased market access opportunities for developing country exporters 
of both goods and services. 
 
At the Bali Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN ministers may present the AEC blueprint and 
the report on progress towards establishing the AEC by 2015 (the regional grouping’s 
score card and midterm review of the AEC blueprint project) to share their views on 
the progress of regional economic integration into an FTA by 2015. The presentation 
may focus on the main purposes and principles of the AEC blueprint, which is to 
establish one production base and one single market by promoting the free flow of 
goods, services and capital. This is a model of regional economic integration and 
trade liberalization which can contribute significantly to global trade liberalization as 
well as to the WTO reform agenda.  
 
A stocktaking of the two mega regionals proceeding in Asia - RCEP and the TPP - 
should also be presented and discussed among WTO Members at the Bali Ministerial. 
The experiences and insights gained can contribute to - and facilitate the process of - 
multilateralizing regional advances. 
  
164 
 
II.14 Can the World Trade Organization Be Saved? Only if Australia and Other 
Members Stop Trashing It  
Malcolm Bosworth, Greg Cutbush and Jenny Corbett Australian National 
University (ANU) 
 
1. Introduction 
The World trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system that it 
administers are in deep trouble. The collapse of the Doha Round in particular 
highlights the extent of its decline. After 10 years Doha has failed - the first Round to 
do so absolutely. The WTO is verging on becoming irrelevant and a relic of past 
decades when it usefully contributed to global liberalization and a multilateral non-
discriminatory rules-based world trading system. Furthermore, over the past decade, 
almost from the time the Uruguay Round was concluded, the WTO has been trashed 
by all Member governments. The WTO has always prided itself on being a ‘member-
driven’ organization, and this partly explained its past success. But in recent years 
Members have driven the WTO in only one direction: into the ground. 
 
The pity is that Members, and many influential trade economists who should know 
better, continue to ignore the WTO’s parlous situation, and the harm to the global 
economy its self-destruction entails. They either think that the WTO is secure and will 
self-correct or do not think that having the WTO as an effective trade institution 
matters, or both. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
 
The serious challenges facing the WTO and the urgent need for action have been 
well documented. Yet nothing has been done. The WTO is being allowed to wither on 
the vine and die as a promoter of global liberalization. Indeed, Members continue to 
trash it in practice by rejecting its fundamental principles and the very economic 
rationale for its existence.  
 
Some say that the WTO will survive because of its multilateral dispute settlement role 
(its dispute settlement mechanism – DSM). While this is an important leg of the WTO, 
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along with the other two legs of rule-making and trade liberalization via multilateral 
trade negotiations, the problem is that each of these roles is intertwined. Like any 
three-legged stool, if any one leg collapses the stool falls over. The deliberate attack 
by Members on the liberalization leg of the WTO also extends to the DSM leg, the 
only impartial and binding mechanism for adjudicating and enforcing WTO 
contractual obligations. One might wonder whether a body unable to deliver further 
liberalization would remain vital (Wolfe, 2013). Moreover, if PTA-based DSMs are 
established in place of multilateral ones, then adjudication of disputes will reflect 
power asymmetries, benefiting the stronger trade partners (Bhagwati, 2012).81  
 
The Bali Ministerial provides a long overdue opportunity to focus on the WTO’s ills. 
The Ministerial must go well beyond just trying to rescue the Doha Round (DR) by 
adopting some ‘lowest common denominator’ agreements. Despite the over-
optimistic and incredible estimates being touted of the economic benefits of 
concluding some of these lesser outcomes, often by those peddling vested interests, 
the DR negotiations fall well below the economic benchmarks needed for it to be 
seen as worthwhile.82  
 
Indeed, if this is the best the DR can achieve, it should perhaps be put out of its 
misery so that Members can move on and focus on the fundamental systemic issues 
threatening the WTO’s very survival. Given the hyperbole of Members and of many 
directly involved in the negotiations, there is no doubt that any rescue of the DR 
would be sold as a mighty outcome. There would then be a risk that the fundamental 
cracks in the WTO would be papered over and any Members’ will for major reform 
dissipated. Reform will be avoided while the DR remains on the books. The failure of 
                                                              
81 Moreover, third countries will have little scope for input into PTA‐based DSMs, though their interests may very 
well be affected by how adjudication is structured. 
82 The highly inflated benefits often associated with the DR as it currently stands results from many reasons. 
These include under‐estimation of the foregone benefits associated with the many exceptions and escape clauses 
to liberalization negotiated as part of the DR, and failing to take full account of the fact that negotiating WTO 
commitments and agreements will have no significant impact unless these result in actual liberalization and 
related reforms. 
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the DR must be tackled head on and all Members must accept their fair share of the 
blame for the WTO’s growing impotency.   
 
A severe warning is warranted: without major changes the failed Doha Round could 
well be the last multilateral round of trade negotiations, at least for a long time. It is 
difficult to conceive that any country would be brave enough to embark on another 
Round. And even if they did, the likelihood that it could last for more than 10 years is 
itself symptomatic of deep problems.  
 
In this chapter, we name the WTO’s key shortcomings and identify some 
fundamental requirements for the restoration of the WTO’s role in managing the 
global trading system. We say the way forward lies principally in the return of the 
primacy of the MFN and unilateral trade liberalization frameworks supported by a 
sincere commitment by Members to domestic transparency of existing and proposed 
trade initiatives.  
 
2. Interpreting the WTO crisis 
The WTO’s problems have been well recognized by some and, for a decade at least, 
there has been no shortage of reviews and assessments of what needs to be done to 
reverse its declining influence. But WTO reform is no closer than it was a decade ago. 
There are two main areas where Members are attacking the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system.  
 
2.1 WTO agreements, disciplines and governance 
This area covers the effectiveness and economic naivety of the WTO agreements 
and its governance, i.e. whether its consensus approach to decision making can 
work in future given the WTO’s enormous growth in membership, agreements and 
disciplines. 
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The multilateral trade agenda expanded exponentially in the Uruguay Round and 
repeated calls are made for the WTO to take on additional disciplines, e.g. the 
Singapore issues (temporarily shelved), environmental and now exchange rate 
issues. The list of demands being placed on the WTO agenda appears never ending. 
Indeed, this has expanded too much with many issues added or requested that 
certainly should not be within the WTO’s purview, for instance TRIPS. This and many 
other issues frequently raised, e.g. competition policy and labor standards, have no 
clear role in a trade agreement, let alone within the WTO. Many new areas are now a 
noose around the WTO’s neck. Moreover, the WTO’s rapid membership expansion, 
mainly developing countries and LDCs, while necessary for it to be a genuine 
multilateral body, has changed its complexion. The WTO now operates like a ‘UN 
organization’ where reaching consensus has become much more difficult. Put bluntly, 
the DR has been bogged down by involving many more Members and many more 
issues. Political jockeying and grandstanding has intensified so much that the 
economic underpinnings of the WTO and trade liberalization have been lost, thereby 
preventing economically sensible trade opening outcomes from being negotiated.  
 
Governments, aided by trade negotiators and lawyers, have promoted a forest of 
multilateral agreements with escape clauses, exceptions and intentional ambiguity 
that have undermined their effectiveness and economic relevance. ‘Setting trade 
policy by trade litigation’ is now at the forefront. To reach consensus among the 
increased membership covering wide-ranging interests, WTO agreements are 
becoming watered down, ambiguous, cumbersome to apply, and difficult to interpret. 
Instead of aiding transparency and predictability, many of these revised and new 
disciplines and agreements are so vague and nebulous that they do the opposite and 
detract from these highly desirable features. Thus, a catch-22 situation is developing 
whereby the greater reliance on dispute settlement needed to help interpret the rules 
carries the risk of WTO litigation and jurisprudence determining Members’ trade 
policies. This loss of economic relevance undermines the WTO, as countries 
168 
 
increasingly resort to legal loopholes and ambiguity in the WTO to defend 
economically bad trade policies, foolishly believing that WTO legal measures must be 
economically sensible. WTO agreements are economic agreements underpinned by 
legal obligations. If the agreements are economically flawed or interpreted too 
narrowly through a legal prism at the expense of good economics, then the outcomes 
will also be bad economically.   
 
The WTO must remain focused on providing opportunities for Members to prosper. 
But it cannot guarantee this outcome for all players – it is foolish and potentially 
costly to the global economy to try, especially when there are so many other 
economic and non-economic factors beyond the WTO that determine economic 
growth and prosperity. The WTO is being asked by Members to do far too many 
things, which is only setting it up to fail and become irrelevant. The WTO cannot 
achieve all it is being asked to do. The underlying rationale of a WTO is to oversee 
trade liberalization to enhance trade and result in prosperity. This directly contradicts 
the growth of anti-globalization sentiments and criticisms of free trade emanating 
from Members. This major obstacle both for the WTO and for open trade policies has 
largely stemmed from governments’ own poor selling at home of the economic merits 
of self-liberalization and of a more globally-integrated world economy. Members must 
resist or counter these ill-informed views at home through greater transparency and 
public scrutiny of protectionist policies if the WTO is to remain effective. The WTO 
must get back to basics and focus on its core capacities of trade liberalization. Re-
focusing it into areas where it can be useful is urgently required.  
 
The steady erosion of the WTO’s centrality will sooner or later bring the world to a 
tipping point – ‘a point beyond which expectations become unmoored and nations 
feel justified in ignoring WTO norms since everybody else does’ (Baldwin & 
Carpenter, 2009). This tipping point, if not already reached, is rapidly approaching.  
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Of course the demise of the WTO and its core values will damage all economies, but 
disproportionately. The hegemonic Members may be able to go it alone and perhaps 
prosper in a discriminatory trading regime. However, for all other WTO Members this 
is not an option, and the WTO provides the best protection against powerful trading 
partners using their strength at the expense of non-hegemonic Members. ‘The great 
political virtue of multilateralism, far exceeding in importance its economic virtues, is 
that it makes it economically possible for most countries, even if small, poor and 
weak, to live in freedom and with a chance of prosperity without having to come to 
special terms with some Great Power’ (Viner, 1947).  
 
Fixing the WTO’s increasing ineffectiveness and irrelevance will not be easy, 
especially given that Members will need to negotiate reforms by consensus. There 
are significant obstacles to these being successfully tackled in the foreseeable future, 
even if embarked on urgently.  
 
2.2 Government attitudes mocking the WTO 
The second area contributing to the WTO’s steady demise is the Members’ stampede 
away from the fundamental principles of multilateralism. The same countries that 
instigated the GATT and the WTO now seem to have lost faith in it as an effective 
international institution fostering multilateral trade liberalization. The main principle 
discarded is the WTO cornerstone of unconditional most-favored nation or MFN 
treatment i.e. non-discrimination between trading partners that is the GATT Article 1. 
The practical application of MFN has always had weaknesses, especially given 
GATT Article XXIV, and now GATS Article V, that have allowed widespread 
exceptions to MFN via preferential trade agreements (PTAs) negotiated by members. 
Nevertheless, in the past, strong resistance by some influential countries (e.g. 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand) helped control the growth of PTAs despite some 
‘hegemonic’ Members, especially the EU, repeatedly putting negotiating PTAs above 
MFN when setting their own trade policies.  
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The turning point was reached when the US openly began to support PTAs and 
started negotiating them willy-nilly like the EU. The US’s trade policy of so-called 
‘competitive liberalization’ based on endless negotiation of PTAs, like the EU’s 
policies, has severely hampered MFN and along with it multilateralism. However, all 
other members have to share the blame as they too jettisoned MFN, despite paying 
repeated lip service, and have rushed to negotiate crisscrossing and inefficient PTAs 
that have proliferated. This is creating a cumbersome and discriminatory world global 
system. Little wonder then that the WTO has become badly damaged.  
 
The major single factor explaining the loss of the WTO’s influence and credibility has 
been the way Members have contradicted the MFN principle. Non-discrimination is 
the very rationale for the WTO’s existence, and undermining this trashes the WTO. 
By negotiating discriminatory PTAs, Members have enshrined discrimination in the 
global trading system (Bhagwati, 2012). Despite the rhetoric of Members, these 
actions have directly weakened the WTO and usurped its role. And, despite what 
they say, this seems exactly what they are trying to do by pursuing PTAs.  
 
Jagdish Bhagwati has correctly called PTAs a ‘pox’ on the global trading system that 
acts like ‘termites in the basement’ to progressively and relentlessly destroy the 
foundations of the WTO; we are now seeing this happening (Bhagwati, 2008).83 The 
WTO’s foundations are crumbling and there is an urgent need to call in the pest 
exterminators before it is too late!  
 
These transgressions have multiplied over the past decade.  
 
(i) Proliferation of PTAs a stain on the WTO 
                                                              
83To Bhagwati`s credit  he has always staunchly defended the WTO and the importance of the MFN principle, and 
consistently been highly critical of the proliferation of PTAs. It is a shame that his grave warnings have not been 
heeded.   
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This proliferation of PTAs, often deceptively sold by Members under the guise of free 
trade agreements, is well documented. For example, the proliferation of PTAs over 
the past 10–15 years was identified by the Warwick Commission as a particular 
problem five years ago (Report of the First Warwick Commission, 2007). It stated 
‘…this has raised pressing questions about the quality of trade relations today and 
their likely future directions in what few would regard as a stable equilibrium ...that 
where feasible, the energy behind such initiatives should be channeled towards 
reinforcing accepted multilateral principles.’ It noted that the very rapid growth of 
PTAs unnecessarily raised trade costs and had worrying implications for the stability, 
fairness, opportunities and coherence of the world trade regime.  
 
The Warwick Commission recommended that efforts to clarify and improve 
disciplines and procedures in relation to WTO provisions on PTAs be intensified. It 
also recommended that major industrialized Members express their commitment to 
multilateralism and willingness to provide leadership to maintain and strengthen 
international trade arrangements for the benefit of all, by refraining from entering into 
PTAs among themselves, as should large developing countries with significant 
shares in world trade. 
 
The Sutherland Report also raised PTAs as a critical problem for the WTO 
(Sutherland Report, 2004). It stated that the erosion of MFN within the WTO from the 
‘spaghetti bowl’ of customs unions, regional and bilateral free trade areas, 
preferences and an endless assortment of miscellaneous trade deals so that MFN is 
no longer the rule, but the exception, matters profoundly to the future of the WTO.  
 
But despite these dire warnings the problem has only compounded. Members’ usual 
justification for embarking on PTAs - that the WTO has bogged down so much and is 
too cumbersome to deal with - has simply become an excuse for them to bypass the 
WTO and to do discriminatory deals to erode MFN. The puzzling question is whether 
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this is intentional or unintentional; certainly it seems intentional on the part of the 
hegemonic members (i.e. the EU and the US).  
 
Of course, the pursuit of PTAs as an alternative to the WTO lacks logic. The more 
Members engage in PTAs, the further the global trading system moves away from 
the goal of non-discrimination. The worse the problem becomes and the more the 
WTO implodes. 
 
While being a latecomer to PTA negotiations, Asia has been making up quickly for 
lost time (Drysdale, 2013).  As of September 2012, there were 103 FTAs with at least 
one Asian country; most were bilateral. Another 26 PTAs existed, 64 were under 
negotiation, and 60 more proposed. Most of the global PTA action now involves an 
Asian country.   
 
Alarmingly the EU and the US have begun negotiating a Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). 84  Also, within the Asia-Pacific region, two major 
agreements are being negotiated in competition with each other, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement, led by the US and excluding China, and the Regional 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (RECP), led by the ASEAN economies and China, 
but excluding the US. Some Members e.g. Australia are negotiating membership in 
both.  
 
Commitment to the ideals of free trade is evidently weak on both sides of the Atlantic, 
such that the TTIP may on balance divert trade rather than create it. And above all, it 
could be an obstacle to a truly global free trade order. However, the biggest victim of 
TTIP may not be any individual country, but the dream of global free trade. Instead of 
focusing efforts on reviving multilateralism, the global trade order becomes more 
complicated with every new PTA, and though they promote trade between partners, 
                                                              
84 President Obama has  reportedly  set  the deadline  for  the  completion of  the  TTTIP  agreement by wanting  it 
signed before leaving office in January 2017. 
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they can also inhibit trade with outside parties. Thus the TTIP may well make any 
future global trade deal less likely. PTAs such as the TTIP are not the best way to 
promote this ideal. The result of such initiatives may well be a step in the opposite 
direction (Hartwich, 2013). Negotiating the TPP and the RECP will be further nails in 
the WTO’s coffin, while the TTIP will surely be its funeral.   
 
(ii) Special and differential treatment a curse on the WTO   
Special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing and especially for least-
developed countries is seen as an essential feature of the GATT/WTO. During the 
Uruguay Round its coverage and form was expanded substantially to become a 
critical focus of developing country members in the DR. Yet economists have long 
recognized that Members using the S&D treatment available in the WTO to avoid 
making substantive liberalizing commitments are ‘shooting themselves in the foot’. 
For all Members, the lion’s share of the economic gains from trade openness comes 
from self-liberalization, not from other members’ liberalizing. In spite of this, 
developing countries have generally decided to follow the politics and not the 
economics by preferring to use S&D to resist reforms. This has not only weakened 
the WTO but also harmed the developing members’ negotiating positions by letting 
developed members ‘off the hook’ and not making them accountable to offer 
genuinely significant trade liberalization. It would serve developing members well if in 
future they could negotiate the removal of S&D in the WTO as a grand bargain in 
exchange for developed members providing significant liberalization. 
 
When only a few developing countries in the WTO were pushing S&D as an 
exception to MFN the damage to the WTO was limited. However, some three-
quarters of WTO Members are now developing countries. Thus, S&D treatment and 
associated politics now dominate the WTO, and this is seriously undermining MFN 
and the WTO. Developing members are more interested than ever in ensuring that 
they avoid economically sensible self-liberalization by hiding behind strengthened 
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S&D treatment, trying to make developed members open markets without doing so 
themselves. At the same time, developed members have lost sight of the economic 
benefits accruing from self-liberalization, adopting instead a stance whereby they 
grant S&D to developing members and implicitly use this to justify ‘watering down’ 
their liberalization.  
 
Selling the DR as a ‘development round’ to get it started has, as was predictable, 
backfired badly because it encouraged an attitude that its objective was global 
redistribution to developing members rather than growth. Hence, transfers and 
redistribution have become the focus of developing members at the expense of 
promoting global economic efficiency to benefit all members, rich or poor, even if 
unevenly. Efforts to ensure the economic benefits are spread evenly between all 
members are likely to be destructive and reduce benefits to many members to the 
lowest common denominator rather than raising the benefits to those members 
receiving only a few. Such outcomes are in effect Pareto suboptimal in a global 
sense in that some Members would benefit more from multilateral and self-
liberalization without making some others worse off. Paying too much attention to 
distribution and equity is undermining liberalization. The WTO should not become a 
development institution overseeing transfers to developing countries. This, combined 
with the stampede to PTAs by Members, has replaced MFN and MFN thinking within 
the WTO with a preoccupation about discrimination and preferentialism. 
  
(iii) Synergies lost between unilateralism and multilateralism 
One of the foundations of the WTO’s past contribution to global liberalization has 
been its ability to build on synergies between unilateralism by Members and their 
WTO commitments. Members embarking on unilateral liberalization, on which all 
genuine trade reforms ultimately depend, could bind such changes via WTO MFN 
commitments, thereby protecting against policy backsliding and enhancing the 
transparency and predictability of the trading system. 
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Now that the WTO has lost its MFN focus and PTAs have proliferated, this synergy 
no longer exists. There is a disconnect between unilateral MFN liberalization and 
discriminatory or non-MFN liberalization. With the era of multilateral trade rounds and 
system-wide rules behind us, PTAs have become the only game in town, and as a 
result the templates established by the hegemonic powers in unequal trade treaties 
with economically weaker countries will increasingly carry the day (Bhagwati, 2012). 
Such templates now extend beyond conventional trade issues to vast numbers of 
areas unrelated to trade, including labor standards, environmental rules, policies on 
investment expropriation, and the ability to impose capital-account controls in 
financial crises (Bhagwati, 2012).  
 
After multilateral liberalization, the next best alternative for individual countries is 
always unilateral MFN reforms. The more countries that carry out such reforms the 
closer is global MFN liberalization.   
 
The universal commitment that existed in many countries to unilaterally liberalize has 
evaporated. This has, not coincidentally, coincided with the growth of PTAs. PTAs 
have fed mercantilism by popularizing the incorrect economic policy objective of 
seeking market access abroad in return for their own liberalization. Members now 
see MFN reforms as undermining the opportunity for negotiating PTAs. Take for 
example the case of many developing Members that argue against multilateral MFN 
liberalization for fear of preference erosion within PTAs and/or under unilateral 
preference schemes provided by developed Members e.g. Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) arrangements. However, this is bad economic thinking. Trade 
preferences are well known to be ‘bad aid, bad trade’ since they end up supporting 
inefficient industries in developing Members. The same applies to exports from 
developed Members to preferential markets – if such sales need ‘preference 
assistance’ then they are unlikely to be efficient industries in the global sense and will 
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distort the resource allocation in the country concerned at the expense of economic 
efficiency.    
 
In the case of Australia, the country’s once strong commitment to unilateralism has all 
but died since the early 2000s. This death has coincided, not surprisingly, with the 
country's redirection of trade policy to negotiating PTAs. In other words, at a time 
when Australia’s pursuit of PTAs has been greatest, its trade reform efforts have 
been lowest. Government policy is now to refrain from further unilateral tariff 
reductions and to lower tariffs only as part of PTAs. Moreover, issues have been 
included in Australian PTAs that have been used as negotiating coinage without first 
being assessed as to whether they have been in Australia’s unilateral interests e.g. 
changes to Australian intellectual property provisions and including investor–state 
dispute settlement provisions. This really amounts to making policy on the run.     
 
Most global and country-specific trade liberalization has come not from negotiated 
liberalization (whether it be multilateral or preferential) but from non-negotiated or 
unilateral liberalization. Indeed, some 75% has come from unilateral reforms. In large 
part this is explained by the fact that what are negotiated in formal talks are bindings 
or commitments, and not actual barriers.85 Thus, for example, in the WTO where 
ceiling bindings in tariffs have prevailed with bound levels at rates well above actual 
levels, negotiated reductions in bound rates over time have done little to lower actual 
levels. In contrast, unilateral reductions reduce actual levels. Empirical results show 
that, for any Member, by far the bulk of economic gains that would accrue from 
                                                              
85 Of course in PTAs actual tariff levels are negotiated. However, because they are applied discriminatorily, it does 
not  follow  that  they are genuinely  liberalizing  in  the economic sense.  Indeed,  they could be de‐liberalizing and 
worsen a country’s national welfare  if,  for example, the PTA results on balance trade diversion  instead of trade 
creation. Moreover, whether PTAS are on balance are genuinely liberalizing is also clouded by many other factors, 
such as the extent to which preferences are provided on goods where trading partners are actually competitive; 
the restrictiveness of rules of origin; and the margins of preference provided. Indeed, there is plenty of empirical 
evidence  to  suggest  that  tariff preferences  available  in PTAs  are not used heavily utilized by  trading partners, 
either because of  commercial  reasons,  such  that  the  costs  and procedures  required  to obtain  a  certificate of 
origin  to avail  the preferential  rate  is not worthwhile given  the margin of preference, or because  the  rules of 
origin have been set so restrictively so as to prevent the foreign exporter from being able to meet them and use 
the lower tariff rate.  
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multilateral liberalization can be realized from unilaterally liberalizing. Thus, sensible 
trade-related unilateral reforms, which any country has full control over, will deliver 
most of the economic gains from trade-related liberalization. The clear policy 
message is that all Members should focus on self-liberalization, and treat any gains 
from multilateral liberalization as a long-term bonus. Of course, if all countries follow 
suit, unilateralism will transform into multilateral liberalization and so the full benefits 
will accrue to the global economy and to individual countries.  
 
Central to good trade reforms and a well-functioning WTO is for all Members to 
endorse the primacy of unilateral liberalization, and to understand that most benefits 
come from self-liberalization and improving one’s own economic efficiency rather 
than from any greater market access abroad. Hence, using one’s own liberalization 
as leverage or as a bargaining coin to ‘force’ other members to open their markets 
can backfire and become a recipe for reform paralysis.  
 
While unilateralism can drive multilateralism, the reverse is wishful thinking. No 
matter what Members agree to in Geneva, the outcomes will not be implemented 
unless it is in the Members’ political and economic interests to do so. WTO 
agreements are becoming more ambiguous and full of escape clauses and wiggle 
room for Members to legally back out of commitments. More to the point, countries 
seem to be more intent to use such loopholes to adopt protectionist policies, selling 
at home the false message that any measure is worthwhile having if it can be legally 
justified in the WTO. Nothing could be further from the truth. Unfortunately WTO legal 
consistency these days has become an excuse for countries to avoid making good 
economic trade reforms at home. The widespread use of S&D treatment by 
developing countries in a quest for gains that might come from liberalization by other 
countries participating in multilateral initiatives is a classic case of this delusional 
thinking. 
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However, domestically, the trade department that is responsible in each case for a 
Member’s WTO negotiations has no mandate to propose unilateral trade reforms and 
hence often obstructs them. Thus, there is a disconnect between the trade 
department that sets ‘WTO policy’ in Geneva and the departments at home that are 
responsible for setting trade-related policy measures. Frequently, therefore, trade 
departments obstruct unilateral reforms, and a prerequisite for unilateralism may be 
to reduce the influence of trade departments over setting trade policies. For example, 
the large trade-opening reforms that Australia adopted in the 1980s and 1990s first 
required the trade department’s influence over domestic trade policy to be reduced 
and for the Australian Treasury, the department responsible for economic policy, to 
take the lead. This is because the trade department argued strongly against 
unilateral reforms, incorrectly believing that Australia should only open its trade 
policies within multilateral negotiations so that it could get some market opening 
abroad in return.   
 
Jan Tumlir, a former Chief Economist of the GATT Secretariat, elegantly described 
the misconception pervading the GATT/WTO and all other negotiations-based 
approaches to trade liberalization long ago. He pointed out that while people 
accepted the argument that when every country protects its economy, all countries 
suffer, they failed to draw the correct conclusion i.e. that ‘liberal (free) trade is the 
best policy for all countries’ to follow irrespective of what others do and instead 
concluded that ‘liberal (free) trade is the best policy only if all countries practice it’. 
This combined with the one-time ‘fruitful lie’ that the gains from trade come primarily 
from the exports you sell rather than the imports you buy, have been the false 
premises on which the complex edifices of international trade agreements have been 
built. This fruitful lie no longer works because Members have ‘come to believe their 
own mercantilist propaganda, and have embraced the misconception that their 
countries’ interests are served only if they can get the other guy to make concessions 
bigger than their own’ (Crook 2006).  
179 
 
 
This same misconception and the desire by governments to use trade policy to 
achieve foreign policy objectives underlie the proliferation of discriminatory PTAs. 
Members should stop preaching the economic merits of PTAs and using hand-picked 
but flawed commissioned studies claiming substantial economic gains to justify PTAs 
that are being negotiated for foreign policy reasons. The international norm of 
combining trade and foreign affairs within the same ministry or department facilitates 
such policy trade-offs, when in fact trade policy should be primarily concerned about 
promoting economic efficiency.86   
 
While democratic governments are free to enter into PTAs for whatever reasons, they 
should not sell them on flawed economic benefits and modeling but on their non-
economic or foreign policy gains. Governments have oversold the economic merits of 
PTAs, which are usually counterproductive and normally negotiated non-
transparently, with details not being released for much needed public debate and 
scrutiny until it is too late and the PTA has been concluded (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2010).  
 
Moreover, the refrain repeated by governments and many economists, that PTAs will 
be subsequently multilateralized so that all will turn out well, is a ruse. There is not 
one example to date of this happening. The move to mega-PTAS now occurring will 
make this likelihood even slimmer; it is far more likely that the world will slide into a 
handful of large discriminatory blocs which will institutionalize discrimination and 
undermine global prosperity. What PTAs are about is simply regionalizing 
multilateralism at the expense of global prosperity, the WTO and the global trading 
system, to everyone’s peril. 
 
                                                              
86 Another flawed combination is putting trade and industry within the same ministry. This often leads to internal 
inconsistencies since good trade policy is a neutral one that does not favour any one sector or activity over 
another. However, often industry policy is directed at trying to assist manufacturing policy relative to other 
activities, mistakenly thinking that what is in the interests of a larger industry sector must be in the national 
interest e.g. the flawed ‘infant‐industry argument’ often used to justify industry assistance. 
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(iv) Confusion between integration and trade liberalization 
Governments, like many economists, are also blurring the distinction between 
integration and trade liberalization, which is contributing to false premises. The term 
integration is being flung around by all as if it in itself is the ultimate objective. But it is 
not. The ultimate objective of the WTO and trade liberalization is to improve 
economic prosperity. This means economic integration is a tool to enable efficient 
global supply chains to be developed internationally so that the benefits of economic 
efficiency from trade liberalization can be realized. These are the economic benefits 
from globalization. For this to happen requires a non-discriminatory global economy 
built on MFN trade liberalization. This, through efficient trade, global integration 
results; it is trade that integrates and this is a by-product of trade liberalization and 
greater global non-discriminatory trade.  
 
Instead, however, many governments and others see integration mainly in 
geographical terms and/or at least see economic integration through regional rather 
than global lenses. Hence, regionalism is being promoted above globalism, and 
discrimination and PTAs are becoming common. This is economically undesirable. It 
promotes regional discriminatory PTAs and regional integration at the expense of 
non-discriminatory global integration. Thus regional supply chains are displacing 
more efficient global supply chains and leading to global inefficiency. MFN 
liberalization does not discriminate, and regional integration and supply will develop 
efficiently if they are more economic than global integration and supply chains. This 
does not mean that regional integration is not important, but that discriminatory trade 
policy and the WTO should not be used to encourage it over global integration. Doing 
so is totally inconsistent with the WTO’s fundamental MFN principle.  
 
3. Fixing the mess        
Some may say that it is already too late, and the failure of the DR perhaps supports 
this view. However, this is too pessimistic, although the fix will not be easy. But the 
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global economic gains of resurrecting the WTO will be substantial and need to be 
fought for.  
 
Ironically, the WTO rot appears to have set in as much from Members overplaying 
their reliance on a multilateral versus unilateral approach to liberalization as from 
them downplaying the costs of discriminatory arrangements. Thus, we would contend, 
the Doha impasse has become an excuse for poor decisions by nations on both the 
domestic and international fronts. 
 The basic problem for the WTO has been the massive change in Members’ attitudes 
towards what the institution should do and a willingness to trash its basic MFN  
principle rather than to treasure it. The WTO will not be revived unless these attitudes 
are reversed. Doing so should be the current priority. While the WTO agenda and 
agreements have also become increasingly flawed, fixing them will be a very long- 
term project. Moreover, this will first require a change in Members’ attitudes; 
otherwise such changes are likely to reflect current bad attitudes and further entrench 
them. It must be remembered that Members do not have to use the economic 
weaknesses in WTO agreements as legal excuses for bad economic trade policy; 
Members can instead focus on the economic merits of the rules. 87  However, 
Members now seem to place greater reliance on such escape clauses in line with 
their changed attitudes to trade liberalization and the role of the WTO.  
 
Reversing the above attitudes will at the very least require fundamental changes to 
how WTO Members approach the WTO. Greater domestic and international 
transparency in Members is imperative. What is clear is that many of the solutions 
being suggested by Members and others for reviving the WTO would actually hasten 
                                                              
87 For example, it is well recognized by economists that the underlying rationale for Members using trade 
remedies, e.g. anti‐dumping action, is flawed. Such measures to stop so‐called ‘dumping’ of exports are clearly 
anti‐competitive and protectionist. Yet the WTO allows such countries to legally apply anti‐dumping measures 
provided the provisions of the relevant agreements are met. However, Members are not required to have anti‐
dumping legislation or to adopt such measures. However, because it is a legal protectionist loophole within the 
WTO anti‐dumping action has proliferated to become the measure by choice to restrict competitive imports. 
Members fail to recognize the vital distinction between what is WTO legal and what is good economic policy with 
regard to anti‐dumping action and other trade remedies.      
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its death, being based on the flawed attitudes outlined above. The following warnings 
and suggestions should be taken on board.  
 
3.1 The Single Undertaking negotiated in the UR should not become a 
scapegoat 
The ‘Single Undertaking’ agreed in the UR to remove the ‘à la carte’ menu from 
which Members were free to choose which agreements (or Codes) to take on and 
which not to was once heralded as a major outcome. And it was, since it necessitated 
all members to sign on to everything, such that it prevented Members from opting out 
of certain agreements. This is basic to having a genuine multilateral institution. Of 
course the depth and coverage of commitments being negotiated still vary 
substantially across Members, but all were required to participate in the negotiations 
and at least to commit to basic obligations. 
  
Prior to the UR, the GATT was stalling partly for lack of a Single Undertaking, hence 
the concerted push during the UR to introduce it. Strangely, however, some, including 
many of those who applauded its achievement at the time, are now calling for its 
abandonment, and mistakenly believe that it is now part of the problem. Undoubtedly, 
the Single Undertaking, just like having many more Members, makes consensus-
based negotiations much more difficult. However, it also greatly increases the 
potential multilateral gains and the WTO’s effectiveness. All Members must therefore 
try harder for it to work, and to make complementary changes to the institution as 
needed to enable it to work as a genuine multilateral body. Removing the Single 
Undertaking and returning to a situation that clearly did not work is misguided.  
 
More thought needs to be given before such a superficial fix is hastily adopted. Hard 
won efforts to introduce a Single Undertaking, surely necessary if the WTO is to be a 
genuine multilateral system, should not be discarded on a whim. The single 
undertaking is not the problem, but indeed is something worth hanging on to and 
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fighting for to ensure that the WTO remains a global player with all Members signing 
on to all disciplines. This should remain the basis of negotiating new disciplines 
within rounds of negotiations, which is the appropriate time for new disciplines to be 
introduced.  
 
However, given the already overfull WTO agenda which covers areas that should not 
really be there and has seriously diverted the focus of the WTO away from trade 
liberalization, there should be no attempt to introduce additional disciplines until 
success with existing issues is achieved.  
 
3.2 Reject suggestions that the Single Undertaking should be removed to 
allow for more liberalized commitments to be negotiated plurilaterally among 
WTO Members 
Again the objections to singularity are based on a misconception. There is nothing 
within the WTO, including the Single Undertaking, that prevents WTO Members from 
negotiating among a subset to adopt more liberal commitments. This was the case, 
for example, for the International Technology Agreement (ITA), which was negotiated 
within the WTO among a small subset of Members.  
 
Membership and coverage of the ITA has since progressively expanded. Plurilateral 
agreements should not, however, become the operational norm of the WTO – these 
are sharply at odds with the concept of multilateralism and every attempt should be 
made to abide by the Single Undertaking.  
 
3.3 Expose the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem for what it is – economic 
nonsense 
WTO Members that fear the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem are either economically 
ignorant and/or playing politics within the WTO at the expense of multilateralism and 
the WTO’s economic role. Proponents of the free-rider view are mercantilists in 
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saying that trade access at home is a gift that should not be given to a trading partner 
without something being received in return. They imply that foreign parties are 
parasites unless they grant access to those offering to open their markets. This 
overplays the value of foreign concessions and underplays the domestic benefits of 
liberalization. In fact liberalization is beneficial for both sides. Trade is not a zero sum 
game. Rather it is a positive sum game and that is the intellectual basis for 
multilateralism and the WTO’s rationale.  
 
The proposition that market opening measures should only be available to exports 
from countries that reciprocate by providing acceptable market opening measures 
flies in the face of the foundation stone of multilateralism, namely non-discrimination 
between trading partners.  
 
In fact, there is no free-rider problem and WTO Members need to acknowledge this is 
the case. It is well known economically that a country benefits most from self-
liberalization on an MFN basis, irrespective of whether or not other countries 
liberalize.   Correcting perceptions about this matter lies at the heart of restoring the 
WTO’s role.   
 
3.4 Return MFN/non-discrimination to WTO’s top priority 
The major single factor explaining the loss of WTO influence and credibility has been 
the considerable damage Members have done to the MFN principle. Promoting non-
discrimination is the rationale for the WTO’s existence, and if this is undermined or 
trashed, then so is the WTO.   
 
As indicated, all Members have been guilty of trashing MFN. Despite paying lip 
service to its importance, their actions speak otherwise, as they accelerate 
negotiations on preferential trade arrangements which enshrine discrimination in the 
global trading system. Despite the rhetoric by governments, these actions directly 
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weaken the WTO and usurp its role. And, despite what governments say, this is 
exactly what at least some Members are trying to do by pursuing PTAs bilaterally and 
regionally.  
 
Restoring the WTO’s foundations relies on Members supporting the WTO’s MFN 
principles, not only with words but with actions. PTAs are no substitute for 
multilateralism and take the global system further away from, and not closer to, 
where we want to end up; that is with an open non-discriminatory global trading 
system whereby global integration is not undermined by regional integration based 
on discrimination. Integration must be efficient to ensure efficient supply chains are 
developed. This cannot happen in a world limited by regional horizons. 
 
Calls to get governments back to multilateralism are unlikely to be heeded if that is 
not what governments, or more precisely their constituents, want. A greater 
understanding of the economic inadequacies of PTAs and the comparative strengths 
of multilateral liberalization is likely to be required. This can only start within countries 
through governments actively promoting the correct economic message, that PTAs 
are flawed and will worsen rather than improve the global situation.  
 
3.5 Non-MFN plurilateral WTO agreements must be avoided    
It follows that if plurilateral agreements are to be negotiated in the WTO among 
certain members in an effort to promote trade openness, they must be non-
preferential and negotiated on an unconditional MFN basis. The WTO is not 
strengthened, as many would seem to contend, by having non-MFN agreements 
negotiated within its purview and/or for it to administer. It already has one such major 
agreement, an overhang from the GATT days, the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA). This preferential (plurilateral) agreement is non-MFN, in that only 
a subset of WTO Members is included. And those who expressed the view that a 
non-MFN agreement was acceptable since it could be transformed later into an 
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unconditional MFN agreement within the WTO Membership, have not seen this 
happen.    
 
The same mistakes made in the GPA look like being repeated in efforts by some, led 
by the US and strongly supported by Australia, to negotiate a plurilateral Trade in 
Services Agreement (TISA). Already, it seems pretty clear that this will not be an 
MFN endeavor, and benefits will not be extended to WTO Members who do not join 
that specific agreement. This would be a backward step that would weaken the WTO 
– it does not need another non-MFN agreement to administer. Worse still, the 
shortcomings of the proposed TISA are bound to become sources of lengthy 
disagreement between the initial promoters of the agreement and prospective 
participants. Negotiations could become interminable. Predictably, arguments about 
TISA’s structure will delay its finalization and may ultimately lead to its demise. 
Meanwhile, initial and prospective participants will have gained a ready excuse for 
undertaking no liberalization at home. Until the agreement is settled, governments 
will have an international pretext for delaying any moves to free up their service 
industries. Unilateral reforms will be put on hold. Thus, as in the past, we could see a 
WTO mechanism become an obstacle to world trade liberalization rather than the 
reverse.  
 
 
4. Enhanced transparency holds the key to changing government attitudes   
Greater and more effective transparency lies at the heart of deeper global 
liberalization and the survival of the WTO as an effective and relevant institution. 
After all, the fundamental benchmark for good transparency and micro-economic 
reform is MFN. Better transparency leads to governments adopting better policies 
(Stoeckel and Fisher, 2008). Transparency is often not defined correctly, especially in 
the WTO context. Transparency involves  the publicly accepted scrutiny of the 
economy-wide benefits and costs of policies. Transparency identifies the national 
interest; informs and educates the government and the public; exposes narrow 
187 
 
vested interests, weakening their influence; and helps build coalitions for reform. By 
establishing criteria for ‘good’ policy, transparency leads to a more predictable policy 
environment and reduces investor and trader uncertainty. 
   
Decisions on opening world markets are made in the domestic policy arenas of 
individual countries, under pressure from protected domestic producers seeking to 
avoid the required adjustment. When governments succumb to these pressures, as 
they have in the DR, they not only forego the unilateral gains (in domestic efficiency) 
available from reducing their own barriers but also diminish the capacity of the WTO 
to deliver the additional gains (improved market access) available from liberalizing in 
a multilateral context (Lowy Institute, 2009).  
 
4.1 Transparency within the WTO  
There is only so much international transparency can achieve. Governments can 
easily ignore findings from external organizations, and international transparency is 
not linked to the domestic transparency process. International transparency tends to 
be comparative across countries. But such comparisons matter little; the main issue 
is whether a country can be made better off by unilaterally reducing trade barriers 
which is the choice each country has, not whether it can influence the behavior of 
others (Stoeckel and Fisher, 2008). 
 
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism was a bold and worthwhile Uruguay Round 
initiative to raise global transparency within the WTO in the hope that it would also 
contribute to domestic transparency. However, it has fallen well short of its objectives. 
The reasons are numerous, including Members’ attitudes that limit the TPRM’s 
effectiveness in practice as Members under review adopt a double standard to 
transparency i.e. they interpret greater transparency to refer to other Members’ trade 
policies but not to their own policies. This flawed view fails to appreciate the 
individual value to all Members of having an independent and fully transparent review 
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of their own trade-related policies. It treats greater self-transparency as a ‘poor’ 
outcome rather than a virtue; if sensible economic reform is to be implemented the 
problem of existing policies must be exposed domestically. It was hoped that periodic 
TPRM reviews would help change Members’ attitudes but this has not occurred. 
The TPRM meets the fewest criteria for good transparency (Stoeckel and Fisher, 
2008). TPRs contain no economic analysis, especially economy-wide analysis. The 
independent Secretariat report contains substantial input from trade departments of 
the Member under review which has the incentive to defend its policies. The TPRM 
has had no substantial impact on better trade policies, largely due to it not evaluating 
the effects of the Member’s trade policies on its national interest (Stoeckel and Fisher, 
2008).  
 
The TPRM has to be re-invigorated to be more effective. It suffers from deficiencies 
and has become a routine institutional review that is tired and stale. Hence, while still 
worthwhile, it needs to be refreshed.  
 
4.2 Domestic transparency the main ingredient for promoting unilateralism 
and an effective WTO 
Regardless of international transparency, advancing better trade policies requires 
shifting the emphasis to domestic processes; this will always be more influential in 
shifting the political economy of reform than external scrutiny (Stoeckel and Fisher, 
2008). The Australian Productivity Commission is the outstanding example 
internationally of good domestic policy transparency and comes closest to applying 
all the key elements of good transparency.  
 
Since protectionism results from government decisions at home, for domestic 
reasons, any response to protectionism must begin at home and bring into public 
view the domestic consequences of those decisions. Domestic transparency 
arrangements provide public advice about the economy-wide costs of domestic 
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protection. The resulting increase in public awareness of those costs is needed to 
counter the powerful influence that protected domestic interests exercise over 
national trade policies (Lowy Institute, 2009). 
 
The TPRM recognizes in principle the importance of domestic transparency.  But 
Members have generally failed to implement it; indeed many Members would seem 
to have gone backwards.  
 
Perhaps the G-20 could play a role in addressing the WTO’s deep problems and 
promoting greater transparency within their own economies. However, given that the 
G-20 contains many of the main WTO recalcitrants, the prospects of progress via this 
route should not be overrated.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The WTO is imploding, largely because Members are trashing its core principles. The 
WTO can be saved but it will need a major change in Members’ attitudes to it, 
including most crucially a return to MFN. The proliferation of PTAs directly 
undermines the WTO and all Members have been complicit in this. It is not too late, 
but the time for action is now. Members can no longer preach the virtues of MFN and 
the WTO while doing the very opposite in practice. Promoting greater transparency, 
in the WTO and more importantly at home, is a key ingredient needed to change 
Members’ attitudes in favor of trade-related liberalization and non-discrimination. And 
of course the best way to limit the adverse effects of PTAs is to engage in MFN 
liberalization, either multilaterally or preferably unilaterally.  
 
It is vital that Members do not ‘save’ the WTO by introducing changes that, while 
perhaps more in tune with Members’ existing bad attitudes, destroy the very 
foundations of the WTO. Under this approach, the question would quickly become 
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not ‘can the WTO be saved’ but ‘is the WTO worth saving?’ For now it definitely is, 
but if the current rot continues than this may not always be the case.   
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II.15  Life after Doha: Reflections in the Run up to MC9 
Simon Lacey, Universitas Pelita Harapan  
 
1. Remembering the Doha Ministerial Conference (MC 4) 
The Doha Ministerial Conference was the culmination of almost two years of planning 
and was a carefully conceived and meticulously scripted event that still contained its 
fair share of surprises. Perhaps the most surprising thing at all is that many trade 
negotiators and the WTO's Director General allowed themselves to be blinded by the 
fact that initiating a round that would ultimately fail could be as disastrous as failing to 
initiate a round at all, and that of these two scenarios, the latter is arguably easier for 
the organization to recover from. This section starts by discussing the run up to Doha 
- especially Seattle - and concludes by discussing some of the inherent 
inconsistencies in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that have played such an 
important role in damning the DDA (Doha Development Agenda) to become a rather 
unfortunate real-life incarnation of Samuel Beckett's unforgettable play Waiting for 
Godot.  
 
1.1. Seattle, September 11 and launching the Doha Development Agenda 
There were probably two overriding factors that, more than anything else, led to the 
launch of the Doha Development Agenda in December 2001, neither of which would 
really have resulted in anything if it were not for the personality of the WTO Director 
General Mike Moore and his willingness to act (for better or worse) on the strength of 
his own convictions. These two factors were 1) the shock of the really spectacular 
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and the belief by many, including 
the WTO Director General, that the best way to put Seattle behind the organization 
was to launch a new Round; and 2) the September 11 attacks on the United States 
which compelled many to the (erroneous) conclusion that the best way to show 
international solidarity in the wake of this terrible tragedy was to launch another 
round of multilateral trade negotiations.88 
 
For anyone who needs reminding about just how dramatic the collapse of the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Seattle (MC 3) was, the easiest thing is probably to search for 
                                                            
88 It is Mike Moore who is generally credited – as the Ministerial talks in Doha reached an impasse on whether or 
not to launch a new round – with addressing delegates and forcefully asking the rhetorical question of whether 
he needed to remind anyone present as to what had taken place in New York just a few weeks before the Doha 
meeting. Another account tells of the Director General intervening during a crucial impasse, confronting 
Members with words to the effect that the multilateral trading system and the WTO would not be able to survive 
yet another failure of a Ministerial Conference to launch a Round, see Paul Blustein, Misadventures of the Most 
Favoured Nations, Public Affairs Publishers, New York 2009, at p. 126. 
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footage of the debacle on YouTube. Otherwise, a 2007 French film production staring 
a whole range of well-known Hollywood celebs captures the mood quite nicely.89 
While commentators disagree about the importance or impact that the street 
protestors had on the actual WTO meeting, the consensus seems to be that 
developing country representatives certainly felt empowered by the mood that took 
hold in Seattle, and decided that politically, they could afford to let the concerted 
efforts by many developed country Members to launch a new round go down in 
flames.90  In any event, the months after the failure of Seattle saw a large degree of 
soul searching by the organization's Director General, who became convinced that 
not only did the WTO need to launch a new round as soon as possible, but that the 
organization should be "re-branded" with a new-found focus on development (and 
the role that trade can play in promoting economic growth).91 
 
The economic impact of the devastating attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York on September 11 went beyond those sectors most directly affected, such as 
insurance, civil aviation, and tourism, and led to a more widely-felt loss of overall 
consumer confidence, particularly in the United States, but also to a very real extent 
globally. This was confirmed by a survey done by the IMF immediately after the 
attacks and published in December 2001.92 The sense of doom and gloom hanging 
over world leaders after 9/11 was perhaps best summarized by Singapore Prime 
Minister at the time, Goh Chok Tong, who at an October summit meeting in 
preparation for the Doha talks noted that the September 11 attacks had "probably 
tipped the world into a global recession".93 
 
It was also in the period between the September 11 attacks and the November 
Ministerial Conference that the narrative started to take hold, that the best way to 
mitigate the effects of this downturn would be to launch a new round of trade 
negotiations. One example of this was the testimony provided by Alan Greenspan 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on 20 
                                                            
89 Battle in Seattle, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0850253/?ref_=fn_al_tt_5 (visited on 19 July 2013); some of 
the well‐known names that appear in the film include André Benjamin, Woody Harrelson, Ray Liotta, Channing 
Tatum and Charlize Theron. 
90 Gary Horlick and several others, writing in the Journal of International Economic Law a few months after 
Seattle, note that a lot more was actually achieved substantively at the Ministerial Meeting than much of the 
coverage that documented the  meeting's failure to launch a round seem to admit; see Gary Horlick et al, 
Reactions to Seattle, in: Journal of International Economic Law, 3(1) March 2000, pp. 167 et seq. 
91 See the account told in Blustein, op cit., at p. 82. 
92 IMF's World Economic Outlook: The Global Economy After September 11, at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/03/ (visited on 25 July 2013).  
93 Cited by BBC News, "Fight terror with trade, summit told", 13 October, 2001, at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐pacific/1597016.stm (visited on 25 July 2013).  
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September, who stated, "A successful round would not only significantly enhance 
world economic growth but also answer terrorism with a firm reaffirmation of our 
commitment to open and free societies".94 But the economic press also took up this 
call, such as the Financial Times, who in an article entitled "A Round to Steady the 
Nerves", extolled the "symbolic and psychological" value that launching a new round 
of trade talks would have.95 
 
1.2. Implementation issues and the flaws of the grand bargain 
It should not be forgotten that developing countries on the whole were less than 
enthusiastic about the prospect of a new round, particularly one that would 
incorporate yet another set of "new issues", of which they were generally suspicious, 
if not actually hostile towards, such as trade and the environment, and linkages 
between trade and labor. However it was specifically with regard to the so-called 
Singapore Issues, particularly trade and competition, trade and investment and 
government procurement that developing countries seemed to harbor the greatest 
enmity.96 In fact, many developing countries wished to keep the Organization focused 
on so-called implementation issues, meaning the challenges Members were still 
facing in implementing the many new obligations entered into when they signed the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.97  
 
Developing countries as a whole also wished to address what they perceived to be 
the glaring asymmetries that had become apparent in the so-called "Grand Bargain" 
of the Uruguay Round, namely liberalization of trade in textiles and agricultural 
                                                            
94 See Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan: The condition of the financial markets, Before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, September 20, 2001, at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2001/20010920/default.htm (visited on 25 July 2013).  
95 Cited in Blustein, op cit., Notes to Chapter 1, at p. 302, note 3.  
96 The Singapore Issues were a set of four areas, two "old" and two "new", that developed countries, particularly 
the EU and to a lesser extent the US, wished to include in talks if a new round was successfully launched. These 
four issues were 1) trade and investment; and 2) trade in competition as noted above (the "new" issues), as well 
as 3) transparency in government procurement and 4) trade facilitation. These last two issues are labeled with 
the moniker "old" because WTO rules already included provisions governing these two areas, even if, for 
government procurement, these rules (under the Government Procurement Agreement or GPA) had not been 
part of the Uruguay Round single undertaking and thus not been adopted by the entire WTO membership. The 
other "old" issue of trade facilitation (i.e. anything that affects goods as they physically cross borders) had already 
been addressed by various GATT articles as early as 1947 (for example in Art. V on freedom of transit, Art. VII on 
customs valuation, or Art. VIII on fees and formalities levied in connection with importing and exporting), but also 
the results of the Uruguay Round contain no less than four separate agreements dedicated to different trade 
facilitation issues (namely agreements on customs valuation, pre‐shipment inspection, rules of origin and import 
licensing). For more on the Singapore Issues, see Simon J. Evenett et al, The Singapore Issues and the World 
Trading System: The Road to Cancun and Beyond, June 2003, at: 
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/22682.pdf (visited on 25 July 2013). 
97 See Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries and the WTO, Issues of Implementation, in: Journal of World Trade, 
34(6): 33–74, 2000. 
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products in exchange for rules on trade and services and trade-related intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS).  
 
It was only after the dust of the Uruguay Round had settled that it became apparent 
to many that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture resulted in little new market access, 
while leaving the complex web of subsidies for (mostly) developed country 
agricultural producers largely in place. Moreover, the WTO Agreement on Textiles 
also left the global system of quotas - the Mutlifibre Arrangement - that had been in 
place since 1974 and that was so resented by developing countries, largely intact for 
another ten years. Compare this to the liberalization commitments made under the 
WTO's General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) and the TRIPS 
Agreement, most of which came into force on 1 January 1995 (the day the WTO 
opened for business), and it is easy to see why developing countries were feeling 
somewhat jilted.98  
 
In any event, most developing country Members felt that implementation issues and 
the asymmetries in liberalization outcomes resulting from the Uruguay Round were 
both matters that could and should be addressed outside of the dynamics of a 
negotiating round per se.  
 
1.3. The Doha Ministerial Declaration 
At ten pages, the Ministerial Declaration is a relatively short document that lists the 
areas in which negotiations are to take place, and attempts to elucidate some of the 
possible outcomes that may or even should ensue from these negotiations, 
particularly greater trade liberalization and a world trading system that produces 
more development-friendly outcomes. This second element is, on its face, the most 
important. What is most striking upon a first reading of the Ministerial Declaration is 
the sheer number of times the words "developing" or "development" appear. The 
relevant numbers are 24 and 39 times respectively, so that, taken together, these two 
terms appear some 63 times, or, just over 6 times per page on average. This is 
arguably little more than a real-life example of Sir Humphrey's famous law of inverse 
relevance, namely "[t]he less you intend to do about something, the more you have to 
                                                            
98 Although this narrative does not do justice to the fact that the GATS is a very flexible agreement that allowed 
many, in fact most developing country Members to largely opt out of sensitive and difficult liberalization 
commitments during the Uruguay Round, and also ignores the fact that LDCs were given transition period to 
implement their obligations under TRIPS, this nevertheless is an accurate reflection of how many developing 
countries (rightly or wrongly) viewed the results of the Uruguay Round.  
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keep talking about it."99 Over time it has become brazenly obvious that this was sadly 
the case. In fact this was evident as early as the next meeting of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun in September 2003 (MC5). This is because the WTO was 
never, is not, and will probably never be a development organization (that is arguably 
the job of the World Bank or the United Nations Development Program), and those 
that believed or advocated otherwise, misconstrued the organization's historical 
pedigree and indeed its institutional purpose and driving imperative. This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Suffice to say here that even a casual reader of the Doha Declaration will recognize 
that many, if not all of the so-called "commitments" - if one can even call them that - 
towards helping developing countries are steeped in aspirational and markedly 
"woolly" language that "commits" Members, at most, to little more than "best 
endeavors", if that. One example is in para. 2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration: 
"We seek to place their [developing countries'] needs and interests at the heart of the 
Work Program adopted in this Declaration". Any developing country representatives 
present in the room should at least have insisted that the words "seek to" be replaced 
with either the word "will" or "shall". Another example is paragraph 42 on Least-
Developed Countries, which contains a string of "commitments" purportedly intended 
to promote the interests of LDCs, but which in reality promise little more than 
"considering" how to do more to help LDCs. Contrast this language with that used to 
describe potential negotiating outcomes in other areas, primarily of interest to 
developed countries (like the desire to see negotiations start on trade and investment 
in para. 20) and the woolly and aspirational language is gone. In this paragraph the 
Ministerial Declaration states "we agree that negotiations will take place after the 
Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by 
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations". Anyone reading 
that paragraph at the time of Doha (and thus without the benefit of hindsight), could 
be excused for thinking that negotiations on trade and investment were a matter of 
"when" and not "if". 
 
To summarize, the WTO Ministerial Declaration that emerged from the Doha talks, 
although a seemingly ambitious document in terms of envisaging a pivot towards the 
needs of developing country members, really just confirmed that the WTO was all 
about business as usual, and that Members would do their best to look like they were 
                                                            
99 Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, Yes Minister : Volume 1 :The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister by the Rt Hon. James 
Hacker MP, BBC Publishing, 1983, at p. 21 
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taking the concerns of developing countries seriously while in reality doing what they 
were really sent to the organization to do, namely extract the most and best market 
access concessions for their own countries while giving the least number of market 
access commitments in exchange therefore. This is what the WTO, and its 
predecessor the GATT were designed to do, and this is what the GATT and now the 
WTO have had a great deal of success in doing. As Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind 
Subramanian pointed out in a 2008 paper on a totally unrelated issue "[t]he genius of 
the [GATT] was to recognize that the politics of trade policy is unavoidably 
mercantilist and then to harness this very mercantilism to avoid protectionist 
outcomes".100 Given the huge gap in terms what the document that launched the 
Doha Work Program and that also established the negotiation agenda promised and 
aspired to on the one hand, and the underlying political-economy realities that it was 
steeped in on the other, is it any wonder that we are currently at such a seemingly 
insurmountable impasse? This is even less surprising when one considers the many 
significant changes that have transformed the global economy since the launch of the 
round. 
 
2. Getting to the current impasse 
It has admittedly been a long road from the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
November 2001 to where we are now - at the time of writing - almost 12 years later 
and with still no end in sight. To put the extraordinary length of time the current round 
has lasted into context, it should be recalled that even the Uruguay Round only 
dragged on for some eight years (September 1986 until December 1993), and it was 
based on an agenda that was much more radical - in terms of bringing new issues 
under multilateral disciplines - and much more controversial - in terms of finally 
subjecting agricultural trade to actionable trade rules - than one could arguably 
contend is the case for the DDA. This section discusses how the Round got to where 
it is now, focusing first on Cancun and the July 2004 Package, followed by the Hong 
Kong Ministerial, the 2008 meeting in Geneva, and the final, and ultimately 
unsuccessful push to conclude the round, first by the end of 2010, then by the end of 
2011. 
 
                                                            
100 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, "Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role 
for the World Trade Organization", Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2008, at: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=871 (visited on 25 July 2005).  
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2.1. The collapse at Cancun (MC 5), and the Round's subsequent rescue in July 
2004 
Two words (actually three) seem to sum up the Ministerial Conference that took 
place in Cancun Mexico from 10-14 September 2003, namely "cotton" and "explicit 
consensus". The first issue overshadowed the meeting from the outset and seemed 
to be the spark that ignited a mood of militancy among developing country 
representatives. The explicit consensus language ended up giving these 
representatives the mechanism by which they could dig in their heels and ultimately 
bring the meeting to an ignominious collapse. 
 
The cotton issue had slowly but steadily been brewing at the WTO for well over a 
year before it sparked the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. As early as January 
2001, Mali had explicitly tabled a request in the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture (established under the so-called inbuilt agenda) for subsidies on this 
commodity to be drastically reduced.101 However the issue really began to pick up 
some traction with the release of a damning report by Oxfam in September 2002 
entitled "Cultivating Poverty: The impact of US cotton subsidies on Africa"102, and 
with the initiation of a dispute under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding by 
Brazil against US cotton subsidies in February 2003.103 Throughout the course of 
2003, the temperature continued to rise on the issue of how damaging US cotton 
subsidies had been for African cotton farmers, so it is somewhat mystifying why US 
trade negotiators, particularly USTR Robert Zoellick were caught so off-guard in 
Cancun when this issue threatened for a while to take center stage and became a 
cause célèbre around which many developing countries could rally.104 Knowing the 
political sensitivity, particularly the positions of key members of Congress on this 
issue, there was little Zoellick could concede in Cancun, which put the US delegation 
in the unenviable position of fighting a rear-guard action in defense of a collection of 
subsidies that were manifestly indefensible given their obvious and demonstrated 
impact on cotton growers in the affected African countries. This caused the US 
delegation to look insensitive and made the DDA's stated goal of improving 
development outcomes for the world's poor seem like a cruel and cynical joke. It is no 
                                                            
101 See Malian Proposals for the Future Negotiations on Agriculture  (G/AG/NG/W/99), 11 January 2001.  
102 http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/cultivating‐poverty (visited on 26 July 2013).  
103 DS267; For a useful comparison of the two tracks that were taken on the issue of cotton (negotiation versus 
litigation), see: Philipp Stucki, Lessons Learned from the Negotiations and Litigations on Cotton, 2008, at: 
http://www.ideascentre.ch/documents/2.28_AnnexactionplanWTICottonFINAL.pdf (visited on 26 July 2013). 
104 For an interesting expose on how the issue emerged and how it was handled in Cancun and thereafter see the 
film documentary The Cotton War, by TVEAPfilms available for download and viewing at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l673CWNdGLc (visited on 26 July 2013). 
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wonder developing countries took the combative stance that they did on what 
seemed to be the most important issue to developed countries at the talks, namely 
the Singapore Issues.105 
 
The "explicit consensus" language that hung over the Singapore Issues was the 
result of intransigence on the part of India as the last holdout at the Doha meeting to 
agree to negotiations on the Singapore Issues, so that the Indian representative in 
Doha (Maran) could reportedly only be prevailed upon to accept this concession if 
the decision to start negotiations on these issues was to be taken by "explicit 
consensus" at the Fifth Ministerial Conference (i.e. the one after Doha).106 Although 
nothing in the WTO's charter (the Marrakesh Agreement) suggests that such a thing 
as explicit consensus exists, over the months leading up to the Cancun meeting, 
Geneva-based representatives, and then at the Cancun meeting itself, trade 
ministers from developing countries had actively worked to cultivate the narrative that 
a decision allowing negotiations on the Singapore Issues to start would only be taken 
if the entire membership was in agreement (which is what the WTO's principle of 
consensus means anyway). This was presumably a tactical move intended to pre-
empt any attempt to isolate a small group or even a single Member in its opposition 
to start these negotiations, since under the normal modus operandi of the WTO it is 
considered very poor form for one Member in particular to dig in its heels and impede 
progress when everybody else has agreed to move forward. The explicit consensus 
language obviated the need for a single Member to feel embarrassed about being 
obstructionist and to allow itself to be strong-armed into going along. As it turns out, 
India was not alone in its opposition to the Singapore Issues, since the representative 
for Malaysia (Rafidah Aziz) also took a strong stand at Cancun.107, Thus it was that, 
after the tempers of developing country delegates had been inflamed over cotton and 
the impasse over agriculture, many of them chose to vent their anger on the 
Singapore Issues. 
 
The Cancun Ministerial ultimately collapsed when the Mexican Foreign Minister Luis 
Ernesto Derbez (in his capacity as chairman of the conference), seeing the lack of 
progress on the Singapore Issues gaveled the meeting to an unexpected and some 
                                                            
105 This is particularly true for the EU and Japan, who were perceived as being some of the most intransigent 
members in the agriculture talks, which developing countries cared about very passionately. 
106 See the account told in Blustein, op cit., at the bottom of p. 128. 
107 See Bridges Daily Update, 14 September 2003, at: http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto‐mc5‐cancun‐2003/bridges‐daily‐
updates‐mc5/161118/ (visited on 26 July 2013). 
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would say premature end in a green room meeting on 14 September, after 4 days of 
conflict-ridden and ultimately fruitless talks.  
 
Many blamed the US for its unwillingness to come up with any kind of compromise 
on cotton besides telling the Cotton 4 to diversify their economies. Others blamed the 
EU for waiting until the last day to concede on the Singapore Issues, while yet others 
blamed the militancy of developing countries. Some even saw Derbez's sudden 
desire to end the meeting over the intractable stance of developing countries vis-à-
vis the Singapore issues as a way to do so without allowing the talks to continue and 
thereby risk the prospect of the US becoming isolated on the cotton issue. Either 
way, it wasn't until the following summer (2004), that the negotiations got back on 
track, largely thanks to US and EU leadership. The Cancun talks, if they had 
provided anything positive (discounting the accession of the first two LDCs to the 
WTO, Nepal and Cambodia), it was the opportunity for developing countries to vent 
their wrath, and to subsequently return to the negotiating table in Geneva with a 
chance for cooler heads to prevail. 
 
The July 2004 meeting, which put the Doha Round decidedly back on track - if only 
temporarily - arguably owed its success more than perhaps any other factor to the 
ambitions and tenacity of USTR Bob Zoellick, who - working closely with the EU chief 
trade negotiator at the time Pascal Lamy - managed to achieve a level of productive 
and constructive progress in the early months of 2004 concerning these two 
countries' positions on agriculture, that it infected the broader WTO membership and 
allowed for a sense of momentum to take hold. Thus it was that by the end of July 
2004, WTO Members had coalesced around a framework document - the July 
package - that contained a little bit of something for everyone.108 Consensus on the 
key agriculture text was reportedly achieved thanks largely to the New Zealand 
ambassador Tim Grosser, who, in his role as the chair of the Special Session on 
Agriculture, essentially seized the reins from a hapless Superchai Panitchpakdi after 
a series of indecisive green room meetings with the main protagonists simply 
repeating their well-known positions.109 
 
Ultimately, the July package 110  rekindled some hope among developing country 
members, that their concerns had not simply been forgotten in the scramble to make 
                                                            
108 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
109 This is at least how Blustein recounts it, see Blustein, op cit., at the bottom of p. 92. 
110 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579). 
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the round about little more than better market access for agricultural and non-
agricultural products, especially by big developed countries and efficient emerging 
market exporters. Thus, the text on agriculture that emerged from the July 2004 
meeting in Geneva specifically provided that developing countries "must be able to 
pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their development goals, poverty 
reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns".111 This commitment was 
given more operationally effective character in the July package by including 
language, in the section on market access, subject to which developing countries 
would be permitted to list a certain number of tariff lines as sensitive products, and to 
exclude these products to a large degree from any liberalization.112 In addition, and 
also under market access, developing countries were to be given a special safeguard 
mechanism by which they would be allowed to raise tariffs on a number of pre-
selected products above bound rates in the event of an import surge.113 
 
On cotton, the July package stated that as a negotiating issue, it would be addressed 
"ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically" in the broader framework of the 
agriculture negotiations, that at least allowed some to hope (as it turns out very 
forlornly) that a resolution on this issue might come sooner rather than later and 
might not be held hostage to the Single Undertaking. Finally, the July package put in 
writing a commitment originally championed by Pascal Lamy that LDCs would be 
released from any obligation to make reduction commitments, thereby giving them 
what some participants took to calling "a round for free".114 
 
To sum up, the mood of the WTO Members at the end of the July 2004 negotiations 
was in stark contrast to the despondency that had prevailed at the end of the Cancun 
collapse. In press statements after the July 2004 meeting, Pascal Lamy was quoted 
as saying that the WTO was now "well and running", while developing country 
representatives such as Kamal Nath of India went on record stating "I think it was 
recognized here that the developing countries cannot be taken for granted", and 
Argentina's chief trade negotiator in Geneva for the meeting (Martin Redrado) 
qualifying the progress made as "a tremendous advance".115  
                                                            
111 Ibid, Annex A, para. 2. It was believed that this language would give cover for excluding politically sensitive 
agricultural commodities in the production of which economically vulnerable farmers were engaged, from the 
ambitious tariff cuts that countries like the US, Australia and other Cairns Group countries were seeking. 
112 Ibid, Annex A, para. 41.  
113 Ibid, Annex A, para. 42. 
114 Ibid, Annex A, para. 43. 
115 All of these quotes taken from a Washington Post article dated 1 August 2004 entitled "Accord Reached On 
Global Trade; Talks Aim to Cut Farm Aid, Tariffs". 
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2.2. Hong Kong (MC 6), aid for trade and pork-barrel commercial diplomacy 
It was quite early on during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference (13–18 December 
2005) that the jockeying over a flurry of proposals on aid for trade started to pick up 
serious momentum, beginning with a proposal circulated by Japan.116 The thousands 
of developing country representatives in Hong Kong rapidly became enthused with a 
new-found sense of purpose and excitement thanks to the Japanese proposal (and 
the others that would ensue soon after, starting with the EU, followed by the US117), 
as it became clear to everyone that there was money to be made, and lots of it. One 
could have been excused for thinking that that the meeting had now been allowed to 
degenerate to the level of pork-barrel politics, and that from now on, many 
developing country demands for genuine reform of the trading system, by cutting the 
highest tariffs and eliminating the most damaging forms of trade-distorting domestic 
support, would likely be considerably blunted (bought off) in exchange for cash 
infusions from rich countries unwilling to show the necessary leadership to change 
the status quo.118 
It is probably fair to say that, although there was a relatively strong sense of anti-
climactic let-down, the Hong Kong meeting brought neither the sense of total despair 
which followed the collapse in Cancun, nor the euphoria that seemed to have gripped 
delegates after the July 2004 meeting in Geneva. One important and largely 
overlooked concession was the EU's offer to eliminate all export subsidies by 2013. 
One participant at the Hong Kong meeting, a veteran of several trade rounds going 
back to the Tokyo Round, noted that if the EU had made an offer like that back in the 
1970s or 1980s, many would have considered it significant enough to conclude 
negotiations and seal the deal right then and there.119 Unfortunately this was not the 
sentiment in Hong Kong, and so wrangling continued, particularly between the US 
and the EU. Also worth noting is that expectations had been severely drummed down 
in the run up to the meeting, with several negotiators and Pascal Lamy - now 
appointed as WTO Director General - voicing their opinions that it might be 
necessary to hold a follow-up meeting to the Hong Kong Ministerial as early as 
March 2006 in Geneva, just so that some real progress could be achieved away from 
                                                            
116 Bridges Daily Update on the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, at: http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto‐mc6‐hong‐kong‐
2005/bridges‐daily‐updates‐mc6/159002/ (visited on 30 July 2013). 
117 See article in the Financial Times dated 14 December 2005 entitled "Little progress at WTO talks despite US 
aid offer". 
118 This view was also shared by John Hilary of War on Want who went on record as saying "rich countries are 
trying to buy off opposition to their trade policies by means of a cynical bribe.", quoted in Bridges Daily Update 
on the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, at: http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto‐mc6‐hong‐kong‐2005/bridges‐daily‐
updates‐mc6/159002/ (visited on 30 July 2013). 
119 This sentiment was expressed by Gary Horlick. 
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the limelight, political point-scoring and posturing that inevitably accompanied high-
level Ministerial Conference meetings.120 
 
2.3. Geneva 2008 – much ado about special safeguard measures 
If at least a dull shimmer of hope had imbued the conclusion of MC6 in Hong Kong, 
by the summer of 2008, the WTO was back to deadlock and despondency with even 
Pascal Lamy's optimism seeming to have faded as talks collapsed at the end of a 
marathon 9-day negotiating session dubbed another mini-ministerial (21 -29 July 
2008).121 Lamy had convened the meeting for the purpose of preparing the formal 
establishment of modalities in agriculture and NAMA.122 It was ultimately the Director 
General who after 5 days of talks that had seen only modest convergence, seized the 
initiative and took the rather desperate measure of himself drawing up a framework 
for compromise on many of the issues that had eluded consensus up to that point, 
such as the magnitude of cuts in domestic support by developed countries, the scope 
of tariff cuts and thus market access commitments for both agricultural and industrial 
goods. Lamy's compromise text received mixed reviews but it was essentially viewed 
as a basis for continuing talks.123 
 
Ultimately, the July 2008 talks failed, ostensibly over an issue that caused quite a bit 
of surprise among many commentators, namely a special safeguard measure (SSM) 
for developing countries that would allow them to temporarily raise tariffs above 
bound rates in the event of an import surge.124 Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) already contains a clause that affords the right for some Members 
to invoke this measure (referred to as an "SSG"), provided they reserved the right to 
do so during the Uruguay Round.125 Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
some countries have been forced to rue their failure to invoke the special safeguard 
on a number of agricultural tariff lines, thus limiting them in principle, to the regular 
WTO safeguard action (under the GATT Article XX escape clause) as the only legal 
option for fending off injurious import surges. This was indeed the oversight that was 
behind the Korea Dairy dispute with the EU from 1997-1999, when Korea - unable to 
                                                            
120 See BBC News Article dated 22 November 2005 entitled "WTO 'won't agree deal in China", available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4461730.stm (visited on 30 July 2013). 
121 See Blustein at p. 275 who refers to Lamy "chocking up". 
122 Bridges Daily Update on the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, at: http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto‐mini‐mc‐
geneva‐2008/englishupdates/13365/ (visited on 30 July 2013). 
123 See Blustein at p. 264. 
124 Bridges Daily Update on the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/wto/geneva2008/englishupdates/15315/ (visited on 30 July 2013). 
125 See Yong‐Shik Lee, Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 
p. 153. 
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invoke the special safeguard under Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture - 
imposed additional duties on imports of skimmed milk powder after its market 
experienced massive import surges in this product which constituted a significant 
threat to its own dairy industry (or so it claimed).126 Korea lost that dispute, just like 
other countries would subsequently lose similar disputes involving their use of 
safeguards under the WTO escape clause.127 Perhaps it was the fact that it had 
ultimately proven unexpectedly difficult to legally impose safeguard measures under 
WTO rules that had led developing countries to the conclusion that what they needed 
was the kind of air-tight policy space that a special safeguard measure very similar to 
the one set forth in Article 5 AoA afforded. Either way, with the benefit of hindsight, 
after a considerable increase in protectionism during and after the financial crisis and 
the ensuing global recession, in which countries demonstrated previously unmatched 
levels of inventiveness in using and abusing existing trade rules to keep out imports 
to shelter import-competing domestic industries (discussed immediately below), it 
seems surprising that it was something as mundane as a special safeguard measure 
that caused the collapse of the July 2008 meeting in Geneva.128 
 
2.4. The global economic crisis and subsequent developments for the DDA  
Some very traumatic events have rocked and in many ways transformed the global 
economy since the collapse of the July 2008 mini ministerial meeting in Geneva. 
Easily the most important of these would have to be the onset of the global financial 
crisis, which was already starting to take hold before the July 2008 meeting, but 
which got going in full swing with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 
2008. The crisis had a crippling effect on international trade, both because of the 
collapse in demand as well as because the credit crunch had a chilling effect on 
trade finance.129  The crisis also led to an increase in pressure on governments 
                                                            
126 See Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, Report of the Panel, 
(WT/DS98/R) at para. 4.54. 
127 It is generally recognized that the difficulty in imposing safeguard measures under GATT Art. XX and the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards is due more than anything to the causation and non‐attribution 
requirements set out in Art. 4.2 (b) of the Safeguards Agreement, see: Douglas A. Irwin, Causing problems? The 
WTO review of causation and injury attribution in US Section 201 cases, in World Trade Review, Vol. 2(3), 2003, 
pp. 297–325, at: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/docs/causal.pdf, (visited on 30 July 2013). 
128 Meaning it is surprising that what was allowed to bring the talks to an abrupt end was that a country such as 
India felt that it absolutely and unequivocally needed the extra policy space that a special safeguard would have 
afforded it; See J. Michael Finger, A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports: what experience with 
other GATT/WTO safeguards tells us about what might work, in: World Trade Review, Vol. 9 (2), 2010, pp. 289 
318, Cambridge University Press. 
129 See article in MoneyWeek dated 24 October 2008, entitled "Is international trade grinding to a halt?" at: 
http://moneyweek.com/is‐international‐trade‐grinding‐to‐a‐halt‐13909/ (visited on 31 July 2013); Some 
economists question the role played by the contraction in trade finance, see e.g. Andrei A Levchenko et al, The 
Collapse of International Trade during the 2008–09 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun, in "IMF Economic 
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across both the developed and developing world to flout trade rules in various forms 
in order to prop up domestic economic interests.130 In developed countries, most 
measures were part of stimulus packages containing bailout plans with massive cash 
injections for domestic industries, particularly the auto industry, but also clean 
technology, transport infrastructure and various others. 131  There was also a 
corresponding rise in contingency protection measures in developed country markets 
such as the US and the EU, as import-competing industries turned to their 
governments for import relief.132 
 
In developing countries, as job losses mounted and economic hardship began to be 
felt, governments also came under pressure to provide import relief from domestic 
producers of import-competing products, either by using traditional means such as 
raising applied to tariff levels to bound rates, the application of contingency protection 
measures or by resorting to other protectionist impediments, such as technical 
barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, import licenses and other 
similar instruments. 133  In some developing countries there was also another 
imperative behind efforts to restrain imports, namely the need to provide relief to 
deteriorating balance of payments situations, and relieve pressure on already 
stretched budget deficits. 
 
As the global economic crisis seemed to abate, it was replaced with dogged 
unemployment and stagnating consumer demand in the US, and the onset of an 
austerity-induced slowdown in several European countries. Developing markets 
managed to recover somewhat better, with India, China and Brazil just three of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Review" (2010) 58, pp. 214–253, at: http://www.palgrave‐
journals.com/imfer/journal/v58/n2/abs/imfer201011a.html (visited on 31 July 2013). 
130 This trend has been documented and analyzed by a number of institutions and individuals, albeit perhaps 
none with as much focus as Simon Evenett and his Global Trade Alert (http://www.globaltradealert.org). For a 
concise and easily digestible overview of the impact the crisis had on trade policy in a number of counties, see 
Simon J. Evenett and Martin Wermelinger, Chapter 1, A snapshot of contemporary protectionism: how important 
are the murkier forms of trade discrimination, in: Mia Mikic with Martin Wermelinger (eds), Rising Non‐Tariff 
Protectionism and Crisis Recovery, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2010, at: 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/tipub2587.pdf (visited on 31 July 2013); See also Crina Viju and William 
A. Kerr, Protectionism and Global Recession: Has the Link Been Broken?; in: Journal of World Trade Vol 45 (3), 
2011, pp. 605–628, Kluwer Law International BV. 
131 For an in‐depth account of the US auto bailout, see: Steven Rattner, Overhaul: An Insider's Account of the 
Obama Administration's Emergency Rescue of the Auto Industry, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, September 2010; 
For a detailed treatment of the 2009 US Stimulus Bill, see Michael Grunwald, The New New Deal: The Hidden 
Story of Change in the Obama Era, Simon & Schuster. August 2012. 
132 Chad P. Bown, Assessing the G20 use of antidumping, safeguards and countervailing duties during the 2008‐
2009 crisis, in Simon J. Evenett (ed.), Unequal Compliance: the 6th GTA Report, London, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, pp. 39‐47. 
133 H.L. Kee, et al, Is Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5274, at: http://go.worldbank.org/Q2MKLTEIN0 (visited on 31 July 2009).  
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large emerging markets that were soon posting healthy growth figures. In any event, 
although summit meetings during and after the crisis had regularly seen leaders 
produce declarations unequivocally calling for a swift conclusion to the Doha Round 
in order to revive the global economy, these statements were not translated into 
action by ambassadors or trade ministers In Geneva or elsewhere. In fact, quite the 
opposite, since it would seem that in terms of domestic political calculus, times of 
economic hardship, high unemployment and austerity are the worst possible 
moments in which to conclude sweeping trade deals, the distributional effects of 
which must then be "sold" to a skeptical and struggling electorate.134 
 
Since the breakdown of the 2008 talks, we have had two further Ministerial 
Conferences, both in Geneva (MC 7 from 30 November to 2 December 2009, and 
MC 8 from 15 to 17 December 2011). It's hard to say whether it was Pascal Lamy's 
tireless optimism and unfaltering ambition or just the fact that Article VI.1 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement mandates these meetings every two years that were the 
driving dynamic behind these get-togethers. In any event, they both followed a very 
similar course, which is to say they were both essentially reduced to little more than 
simple stocktaking exercises, with the DG and Members as a whole keen to avoid 
even the whiff of another high-stakes collapse. Much of the negotiating on the truly 
troublesome issues of agriculture and NAMA continued, primarily in Geneva but in 
the months between Ministerial Conference meetings. Thus we have seen the focus 
shift to more technical issues, such as scheduling approaches in the agriculture talks, 
and non-tariff barriers in the NAMA negotiations.135 The agricultural talks took a new 
tack in 2012 as the onus moved in response to a submission made on food security 
by developing countries.136 By the middle of 2012, Pascal Lamy joined other WTO 
Members (particularly the US) that had indicated a strong preference for the 
Organization to abandon the Single Undertaking and start making progress on any 
area where positive outcomes might still be achievable, by negotiating in plurilateral 
groups or "clusters".137 
                                                            
134 See James Bachus, The Bicycle Club: Affirming the American Interest in the Future of the WTO (2003) 37 
Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37 (3), 2007, pp. 429–441, draft available at: 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/bacchusbicycle.pdf, see p. 9. In particular 
135 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 13 • Number 16 • 6th May 2009, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/46289/ (visited on 31 July 2013).  
136 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 16 • Number 39 • 14th November 2012, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/149960/ (visited on 31 July 2013).  
137 This was indeed something that had started being advocated as early as 2011, where some members, seeing 
the progress made using this approach for an updated Government Procurement Agreement, also concluded it 
would be the best way forward in other areas, including in particular services; See Bridges Weekly Trade News 
Digest • Volume 16 • Number 29 • 25th July 2012, at: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/139026/ (visited on 
31 July 2013).  
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There has also been some progress in other areas, seemingly far removed from the 
squabbles on subsidy and tariff cuts that characterized the agriculture and NAMA 
negotiations for so many years. This would include most notably trade facilitation138, 
which, if anything, promises to be the real deliverable as we head towards Bali. More 
limited progress has been made recently in talks on services, where again it seems 
as if the Single Undertaking has been relegated to the history books (where it 
perhaps belongs in an organization of 155 countries and separate customs 
territories). Reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding has also seen limited 
progress and could possibly be another bunch of low-hanging fruit that the WTO 
might be able to harvest at the Bali meeting.139 As we get closer to the December 
meeting and with the "last petrol stop on the road to Bali" having been passed in 
July140 (with reportedly adequate progress141), the focus will need to narrow on a few 
core issues were forward momentum can be maintained. The next section turns 
away from the histrionics of the Doha Round with the inevitable speculation about 
what may or may not be achieved at Bali, and asks what to do with the WTO.  
 
3. What to do with the WTO? 
Since the collapse in July 2008, there has been a fair amount of navel gazing by the 
WTO itself142, as well as helpful advice by outside commentators on how to get the 
Organization beyond its current funk.143 Not wishing to really add to this debate, this 
chapter limits itself to making three points, the first being that WTO Members do not 
necessarily need to be engaged in a perpetual negotiating round for the Organization 
to survive (consolidation trumps negotiation - at least for a while). This section 
discusses the fickleness of attempts to turn the WTO into just another economic 
development organization (which is totally at odds with its institutional psychology). 
Finally it discusses a few things that the WTO has managed and is managing to do 
                                                            
138  See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 16 • Number 29 • 25th July 2012, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/67633/ (visited on 31 July 2013). 
139 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 16 • Number 29 • 25th July 2012, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/99586/ (visited on 31 July 2013). 
140 This was how Pascal Lamy put it, quoted in Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest vol. 17 (20) 6 June 2013, at: 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/165342/ (visited on 31 July 2013).  
141 See "Lamy: 'Clearer' Road to Bali Ministerial, Though Work Remains", in Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 
vol. 17 (27) 25 June 2013, at:  http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/173294/ (visited on 31 July 2013). 
142 See e.g. Panel on Defining the Future of Trade convened by WTO Director‐General Pascal Lamy, The Future of 
Trade: The Challenges of Convergence, World Trade Organization, April 2013, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dft_panel_e/future_of_trade_report_e.pdf (visited on 31 July 
2013). 
143 See e.g. Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett  (eds.), Next Steps: Getting Past the Doha Round Crisis, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2011, at: http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08348.pdf (visited on 31 
July 2013).  
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very well, and which the Organization should be encouraged and supported in doing 
further.  
 
3.1. Debunking the bicycle theory 
It seems to be a well-rehearsed aphorism these days that the process of trade 
liberalization is like a bicycle, which, if it ever stops moving forward, will fall over. 
Fred Bergsten is generally credited with first coining this phrase in the 1970s144, and 
USTR Zoellick also invoked it in an op-ed he wrote for the New York Times a few 
weeks before the 2001 Doha meeting.145 Blustein, in his detailed chronicle of the 
WTO covering the period from Seattle to July 2008 also makes a compelling case for 
the need for the legislative function of the WTO, i.e. its negotiating bodies (like the 
Trade Negotiations Committee or TNC) to constantly update the WTO agreements 
so that the Organizations' rules accurately reflect and govern the issues and tensions 
confronting the world trading system.146 It is almost certainly wrong to assume that 
because the Doha Round has stalled, worldwide efforts to liberalize international 
trade have stalled with it. To be sure, efforts at achieving greater market opening and 
a reduction in trade barriers on a multilateral basis are currently on ice, but the march 
of trade and investment liberalization is moving on in different forms and fora. After 
all, what is the spaghetti bowl of preferential trading arrangements that has swept up 
so many WTO Members if not an unprecedented surge of energy towards the 
reduction of trade barriers (albeit on a discriminatory and thus admittedly "third-best" 
policy option basis147)? Many economists and trade policy commentators view the 
pivot towards preferentialism as an alarming move in the wrong direction.148 Others149 
prefer to take a longer view, since, after all, was not the 1948 GATT first preceded by 
a slew of bilateral preferential trade agreements entered into by Cordell Hull under 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1938?150 Taken together, the current two 
                                                            
144 See Fred Bergsten, Toward a New International Economic Order, Lexington Books, 1975, as quoted in Bachus 
(2003).  
145 See "The Record Shows It's the Open Traders Who Get Ahead" by Robert B. Zoellick, New York Times, 8 
November 2001, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/opinion/08iht‐edrobert_ed3_.html (visited on 1 
August 2013).  
146 See Blustein's musings in Chapter 14 of Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations, op cit. 
147 The statement in brackets assumes that the "first best" policy option for liberalization is the unilateral 
lowering or elimination of trade barriers (desirable economically but not always achievable politically); the 
"second best" policy option is multilateral liberalization under the WTO or a similar framework; and that thus any 
liberalization undertaken in the form of preferential trading arrangements is little more than a "third best" policy 
option. 
148 Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, American 
Enterprise Institute, 1995. 
149 Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, Multilateralizing Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
150 Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO, Brookings, 2004, at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2004/10/10globaleconomics‐dam (visited on 1 August 2013); for a 
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preferential trading arrangements being negotiated under the auspices of the Trans-
pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) will cover close to 80 per cent of global GDP151. The discriminatory side 
effects of not being part of these agreements will be felt by only a small number of 
countries, which wont include most of the world's poorest nations, since these 
countries already benefit from duty free (and largely quota free) access to their main 
export markets under a variety of frameworks such as Everything But Arms (EBA), 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), and preferential access agreements like the EU's extensive 
network of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).. 
 
Even looking beyond the myriad of preferential trading arrangements, it is now 
possible to detect signs of forward-moving trade liberalization at the WTO, even in 
the absence of movement under the Doha Work Program. This was the case most 
recently of an expanded agreement on government procurement (eluded to above), 
and is now looking increasingly likely for trade in services. In fact, there are a number 
of areas where some sort of agreement is looking more than probable outside the 
constraints posed by the Single Undertaking, such as trade facilitation, a South-
South agreement on duty free and quota free access for LDCs, even reform of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. Members, it seems, have increasingly come to 
see the Single Undertaking as a debilitating straight jacket that must be thrown off if 
anything is to be achieved in Geneva. 
 
As a piece of political-economy orthodoxy, the bicycle theory contends that where the 
process of trade liberalization ceases moving forward, the global trading system 
inevitably succumbs to a rise in protectionism and a tendency for those countries that 
had traditionally shown leadership in trade negotiations, to become increasingly 
inward-looking. Although we have seen a rise in protectionism over the last few years 
since the economic crisis, this was invariably part of a broader, knee-jerk reaction by 
policymakers and trade ministry officials to the domestic micro- and macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
more historically authentic source, see: Richard N. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, Oxford at the Clarendon 
Press, 1956.  
151 The TTIP and the TPP are reported as each covering approximately 40 percent and 60 percent of global GDP, 
see:  The Washington Post article dated 8 July  2009 entitled "Talks over a huge U.S.‐Europe trade deal start this 
week. Here’s what you need to know" at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/08/talks‐over‐a‐huge‐u‐s‐europe‐trade‐deal‐
start‐this‐week‐heres‐what‐you‐need‐to‐know/ (visited on 1 August 2013); see also USTR press release dated 25 
September 2008 entitled "Trans‐Pacific Partners and United States Launch FTA Negotiations", at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/trans‐pacific‐partners‐and‐united‐states‐launch‐fta‐negotiations (visited on 1 August 2013). 
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impacts of the crisis, rather than a symptom of the failure to achieve positive 
outcomes under the Doha process. 
 
3.2. The WTO is not a development organization 
A little over a year after the collapse of the Cancun ministerial meeting in September 
2003, when many people's faith in the development-centricity of the Doha Round was 
starting to fray considerably, a very interesting paper was published by Joseph 
Stieglitz and Andrew Charlton, entitled "The Development Round of Trade 
Negotiations In The Aftermath of Cancun".152 Although this report contains a number 
of erroneous assumptions and naïve assertions153, its value was and remains the fact 
that it highlights, in easily understandable terms, what the Doha Work Program would 
look like if developing countries' interest were truly at the heart of the agenda. By the 
same token, the paper succeeded in pointing out just how far from such an agenda 
the emphasis of the Doha round had strayed. Thus it is, they argue, that if Doha were 
genuinely about the interests of developing countries, then its primary focus would be 
on reducing trade barriers to exports of labor-intensive goods (particularly textiles 
and processed foods) as well as agricultural commodities. In the area of services, a 
development round would logically have to prioritize the movement of workers in 
lower-skilled vocations such as maritime and construction, and provide easier access 
to labor markets in developed countries for developing-country workers in 
professions of obvious export interest to them, such as computer programmers, 
nurses, etc.154 Surely by the time of the cotton fiasco at Cancun and the emptiness of 
the commitments on this issue that emerged from the July 2004 package, it should 
have been obvious to everyone that the Doha Round was as little about genuinely 
addressing the needs of developing countries as previous rounds had been.155 
 
This is admittedly not an indictment of the Organization itself, but rather those who 
continue to misunderstand the true nature of the WTO and the treaty framework that 
                                                            
152 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, The Development Round of Trade Negotiations In The Aftermath of 
Cancun, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, available at: 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01132 (visited on 2 August 2013). 
153 For example, the paper asserts that the need to put the interests of developing countries' at the center of the 
negotiating agenda was the result of "a renewed spirit of collective responsibility for the challenges faced by poor 
countries, and also as a response to the perceived inequities generated by previous rounds of trade negotiations" 
(p. 2). As Blustein (op. cit.) has convincingly laid out, the focus on development was both an attempt by Mike 
Moore to "rebrand" the Organization in the aftermath of Seattle, and a (somewhat cynical) negotiating tactic in 
order to get reluctant developing countries to abandon their insistence on focusing on implementation issues 
and agree to the launch of a new round at Doha. 
154 See Stieglitz and Charlton (op. cit.) at p. 3. 
155 See for example, Timothy E. Josling, Stefan Tangermann and T.k. Warley, Agriculture in the GATT, MacMillan 
Press, 1996. 
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preceded it, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. It is true that both the 
preamble to the GATT and the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization explicitly and deliberately mention that one of the objectives pursued by 
these initiatives was and continues to be "raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand".156 It is equally true that the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement goes 
even further by stating "there is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries and especially the least developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of the their 
economic development".157 Nevertheless, this should in no way be misconstrued by 
anyone as meaning that the WTO is intrinsically geared towards achieving 
development outcomes. After all, the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement also 
speaks of "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment"158, but nobody in their right minds would ever contend that the WTO is 
an environmental organization.159 Economic growth was always one of the intended 
benefits (perhaps even the principle objective) of both the GATT and the WTO, and it 
was always to be achieved first and foremost by lowering trade barriers and 
eliminating discrimination in general (and not primarily for the benefit of developing 
countries). Whether or not this process serves the interests of developing countries 
was always going to be contingent on developing countries themselves and how well 
they understood and effectively managed to co-opt the organization's processes and 
dynamics to suit their own ends.160 This last assertion might sound somewhat callous 
and probably ignores to a certain extent the distribution of power underlying how the 
WTO conducts its business, but the haphazard fashion in which many developing 
countries approach their membership of the WTO in many ways makes them their 
own worst enemies. 
 
Nobody should mistake the fact that international economic policy and trade 
negotiations are a contact sport. The WTO is little more than the referee. Those 
countries that allocate sufficient political capital, personnel, technical expertise and 
                                                            
156 Second recital of the Preamble to the GATT. 
157 Third recital of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. 
158 First recital of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. 
159 In fact many would (incorrectly) contend just the opposite. 
160 Some would even argue that the kind of policy constraints imposed by WTO rules are even inimical to the 
process of development; see for example, Ha‐Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective, Anthem Press, 2002; or more recently, Joe Studwell, How Asia Works: Success and Failure 
in the World's Most Dynamic Region, Grove Press, 2013. 
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monetary resources to playing this game seriously will do better than those countries 
that do not. To be sure, many developing countries and LDCs in particular are not in 
a position - due to considerable resource constraints - to pay proper attention to what 
is going on at the WTO, but this is not due to some failure on the part of the WTO as 
an organization. Rather this is just the nature of the world we live in, where some 
people and countries are endowed with more and others have less. We do not 
bemoan the fact that no LDC has ever won the World Cup, we just accept that this is 
probably due to the fact that other countries - including large developing countries - 
are just much better resourced and thus better able to consistently field strong 
teams.161 Do we blame FIFA for this "injustice"? Of course not. Despite their resource 
constraints, and the myriad of more pressing policy priorities that developing 
countries and LDCs face, there are arguably many ways for them to be more 
effective at the WTO than they have been before and during the Doha Round.  
 
The haphazard way in which the Cotton 4 approached this issue is a glaring 
example: If they had pursued a dual track of litigation AND negotiation, they would 
arguably at least be hundreds of millions of dollars richer by now, rather than just 
disgruntled.162 
 
This said, it is important not to conclude that the WTO is an organization that cannot 
achieve development outcomes, since it can and does. But it should be borne in 
mind that development is only likely to become the WTO's primary focus once 
developing countries start writing the work programs for future negotiating rounds, 
rather than letting developed countries do this for them (which is what happened at 
Doha). Whether developed countries will let developing countries do this is another 
matter entirely, and will of course depend on what developing countries are prepared 
to give developed countries in return for this. After all, the WTO is nothing if not a tit-
for-tat organization, a negotiating forum, a place where countries exchange 
concessions. 
 
                                                            
161 The FIFA World Cup has only ever been won by the following eight national teams: Brazil, Italy, Germany, 
Argentina, Uruguay, France, Spain, England; LDCs appear to qualify quite infrequently, but have started to do so 
more commonly over the last 2 decades; see: David Arscott , The World Cup, A Very Peculiar History, Salariya, 
2012.  
162 Brazil doggedly litigated against the US cotton subsidies and refused to simply let the US off the hook, so that 
in the end, the US ended up agreeing to pay USD 147.3 million to Brazilian cotton farmers, a most unusual 
remedy for the WTO; see:  Randy Schnepf, Brazil's WTO Case Against the U. S. Cotton Program, Congressional 
Research Service, 2010, at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32571.pdf  (visited on 2 August 2013).  
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3.3. Things the WTO does well 
It should be relatively clear to most observers that as the former Director General 
Mike Moore liked to repeat, the dispute settlement system is undoubtedly the jewel in 
the Organization's crown. Compared to the gridlock that the GATT system of dispute 
settlement succumbed to when the US tried (unsuccessfully) to use it in the 1980s to 
pry open European agricultural markets that had been closed by the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the WTO's dispute settlement system is a remarkable piece of 
international treaty making and has served its purpose surprisingly well. Only a 
limited number of disgruntled elements would probably argue that the dispute 
settlement system needs a radical shakeup beyond a bit of tinkering at the margins, 
as is currently going on in the negotiations on dispute settlement reform. Although 
there have been a limited number of cases that have shown what the limits of the 
dispute settlement system are in forcing countries to make changes that are 
politically difficult for them, overall, it is probably safe to say that the consensus is 
certainly leaning in favor of preserving and strengthening the dispute settlement 
function of the WTO. 
 
Another thing that the WTO has proven exceedingly useful for is monitoring how 
Members are doing in terms of implementing their commitments. This happens under 
various instruments, the most prominent of which would have to be the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism, which subjects all WTO Members to a periodic review of their 
trade regimes and their compliance with WTO rules. Another more recent innovation 
in this area has been the trade monitoring reports, one of which is performed by the 
Secretariat alone and covers "trade-related developments covering the whole WTO 
membership and observers", the other of which the WTO does in collaboration with 
the OECD and UNCTAD, and which focuses on "trade and investment measures 
taken by G-20 economies".163 Finally, the various committee meetings that take place 
under the specific mandates set forth in different WTO agreements are also a very 
useful forum for Members to monitor and discuss trade related issues. One example 
of this (among many) is the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, which meets 
regularly by virtue of Art. 13 of the TBT Agreement. At these meetings, 
representatives from WTO Members can raise trade-related concerns of activities by 
other Members who have enacted or plan to enact technical regulations, standards 
or conformity assessment procedures that threaten to have a trade impact on exports 
of interest to them. Thus it was that at the meeting of the TBT Committee that took 
                                                            
163 See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/trade_monitoring_e.htm (visited on 2 August 2013).  
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place on 27-28 November 2012, Members discussed thirty-six different new and 
recurring trade concerns, including a proposal to introduce plain packaging for 
tobacco products in New Zealand, and import permit regulations for horticultural 
products from the Ministries of Agriculture and Trade in Indonesia.164 Thus monitoring 
is undoubtedly an important function of the WTO that nobody would wish to see 
abolished. 
 
Another area where there is arguably a large degree of consensus among 
economists, trade lawyers and policy makers is that a number of issues exist where 
negotiations only really make sense when done at the multilateral level and thus at 
the WTO, the most important of which would have to be subsidies. After all, there is 
no reason to negotiate reductions in subsidies vis-à-vis a single trading partner and 
to make difficult political-economy cuts to such programs when they will ultimately do 
little more than improve the market access of another subsidizing country not party to 
the same reduction commitments. The same is arguably true for rules on intellectual 
property rights, prudential regulations, currency manipulation, trade-related 
environmental measures and a myriad other economic policy areas that are 
susceptible to international arbitrage as economic actors seek out jurisdictions with 
the lowest possible compliance costs. On issues such as these, we need an 
international organization that can act as a forum for negotiations that deliver 
enforceable outcomes, and we are in fact lucky to already have one in the form of the 
WTO (at least for some of these issues).  
 
Finally, the thing that the WTO does well is balancing out (to an admittedly limited 
albeit very real extent) the power asymmetries that naturally arise when big, 
economically powerful and well-organized countries come to the same negotiating 
table as small, economically weaker and less well-organized countries. Think of the 
miss-match in economic strength and trade policy expertise that is at play when a 
developing country like the Philippines negotiates an economic partnership 
agreement with Japan, or Columbia negotiates an FTA with the Unites States. It is 
arguably power imbalances such as these that allow the EU to get away with 
concluding preferential trading arrangements with many smaller trading partners that 
explicitly carve out important areas like contingency protection from the dispute 
settlement provisions of these agreements. The "victory" that developing countries 
scored over the EU at Cancun, ultimately forcing Pascal Lamy to abandon any of the 
                                                            
164 See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 27‐28 November 2012 
(G/TBT/M/58). 
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Singapore Issues except the one that developing countries were favorable to would 
be unthinkable in a more limited setting where one or a handful of developing 
countries face off against the EU as the sole hegemon in the room. The ability of the 
WTO to create a more level playing field (an admittedly tired and over-used cliché) 
for developed and developing countries has been analyzed and documented in a 
number of articles including a very insightful one by Cristina Davis in 2005, that 
compares the differences in outcomes between Vietnamese catfish exporters (when 
Vietnam was not yet in the WTO) and Peruvian exporters of sardines when faced 
with trade barriers in rich-country export markets.165 The WTO undoubtedly still has 
its uses in this respect and we cannot afford to do without it. 
 
Conclusion 
As WTO Members shuffle hesitantly towards Bali, prospects remain unsure as to 
whether this will finally be the Ministerial Conference that draws a line in the sand 
and thrusts a stake into the heart of the Doha Round, thus terminating it for good, or 
whether we are in for more drama-laden histrionics and the frustration of yet another 
collapse, or whether this meeting will be used to consolidate the progress made up to 
now and put the Organization back on a path towards achieving some modest albeit 
positive outcomes. The truth is that nobody really knows what will transpire at Bali, 
and the language coming out of Geneva, particularly the statements of the US 
Ambassador Michael Punke, give one little enough reason for optimism.166 
 
To be sure, the new Director General Roberto Azavedo and his team can impart 
fresh new momentum and steer the Bali meeting and ultimately the Doha Round to a 
positive outcome. It will be interesting to observe how the new DG and his team use 
the limited time they have in office before the Bali meeting commences, but it will 
undoubtedly be a mixture of managing expectations while trying to edge Members 
towards consensus. In many ways this is slightly reminiscent of the Tokyo Round, 
which also largely took place through troubled economic times and which failed to 
achieve outcomes in a few important areas, such as agriculture and safeguards. 
                                                            
165 Christina l. Davis, Do WTO rules create a level playing field? Lessons from the experience of Peru and Vietnam, 
in: John S. Odell (ed.), Negotiating Trade, Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 219 ‐ 256. 
166 See Statement by U.S. Ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke at a Meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee at the World Trade Organization dated 11 April 2013 at: http://www.ustr.gov/about‐us/press‐
office/speeches/transcripts/2013/april/amb‐punke‐statement‐wto‐tnc; this statement was followed a couple of 
months later with one only slightly more optimistic, see Statement by Ambassador Michael Punke at a Meeting 
of the World Trade Organization's Trade Negotiations Committee dated 22 July 2013, at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/about‐us/press‐office/speeches/transcripts/2013/july/amb‐punke‐WTO‐tnc (visited on 3 
August 2013).  
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Nevertheless, GATT Contracting Parties and the GATT Director General Olivier Long 
were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat and conclude the round with some 
notable successes.167 It is more than remotely likely that history will repeat itself here, 
and that Bali may just provide the impetus needed to finally put all of us out of our 
Doha-related misery.  
                                                            
167 See, Gilbert R. Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, Princeton University Press, 
1986. 
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East Asian economic integration in wide-ranging policy areas. ERIA works closely 
with both the ASEAN Secretariat and 16 research institutes to undertake and 
disseminate policy research and provide analytical policy recommendations to 
Leaders and Ministers at their regional meetings. Capacity building aimed at 
strengthening policy research capacities, especially in the less developed countries, 
is another important issue for ERIA. ERIA conducts its research under three pillars: 
‘Deepening Economic Integration’, ‘Narrowing Development Gaps’, and ‘Sustainable 
Development’. Research covers a wide range of policy areas, such as trade and 
investment, globalization, and SME promotion, human resource and infrastructure 
development, as well as energy and environment issues. ERIA organizes seminars 
and symposia with the aim of nurturing a sense of community in the region, seeking 
inputs from stakeholders, as well as disseminating ERIA-related research findings. 
Under the broad mandates from East Asia Summits, ASEAN Summits and related 
Ministerial Meetings, ERIA has been providing policy recommendations on various 
occasions to stimulate economic growth, deepen regional integration and strengthen 
partnerships in East Asia. For more information, see http://www.eria.org/. 
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UPH 
Established in 1994, Universitas Pelita Harapan (UPH) has quickly become one of 
Indonesia’s leading institutions of higher learning and the country’s top-ranked 
private university. While consistently underlining the vision of ‘knowledge, faith and 
character’, UPH, in cooperation with overseas partner universities, has developed a 
very rich curriculum in many areas of study, ensuring that its graduates are respected 
globally and appreciated by modern business and industries. UPH has expanded 
strategic partnerships with prestigious overseas universities, which include the 
National University of Singapore, Queensland University of Technology and Murdoch 
University in Australia, Biola University in the United States, Ilmenau University of 
Technology in Germany, Xiamen University in China, as well as, most recently, the 
World Trade Institute at the University of Bern, in Switzerland, with whom it has 
developed a highly innovative new Masters programme in International Trade, 
Investment and Competition (MTIC) through funding from the Swiss State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs (SECO). UPH has also entered into partnerships with leading 
multinational and national companies, such as Microsoft, Intel, Toshiba, Matahari, 
Multipolar, and Lippo Karawaci. Such cooperation aims at ensuring that the 
University’s learning concepts, curriculum and infrastructure are always up to date 
and enriched by state-of-the-art technology and business practices. UPH is 
committed to providing excellent holistic education and learning, supported by world-
class facilities, technology, and infrastructure. UPH graduates have been well 
received by other universities and major corporations both in Indonesia and in other 
countries. UPH is currently establishing a Global Campus, with international 
programmes and e-learning systems supported by a Digital Smart-Campus. For 
more information, see http://www.uph.edu/. 
 
WTI 
The World Trade Institute (WTI) is a centre of excellence of the University of Bern, 
Switzerland. Established in 1999, it is one of the world’s leading academic institutions 
dedicated to the regulation of international trade. The WTI transcends boundaries by 
fusing law, economics and international relations in interdisciplinary research, training, 
advisory work and technical assistance in Switzerland and abroad. The WTI was the 
first, and is the most experienced institution in the world offering a specialized 
postgraduate degree in the law and economics of international trade regulation, 
through its flagship Master of International Law and Economics (MILE) program. The 
WTI also hosts a multidisciplinary Doctoral School of Economic Globalization and 
Integration. Students benefit from the Institute’s global faculty, consisting of leading 
scholars and practitioners drawn from the ranks of the world’s most prominent 
universities, policy research institutions, law firms and international organizations. 
The WTI aims to equip students with the practical skills and knowledge to meet the 
ever evolving challenges of global governance. The WTI pursues different lines of 
activity in the fields of research, training, and advisory services. Tailor-made courses 
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and consulting for professionals from Ministries, organizations and private industry 
are based on cutting edge policy research. The WTI cooperates closely with the 
University of Bern’s Department of Economic Law, with which it shares its premises. 
As host institution of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade 
Regulation, the WTI is also at the core of a global research network connecting our 
students to researchers, practitioners and our own alumni in the field. Its purpose is 
to develop innovative policy recommendations, which reflect a better balance 
between economic and other regulatory objectives. For more information, see 
www.wti.org. 
 
THE ROAD TO BALI:
ERIA Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) forthcoming Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali comes at a critical 
juncture for the multilateral trade body, long mired in the Doha Round stalemate. Beyond offering a critical 
rst test at consensus-building and institutional renewal, the Bali Ministerial affords a unique opportunity 
to gauge contrasting perceptions across ASEAN and East Asian countries of the continued relevance of 
the WTO to trade and economic governance within the region and beyond.
Resulting from the collaborative efforts of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia 
(ERIA), the Universitas Pelita Harapan (UPH) and the World Trade Institute at the University of Bern (WTI), 
this policy research initiative offers comparative scholarship on some of the key questions arising from the 
forthcoming WTO Ministerial gathering from an East Asian perspective. Specically, it explores what 
scholars in the region expect the Bali Ministerial to produce by way of tangible outcomes and whether the 
Ministerial will restore the momentum needed to bring the Doha Round to a successful conclusion. 
Contributors also investigate how relevant the WTO remains to the multiple processes of deepening 
economic integration in ASEAN and East Asia (e.g. AEC, TPP, RCEP) and, importantly, what lessons in 
rule-design and market opening WTO Members could usefully draw from the ongoing march towards the 
establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community.   
